Capabilities, perception, and escalation

American Political Science Review

Volumn 91, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 15-27

  Bueno De Mesquita, Bruce ^a   Morrow, James D ^a   Zorick, Ethan R ^b  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031286121     PISSN: 00030554     EISSN: 15375943     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2952256     Document Type: Article

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