Simulation modeling in political science

American Behavioral Scientist

Volumn 42, Issue 10, 1999, Pages 1509-1530

  Johnson, Paul E ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 22644451774     PISSN: 00027642     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/00027649921957865     Document Type: Article

References (99)

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