Signalling and adaptive learning in an entry limit pricing game

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 28, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 662-683

  Cooper, David J ^a   Garvin, Susan ^a   Kagel, John H ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031319725     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2555781     Document Type: Article

References (30)

1. AUMANN, R. AND BRANDENBURGER, A. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium." Econometrica, Vol. 63 (1995), pp. 1161-1180.
2. BAGWELL, K. AND RAMEY, G. "Advertising and Limit Pricing." RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 19 (1988), pp. 59-71.
3. BANKS, J.S. AND SOBEL, J. "Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games." Econometrica, Vol. 55 (1987), pp. 647-661.
4. BRANDTS, J. AND HOLT, C.A. "An Experimental Test of Equilibrium Dominance in Signaling Games." American Economic Review, Vol. 82 (1992), pp. 1350-1365.
5. _ AND _. "Adjustment Patterns and Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Signaling Games." International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 22 (1993), pp. 279-302.
6. _ AND _. "Naive Bayesian Learning and Adjustment to Equilibrium in Signaling Games." Mimeo, 1994.
7. BROWN, G.W. "Iterative Solutions of Games by Fictitious Play." In T.C. Koopmans, ed., Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation. New York: Wiley, 1951.
8. CHO, I. "Equilibrium Analysis of Entry Deterrence: A Reexamination." Unpublished manuscript, University of Chicago, 1987.
9. _ AND KREPS, D. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria." Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 102 (1987), pp. 179-221.
10. COOPER, D.J., GARVIN, S., AND KAGEL, J.H. "Signalling and Adaptive Learning in an Entry Limit Pricing Game." Mimeo, University of Pittsburgh, 1995.
11. _, AND _. "Adaptive Learning versus Equilibrium Refinements in an Entry Limit Pricing Game." Economic Journal, Vol. 107 (1997), pp. 553-575.
12. FRIEDMAN, J. "On Entry Preventing Behavior and Limit Price Models of Entry." In S. Brams, A. Schotter, and G. Schwodiauer, eds., Applied Game Theory. Wurzburg: Physica-Verlag, 1979.
13. FUDENBERG, D. AND LEVINE, D.K. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium." Econometrica, Vol. 61 (1993), pp. 523-546.
14. _ AND _. Theory of Learning in Games. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, forthcoming.
15. GARVIN, S. "Experiments in Entry Deterrence." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1993.
16. GROSSMAN, S. AND PERRY, M. "Sequential Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information." Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 39 (1986), pp. 120-154.
17. JUNG, Y.J., KAGEL, J.H., AND LEVIN, D. "On the Existence of Predatory Pricing: An Experimental Study of Reputation and Entry Deterrence in the Chain Store Game." RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 25 (1994), pp. 72-93.
18. KADIYALI, V. "Entry, Its Deterrence, and Its Accommodation: A Study of the U.S. Photographic Film Industry." RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 27 (1996), pp. 452-478.
19. KREPS, D.M. AND WILSON, R. "Sequential Equilibria." Econometrica, Vol. 50 (1982), pp. 853-894.
20. MAILATH, G., OKUNO-FUJIWARA, M., AND POSTLEWAITE, A. "Belief-Based Refinements in Signalling Games." Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 60 (1993), pp. 241-276.
21. MILGROM, P. AND ROBERTS, J. "Limit Pricing and Entry Under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis." Econometrica, Vol. 50 (1982), pp. 443-459.
22. _ AND _. "Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality." Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94 (1986), pp. 796-821.
23. MILLER, R.M. AND PLOTT, C.R. "Product Quality Signaling in Experimental Markets." Econometrica, Vol. 53 (1985), pp. 837-872.
24. MIYASAWA, K. "On the Convergence of the Learning Process in a 2×2 Non-zero-sum Game.× Econometric Research Program, Research Memorandum #33, Princeton University, 1961.
25. NÖLDEKE, G. AND SAMUELSON, L. "Learning to Signal in Markets." SSRI paper #9409, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1994.
26. PARTOW, Z. AND SCHOTTER, A. "Does Game Theory Predict Well for the Wrong Reasons: An Experimental Investigation." RR # 93-46, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University, 1993.
27. RILEY, J.G. "Informational Equilibrium." Econometrica, Vol. 78 (1979), pp. 331-359.
28. ROBINSON, J. "An Iterative Method of Solving a Game." Annals of Mathematics, Vol. 54 (1951), pp. 296-301.
29. ROTH, A.E. AND MALOUF, M.W.K. "Game Theoretic Models and the Role of Information in Bargaining: An Experimental Study." Psychological Review, Vol. 86 (1979), pp. 574-594.
30. SHAPLEY, L. "Some Topics in Two-Person Games." Advances in Game Theory, Annals of Mathematical Studies, Vol. 5 (1964), pp. 1-28.