An Introduction to Applicable Game Theory

Journal of Economic Perspectives

Volumn 11, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 127-149

  Gibbons, Robert ^a,b  

^a The Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management   (United States)

^b NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001350108     PISSN: 08953309     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/jep.11.1.127     Document Type: Article

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