Nucleus and shield: The evolution of social structure in the iterated prisoner's dilemma

American Sociological Review

Volumn 61, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 278-307

  Lomborg, Bjørn ^a  

^a AARHUS UNIVERSITY   (Denmark)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001135281     PISSN: 00031224     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2096335     Document Type: Article

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