On the origin of convention: Evidence from coordination games

Economic Journal

Volumn 107, Issue 442, 1997, Pages 576-596

  Van Huyck, John B ^a   Battalio, Raymond C ^a   Rankin, Frederick W ^a  

^a TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000257192     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.1997.tb00028.x     Document Type: Article

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