Reinforcement-based vs. Belief-based learning models in experimental asymmetric-information games

Econometrica

Volumn 68, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 605-641

  Feltovich, Nick ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON   (United States)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Calibration; Equilibrium; Learning; Model comparison; Zero sum game

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001283474     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00125     Document Type: Article

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