Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 89, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 165-185

  Dekel, Eddie ^a,b   Fudenberg, Drew ^c   Levine, David K ^d  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^c HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001279276     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1999.2576     Document Type: Article

References (25)

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