Vacancy Chains and Equilibration in Senior-Level Labor Markets

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 76, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 362-411

  Blum, Yosef ^a   Roth, Alvin E ^b   Rothblum, Uriel G ^a  

^a TECHNION ISRAEL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Israel)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000997861     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1997.2307     Document Type: Article

References (39)

1. Abbott A. Vacancy models for historical data. Social Mobility and Social Structure. 1990;Cambridge University Press. p. 80-102.
2. Abeledo H, Rothblum U. G. Courtship and linear programming. Linear Algebra Its Appl. 1993.
3. H. Abeledo, U. G. Rothblum, 1992, Paths to marriage stability.
4. S. Barbera, B. Dutta, 1991, Protective behaviour in matching Modelsm, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona.
5. E. Bennett, 1991, Entry, divorce and re-marriage in matching markets.
6. Bergstrom T., Bagnoli M. Courtship as a waiting game. J. Polit. Econ. 101:1993;185-202.
7. Y. Blum, U. G. Rothblum, 1994, Timing is everything' and marital bliss.
8. Crawford V. P. Comparative statics in matching markets. J. Econ. Theory. 54:1991;389-400.
9. Crawford V. P., Knoer E. M. Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers. Econometrica. 49:1981;437-450.
10. Demange G., Gale D., Sotomayor M. O. A. A further note on the stable matching problem. Discrete Appl. Math. 16:1987;217-222.
11. Dubins L. E., Freedman D. A. Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley algorithm. Amer. Math. Monthly. 88:1981;485-494.
12. Gale D., Shapley L. S. College admissions and the stability of marriages. Amer. Math. Monthly. 69:1962;9-15.
13. Gale D., Sotomayor M. O. A. Some remarks on the stable marriage problem. Discrete Appl. Math. 11:1985;223-232.
14. Gibbons R., Katz L. Layoffs and lemons. J. Labor Econ. 9:1991;351-380.
15. Gibbons R., Murphy K. J. Optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career concerns: Theory and evidence. J. Polit. Econ. 100:1992;468-505.
16. Granovetter M. Getting a Job. 1974;Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
17. Granovetter M. Afterword: Reconsiderations and a New Agenda, Getting a Job. 1995;University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
18. Holmstrom B., Milgrom P. The firm as an incentive system. Amer. Econ. Rev. 84:Sept. 1994;972-991.
19. Kelso A. S. Jr. Job matching, coalition formation, and gross substitutes. Econometrica. 50:1982;1483-1504.
20. Knuth D. E. Mariages Stables. 1976;Les Presses de l'Universite Montreal, Montreal.
21. McVitie D., Wilson L. B. Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets. BIT. 10:1970;295-309.
22. Mo J-p. Entry and structures of interest groups in assignment games. J. Econ. Theory. 46:1988;66-96.
23. Mongell S., Roth A. E. Amer. Econ. Rev. 81:1991;441-464.
24. Pollak R. A. For better or worse: The roles of power in models of distribution within marriage. Amer. Econ. Rev. Papers and Proceedings. 84:May 1994;148-152.
25. Roth A. E. The economics of matching: Stability and incentives. Math. of Oper. Res. 7:1982;617-628.
26. Roth A. E. The evolution of the labor market for medical interns and residents: A case study in game theory. J. Polit. Econ. 92:1984;991-1016.
27. Roth A. E. Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage model. J. Econ. Theory. 36:1984;383-387.
28. Roth A. E. On the allocation of residents to rural hospitals: A general property of two-sided matching markets. Econometrica. 54:1986;425-427.
29. Roth A. E. New physicians: A natural experiment in market organization. Science. 250:1990;1524-1528.
30. Roth A. E. A natural experiment in the organization of entry level labor markets: Regional markets for new physicians and surgeons in the U.K. Amer. Econ. Rev. 81:1991;415-440.
31. A. E. Roth, The information requirements of strategic behavior in labor markets and other matching processes.
32. Roth A. E., Sotomayor M. O. A. Two Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. Econometric Society Monograph Series. 1990;Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge.
33. Roth A. E., Vande Vate J. H. Random paths to stability in two sided matching. Econometrica. 58:1990;1475-1480.
34. Roth A. E., Vande Vate J. H. Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms. Econ. Theory. 1:1991;31-44.
35. Roth A. E., Xing X. Jumping the gun: Imperfections and institutions related to the timing of market transactions. Amer. Econ. Rev. 84:1994;992-1044.
36. Roth A. E., Xing X. Turnaround time and bottlenecks in market clearing: Decentralized matching in the market for clinical psychologists. J. Polit. Econ. 105:1997;284-329.
37. Smith D. R. A labor market perspective on the mobility of college football coaches. Social Forces. 61:1983;1147-1167.
38. Sotomayor M. O. A. A non-constructive elementary proof of the existence of stable marriages. Games Econ. Behav. 13:1996;135-137.
39. White H. C. Chains of Opportunity: System Models of Mobility in Organizations. 1970;Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge.