Variations on a theme: The conceptualization of deterrence in Israeli strategic thinking

Security Studies

Volumn 7, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 145-181

  Bar Joseph, Uri ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HAIFA   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0009219127     PISSN: 09636412     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09636419808429353     Document Type: Article

References (140)

1. Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 11. For a similar definition see Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 83. Others (for example, Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis [Beverly Hills: Sage, 1983], 29-30), tend to emphasize the military aspects of this concept.
2. Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 11. For a similar definition see Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 83. Others (for example, Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis [Beverly Hills: Sage, 1983], 29-30), tend to emphasize the military aspects of this concept.
3. Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 11. For a similar definition see Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 83. Others (for example, Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis [Beverly Hills: Sage, 1983], 29-30), tend to emphasize the military aspects of this concept.
4. See, for example: Paul K. Huth and Bruce Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980," World Politics 36, no. 4 (July 1984): 496-526; Paul K. Huth, "The Extended Deterrent Value of Nuclear Weapons," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 34, no. 2, (June 1990): 270-90.
5. See, for example: Paul K. Huth and Bruce Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980," World Politics 36, no. 4 (July 1984): 496-526; Paul K. Huth, "The Extended Deterrent Value of Nuclear Weapons," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 34, no. 2, (June 1990): 270-90.
6. Israel accepted the territorial status quo at each stage of the Arab-Israeli conflict. During the British Mandate the Jewish Yishuv accepted the 1937 Peel Plan for the partition of Palestine, and then the UN Partition Plan of 1947. Israel, moreover, accepted the territorial status quo in the aftermath of the 1948 war, and was satisfied with its territorial gains in the wars of 1956 and 1967. The Arabs, on the other hand, played the revisionist part throughout the conflict. The Palestinians rejected the partition plans of 1937 and 1947, and the Arab states refused to accept the territorial outcomes of the wars that followed. The only major exception to Israel's tendency to accept the present territorial status quo occurred during the 1949 Israeli-Transjordanian armistice negotiations. Israel - which at that stage of the war was at the height of its military superiority over the Arabs - used an already prepared military operation aimed at occupying the entire West Bank in order to pressure Transjordan to agree to more limited Israeli territorial concessions. For a discussion of this episode, see: Uri Bar-Joseph, The But of Enemies: Israel and Transjordan in the War of 1948 (London: Frank Cass, 1987), 206-13; Jon and David Kimche, Both Sides of the Hill: Britain and the Palestine War (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1960), 265-272; IIan Pappe, Britain and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: 1948-1951 (New York: St. Martin's, 1988), 180-82; and Avi Shlaim, The Politics of Partition: King Abdullah, the Zionists and Palestine, 1921-1951 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 290-300. Politically, Israel's strategic goal since 1948 was to end the conflict by political means. As long as this goal was deemed impossible, however, Israel was ready to accept the continuation of the political status quo rather than use force to compel the Arabs to a political settlement. The only exception is the political and military pressure employed by Israel in 1983 in order to oblige the Christian government of Amin Jumail in Lebanon to sign a formal peace agreement. The failure of this agreement has decreased any Israeli tendency to take a similar course of action in the future.
7. Israel accepted the territorial status quo at each stage of the Arab-Israeli conflict. During the British Mandate the Jewish Yishuv accepted the 1937 Peel Plan for the partition of Palestine, and then the UN Partition Plan of 1947. Israel, moreover, accepted the territorial status quo in the aftermath of the 1948 war, and was satisfied with its territorial gains in the wars of 1956 and 1967. The Arabs, on the other hand, played the revisionist part throughout the conflict. The Palestinians rejected the partition plans of 1937 and 1947, and the Arab states refused to accept the territorial outcomes of the wars that followed. The only major exception to Israel's tendency to accept the present territorial status quo occurred during the 1949 Israeli-Transjordanian armistice negotiations. Israel - which at that stage of the war was at the height of its military superiority over the Arabs - used an already prepared military operation aimed at occupying the entire West Bank in order to pressure Transjordan to agree to more limited Israeli territorial concessions. For a discussion of this episode, see: Uri Bar-Joseph, The But of Enemies: Israel and Transjordan in the War of 1948 (London: Frank Cass, 1987), 206-13; Jon and David Kimche, Both Sides of the Hill: Britain and the Palestine War (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1960), 265-272; IIan Pappe, Britain and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: 1948-1951 (New York: St. Martin's, 1988), 180-82; and Avi Shlaim, The Politics of Partition: King Abdullah, the Zionists and Palestine, 1921-1951 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 290-300. Politically, Israel's strategic goal since 1948 was to end the conflict by political means. As long as this goal was deemed impossible, however, Israel was ready to accept the continuation of the political status quo rather than use force to compel the Arabs to a political settlement. The only exception is the political and military pressure employed by Israel in 1983 in order to oblige the Christian government of Amin Jumail in Lebanon to sign a formal peace agreement. The failure of this agreement has decreased any Israeli tendency to take a similar course of action in the future.
8. Israel accepted the territorial status quo at each stage of the Arab-Israeli conflict. During the British Mandate the Jewish Yishuv accepted the 1937 Peel Plan for the partition of Palestine, and then the UN Partition Plan of 1947. Israel, moreover, accepted the territorial status quo in the aftermath of the 1948 war, and was satisfied with its territorial gains in the wars of 1956 and 1967. The Arabs, on the other hand, played the revisionist part throughout the conflict. The Palestinians rejected the partition plans of 1937 and 1947, and the Arab states refused to accept the territorial outcomes of the wars that followed. The only major exception to Israel's tendency to accept the present territorial status quo occurred during the 1949 Israeli-Transjordanian armistice negotiations. Israel - which at that stage of the war was at the height of its military superiority over the Arabs - used an already prepared military operation aimed at occupying the entire West Bank in order to pressure Transjordan to agree to more limited Israeli territorial concessions. For a discussion of this episode, see: Uri Bar-Joseph, The But of Enemies: Israel and Transjordan in the War of 1948 (London: Frank Cass, 1987), 206-13; Jon and David Kimche, Both Sides of the Hill: Britain and the Palestine War (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1960), 265-272; IIan Pappe, Britain and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: 1948-1951 (New York: St. Martin's, 1988), 180-82; and Avi Shlaim, The Politics of Partition: King Abdullah, the Zionists and Palestine, 1921-1951 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 290-300. Politically, Israel's strategic goal since 1948 was to end the conflict by political means. As long as this goal was deemed impossible, however, Israel was ready to accept the continuation of the political status quo rather than use force to compel the Arabs to a political settlement. The only exception is the political and military pressure employed by Israel in 1983 in order to oblige the Christian government of Amin Jumail in Lebanon to sign a formal peace agreement. The failure of this agreement has decreased any Israeli tendency to take a similar course of action in the future.
9. Israel accepted the territorial status quo at each stage of the Arab-Israeli conflict. During the British Mandate the Jewish Yishuv accepted the 1937 Peel Plan for the partition of Palestine, and then the UN Partition Plan of 1947. Israel, moreover, accepted the territorial status quo in the aftermath of the 1948 war, and was satisfied with its territorial gains in the wars of 1956 and 1967. The Arabs, on the other hand, played the revisionist part throughout the conflict. The Palestinians rejected the partition plans of 1937 and 1947, and the Arab states refused to accept the territorial outcomes of the wars that followed. The only major exception to Israel's tendency to accept the present territorial status quo occurred during the 1949 Israeli-Transjordanian armistice negotiations. Israel - which at that stage of the war was at the height of its military superiority over the Arabs - used an already prepared military operation aimed at occupying the entire West Bank in order to pressure Transjordan to agree to more limited Israeli territorial concessions. For a discussion of this episode, see: Uri Bar-Joseph, The But of Enemies: Israel and Transjordan in the War of 1948 (London: Frank Cass, 1987), 206-13; Jon and David Kimche, Both Sides of the Hill: Britain and the Palestine War (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1960), 265-272; IIan Pappe, Britain and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: 1948-1951 (New York: St. Martin's, 1988), 180-82; and Avi Shlaim, The Politics of Partition: King Abdullah, the Zionists and Palestine, 1921-1951 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 290-300. Politically, Israel's strategic goal since 1948 was to end the conflict by political means. As long as this goal was deemed impossible, however, Israel was ready to accept the continuation of the political status quo rather than use force to compel the Arabs to a political settlement. The only exception is the political and military pressure employed by Israel in 1983 in order to oblige the Christian government of Amin Jumail in Lebanon to sign a formal peace agreement. The failure of this agreement has decreased any Israeli tendency to take a similar course of action in the future.
10. John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), used the Arab-Israeli conflict as one of his three case studies; Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), used the failure of Israel's deterrence in 1973 as one of their two major case studies; Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), focused solely on the Israeli case. For a more recent debate on the outcomes of Israel's deterrence strategy and its causes, see: Elli Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate: Is the Dependant Variable Elusive?" Security Studies 3, no. 3 (spring 1994): 384-427; Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Rivalry," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 851-910; and Lieberman, Deterrence Theory: Success or Failure in Arab-Israeli Wars? McNair Paper 45 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, October 1995). For Stein's response to Lieberman's critique, see Janice Gross Stein, "Deterrence and Learning in an Enduring Rivalry: Egypt and Israel, 1948-73," Security Studies 6, no. 1 (autumn 1996): 104-52.
11. John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), used the Arab-Israeli conflict as one of his three case studies; Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), used the failure of Israel's deterrence in 1973 as one of their two major case studies; Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), focused solely on the Israeli case. For a more recent debate on the outcomes of Israel's deterrence strategy and its causes, see: Elli Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate: Is the Dependant Variable Elusive?" Security Studies 3, no. 3 (spring 1994): 384-427; Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Rivalry," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 851-910; and Lieberman, Deterrence Theory: Success or Failure in Arab-Israeli Wars? McNair Paper 45 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, October 1995). For Stein's response to Lieberman's critique, see Janice Gross Stein, "Deterrence and Learning in an Enduring Rivalry: Egypt and Israel, 1948-73," Security Studies 6, no. 1 (autumn 1996): 104-52.
12. John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), used the Arab-Israeli conflict as one of his three case studies; Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), used the failure of Israel's deterrence in 1973 as one of their two major case studies; Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), focused solely on the Israeli case. For a more recent debate on the outcomes of Israel's deterrence strategy and its causes, see: Elli Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate: Is the Dependant Variable Elusive?" Security Studies 3, no. 3 (spring 1994): 384-427; Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Rivalry," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 851-910; and Lieberman, Deterrence Theory: Success or Failure in Arab-Israeli Wars? McNair Paper 45 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, October 1995). For Stein's response to Lieberman's critique, see Janice Gross Stein, "Deterrence and Learning in an Enduring Rivalry: Egypt and Israel, 1948-73," Security Studies 6, no. 1 (autumn 1996): 104-52.
13. John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), used the Arab-Israeli conflict as one of his three case studies; Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), used the failure of Israel's deterrence in 1973 as one of their two major case studies; Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), focused solely on the Israeli case. For a more recent debate on the outcomes of Israel's deterrence strategy and its causes, see: Elli Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate: Is the Dependant Variable Elusive?" Security Studies 3, no. 3 (spring 1994): 384-427; Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Rivalry," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 851-910; and Lieberman, Deterrence Theory: Success or Failure in Arab-Israeli Wars? McNair Paper 45 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, October 1995). For Stein's response to Lieberman's critique, see Janice Gross Stein, "Deterrence and Learning in an Enduring Rivalry: Egypt and Israel, 1948-73," Security Studies 6, no. 1 (autumn 1996): 104-52.
14. John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), used the Arab-Israeli conflict as one of his three case studies; Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), used the failure of Israel's deterrence in 1973 as one of their two major case studies; Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), focused solely on the Israeli case. For a more recent debate on the outcomes of Israel's deterrence strategy and its causes, see: Elli Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate: Is the Dependant Variable Elusive?" Security Studies 3, no. 3 (spring 1994): 384-427; Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Rivalry," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 851-910; and Lieberman, Deterrence Theory: Success or Failure in Arab-Israeli Wars? McNair Paper 45 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, October 1995). For Stein's response to Lieberman's critique, see Janice Gross Stein, "Deterrence and Learning in an Enduring Rivalry: Egypt and Israel, 1948-73," Security Studies 6, no. 1 (autumn 1996): 104-52.
15. John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), used the Arab-Israeli conflict as one of his three case studies; Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), used the failure of Israel's deterrence in 1973 as one of their two major case studies; Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), focused solely on the Israeli case. For a more recent debate on the outcomes of Israel's deterrence strategy and its causes, see: Elli Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate: Is the Dependant Variable Elusive?" Security Studies 3, no. 3 (spring 1994): 384-427; Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Rivalry," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 851-910; and Lieberman, Deterrence Theory: Success or Failure in Arab-Israeli Wars? McNair Paper 45 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, October 1995). For Stein's response to Lieberman's critique, see Janice Gross Stein, "Deterrence and Learning in an Enduring Rivalry: Egypt and Israel, 1948-73," Security Studies 6, no. 1 (autumn 1996): 104-52.
16. John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), used the Arab-Israeli conflict as one of his three case studies; Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), used the failure of Israel's deterrence in 1973 as one of their two major case studies; Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), focused solely on the Israeli case. For a more recent debate on the outcomes of Israel's deterrence strategy and its causes, see: Elli Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate: Is the Dependant Variable Elusive?" Security Studies 3, no. 3 (spring 1994): 384-427; Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Rivalry," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 851-910; and Lieberman, Deterrence Theory: Success or Failure in Arab-Israeli Wars? McNair Paper 45 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, October 1995). For Stein's response to Lieberman's critique, see Janice Gross Stein, "Deterrence and Learning in an Enduring Rivalry: Egypt and Israel, 1948-73," Security Studies 6, no. 1 (autumn 1996): 104-52.
17. Immediate deterrence is defined as an interaction between opposing states "where at least one of them are seriously considering attacking the other or attacking some area of the world the other deems important....[and]...the latter threaten the use of force in retaliation in an attempt to prevent the attack." General deterrence refers to a relationship between two opponents in which "leaders in at least one would consider resolving to force if the opportunity arose...[and] [t]he other side, precisely because it believes the opponent would be willing to consider resort to force, maintains forces of its own and offers warnings to respond in kind to attempts to use force contrary to its interests" (Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis, 38, 42-3).
18. One exception to the rule regarding the negligible prescriptive contribution of academics to Israel's conventional deterrence is Israel Beer, Israel's Security: Yesterday-Today-Tomorrow (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Amikam, 1966). Beer estimated that in the long run Israel would fail to maintain military superiority over the Arabs and, therefore, its conventional and nuclear deterrence strategy would fail. The reality of the last three decades and the peace process in the present have proven Beer wrong. For prescriptive studies of Israel's nuclear deterrence policy, see Shai Feldman Israeli Nuclear Deterrence (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), which calls for an open Israeli nuclear deterrence policy; Yair Evron, Israel's Nuclear Dilemma (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), which recommends that Israel avoid such a policy; and Avner Cohen and Marvin Miller, "How to Think About - and Implement - Nuclear Arms Control in the Middle East," Washington Quarterly 16, no. 2 (spring 1993): 101-13, which calls on Israel to stop the production of weapons-usable nuclear materials in exchange for Arab and Iranian acceptance of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections in their declared and suspect nuclear facilities.
19. One exception to the rule regarding the negligible prescriptive contribution of academics to Israel's conventional deterrence is Israel Beer, Israel's Security: Yesterday-Today-Tomorrow (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Amikam, 1966). Beer estimated that in the long run Israel would fail to maintain military superiority over the Arabs and, therefore, its conventional and nuclear deterrence strategy would fail. The reality of the last three decades and the peace process in the present have proven Beer wrong. For prescriptive studies of Israel's nuclear deterrence policy, see Shai Feldman Israeli Nuclear Deterrence (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), which calls for an open Israeli nuclear deterrence policy; Yair Evron, Israel's Nuclear Dilemma (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), which recommends that Israel avoid such a policy; and Avner Cohen and Marvin Miller, "How to Think About - and Implement - Nuclear Arms Control in the Middle East," Washington Quarterly 16, no. 2 (spring 1993): 101-13, which calls on Israel to stop the production of weapons-usable nuclear materials in exchange for Arab and Iranian acceptance of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections in their declared and suspect nuclear facilities.
20. One exception to the rule regarding the negligible prescriptive contribution of academics to Israel's conventional deterrence is Israel Beer, Israel's Security: Yesterday-Today-Tomorrow (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Amikam, 1966). Beer estimated that in the long run Israel would fail to maintain military superiority over the Arabs and, therefore, its conventional and nuclear deterrence strategy would fail. The reality of the last three decades and the peace process in the present have proven Beer wrong. For prescriptive studies of Israel's nuclear deterrence policy, see Shai Feldman Israeli Nuclear Deterrence (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), which calls for an open Israeli nuclear deterrence policy; Yair Evron, Israel's Nuclear Dilemma (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), which recommends that Israel avoid such a policy; and Avner Cohen and Marvin Miller, "How to Think About - and Implement - Nuclear Arms Control in the Middle East," Washington Quarterly 16, no. 2 (spring 1993): 101-13, which calls on Israel to stop the production of weapons-usable nuclear materials in exchange for Arab and Iranian acceptance of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections in their declared and suspect nuclear facilities.
21. One exception to the rule regarding the negligible prescriptive contribution of academics to Israel's conventional deterrence is Israel Beer, Israel's Security: Yesterday-Today-Tomorrow (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Amikam, 1966). Beer estimated that in the long run Israel would fail to maintain military superiority over the Arabs and, therefore, its conventional and nuclear deterrence strategy would fail. The reality of the last three decades and the peace process in the present have proven Beer wrong. For prescriptive studies of Israel's nuclear deterrence policy, see Shai Feldman Israeli Nuclear Deterrence (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), which calls for an open Israeli nuclear deterrence policy; Yair Evron, Israel's Nuclear Dilemma (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), which recommends that Israel avoid such a policy; and Avner Cohen and Marvin Miller, "How to Think About - and Implement - Nuclear Arms Control in the Middle East," Washington Quarterly 16, no. 2 (spring 1993): 101-13, which calls on Israel to stop the production of weapons-usable nuclear materials in exchange for Arab and Iranian acceptance of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections in their declared and suspect nuclear facilities.
22. The first three of the four sub-types are similar, in some respects, to the three types of deterrence suggested by Herman Kahn in the nuclear context. His "Type Hl" "tit for tat" deterrence resembles "current deterrence"; his "Type II" deterrence "against extremely provocative acts other than a massive direct attack" is similar to "specific deterrence"; and his "Type I" deterrence against "a massive direct attack against one's country" coincides with "strategic deterrence." Herman Kahn, Thinking About the Unthinkable in the 1980s (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 109. For a discussion of the three types see ibid., 110-22.
23. The first three of the four sub-types are similar, in some respects, to the three types of deterrence suggested by Herman Kahn in the nuclear context. His "Type Hl" "tit for tat" deterrence resembles "current deterrence"; his "Type II" deterrence "against extremely provocative acts other than a massive direct attack" is similar to "specific deterrence"; and his "Type I" deterrence against "a massive direct attack against one's country" coincides with "strategic deterrence." Herman Kahn, Thinking About the Unthinkable in the 1980s (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 109. For a discussion of the three types see ibid., 110-22.
24. See especially: Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963); and Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981); and Christopher H. Achen and Duncan Snidel, "Rational Deterrence Theory and the Comparative Case Studies," World Politics 41, no. 2 (January 1989): 143-69.
25. See especially: Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963); and Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981); and Christopher H. Achen and Duncan Snidel, "Rational Deterrence Theory and the Comparative Case Studies," World Politics 41, no. 2 (January 1989): 143-69.
26. See especially: Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963); and Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981); and Christopher H. Achen and Duncan Snidel, "Rational Deterrence Theory and the Comparative Case Studies," World Politics 41, no. 2 (January 1989): 143-69.
27. See especially: Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963); and Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981); and Christopher H. Achen and Duncan Snidel, "Rational Deterrence Theory and the Comparative Case Studies," World Politics 41, no. 2 (January 1989): 143-69.
28. George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy; John Steinbrunner, "Beyond Rational Deterrence," World Politics 28, no. 2 (January 1976): 223-45; Robert Jervis, "Deterrence and Perception," International Security 7, no. 3 (winter 1982/83): 3-30; Jervis, Lebow, and Stein, Psychology and Deterrence; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter," World Politics 41, no. 2 (January 1989): 208-24; and Stein, "Deterrence and Learning."
29. George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy; John Steinbrunner, "Beyond Rational Deterrence," World Politics 28, no. 2 (January 1976): 223-45; Robert Jervis, "Deterrence and Perception," International Security 7, no. 3 (winter 1982/83): 3-30; Jervis, Lebow, and Stein, Psychology and Deterrence; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter," World Politics 41, no. 2 (January 1989): 208-24; and Stein, "Deterrence and Learning."
30. George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy; John Steinbrunner, "Beyond Rational Deterrence," World Politics 28, no. 2 (January 1976): 223-45; Robert Jervis, "Deterrence and Perception," International Security 7, no. 3 (winter 1982/83): 3-30; Jervis, Lebow, and Stein, Psychology and Deterrence; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter," World Politics 41, no. 2 (January 1989): 208-24; and Stein, "Deterrence and Learning."
31. George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy; John Steinbrunner, "Beyond Rational Deterrence," World Politics 28, no. 2 (January 1976): 223-45; Robert Jervis, "Deterrence and Perception," International Security 7, no. 3 (winter 1982/83): 3-30; Jervis, Lebow, and Stein, Psychology and Deterrence; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter," World Politics 41, no. 2 (January 1989): 208-24; and Stein, "Deterrence and Learning."
32. George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy; John Steinbrunner, "Beyond Rational Deterrence," World Politics 28, no. 2 (January 1976): 223-45; Robert Jervis, "Deterrence and Perception," International Security 7, no. 3 (winter 1982/83): 3-30; Jervis, Lebow, and Stein, Psychology and Deterrence; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter," World Politics 41, no. 2 (January 1989): 208-24; and Stein, "Deterrence and Learning."
33. George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy; John Steinbrunner, "Beyond Rational Deterrence," World Politics 28, no. 2 (January 1976): 223-45; Robert Jervis, "Deterrence and Perception," International Security 7, no. 3 (winter 1982/83): 3-30; Jervis, Lebow, and Stein, Psychology and Deterrence; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter," World Politics 41, no. 2 (January 1989): 208-24; and Stein, "Deterrence and Learning."
34. For a good review of this approach, see Jack Levy, "Review Article: When do Deterrent Threats Work?" British Journal of Political Science 18, pt. 4 (October 1988): 485-512.
35. Randolph M. Siverson and Michael R. Tenefoss, "Power, Alliance, and Escalation of International Conflict, 1815-1965," American Political Science Review 78, no. 4 (December 1984): 1057-69; Huth and Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work?"; Huth and Russett, "Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation," International Studies Quarterly 32, no. 1 (March 1988): 29-46; Huth and Russett, "Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference," World Politics 42, no. 4 (April 1990): 466-501; Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988).
36. Randolph M. Siverson and Michael R. Tenefoss, "Power, Alliance, and Escalation of International Conflict, 1815-1965," American Political Science Review 78, no. 4 (December 1984): 1057-69; Huth and Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work?"; Huth and Russett, "Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation," International Studies Quarterly 32, no. 1 (March 1988): 29-46; Huth and Russett, "Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference," World Politics 42, no. 4 (April 1990): 466-501; Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988).
37. Randolph M. Siverson and Michael R. Tenefoss, "Power, Alliance, and Escalation of International Conflict, 1815-1965," American Political Science Review 78, no. 4 (December 1984): 1057-69; Huth and Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work?"; Huth and Russett, "Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation," International Studies Quarterly 32, no. 1 (March 1988): 29-46; Huth and Russett, "Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference," World Politics 42, no. 4 (April 1990): 466-501; Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988).
38. Randolph M. Siverson and Michael R. Tenefoss, "Power, Alliance, and Escalation of International Conflict, 1815-1965," American Political Science Review 78, no. 4 (December 1984): 1057-69; Huth and Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work?"; Huth and Russett, "Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation," International Studies Quarterly 32, no. 1 (March 1988): 29-46; Huth and Russett, "Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference," World Politics 42, no. 4 (April 1990): 466-501; Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988).
39. Randolph M. Siverson and Michael R. Tenefoss, "Power, Alliance, and Escalation of International Conflict, 1815-1965," American Political Science Review 78, no. 4 (December 1984): 1057-69; Huth and Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work?"; Huth and Russett, "Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation," International Studies Quarterly 32, no. 1 (March 1988): 29-46; Huth and Russett, "Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference," World Politics 42, no. 4 (April 1990): 466-501; Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988).
40. Zeev Maoz, "Resolve, Capability, and the Outcomes of Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976," Journal of Conflict Resolution 27, no. 2 (June 1983): 195-229; Frank J. Wayman, J. David Singer, and Gary Goertz, "Capabilities, Military Allocations, and Success in Militarized Disputes," International Studies Quarterly 27, no. 4 (December 1983): 497-515; Peter Karsten, Peter D. Howell, and Artis F. Allen, Military Threats: A Systemic Historical Analysis of the Determinants of Success (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1984).
41. Zeev Maoz, "Resolve, Capability, and the Outcomes of Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976," Journal of Conflict Resolution 27, no. 2 (June 1983): 195-229; Frank J. Wayman, J. David Singer, and Gary Goertz, "Capabilities, Military Allocations, and Success in Militarized Disputes," International Studies Quarterly 27, no. 4 (December 1983): 497-515; Peter Karsten, Peter D. Howell, and Artis F. Allen, Military Threats: A Systemic Historical Analysis of the Determinants of Success (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1984).
42. Zeev Maoz, "Resolve, Capability, and the Outcomes of Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976," Journal of Conflict Resolution 27, no. 2 (June 1983): 195-229; Frank J. Wayman, J. David Singer, and Gary Goertz, "Capabilities, Military Allocations, and Success in Militarized Disputes," International Studies Quarterly 27, no. 4 (December 1983): 497-515; Peter Karsten, Peter D. Howell, and Artis F. Allen, Military Threats: A Systemic Historical Analysis of the Determinants of Success (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1984).
43. In their classic form, reprisals are "coercive measures taken by one state against another, without belligerent intent, in order to secure redress for or to prevent recurrence of acts or omissions which are perceived under international law to constitute international delinquency" (Barry M. Blechman, "The Consequences of Israeli Reprisals: An Assessment" (Ph.D. diss., Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., 1971), 38.
44. Moshe Dayan, "Why Israel Strikes Back," in Donald Robinson, Under Fire: Israel's Twenty Year Struggle for Survival, (New York: Norton, 1968), 122.
45. For Example, Lieberman, Deterrence theory, 13; Dan Schueftan, Attrition: Egypt Post-War Political Strategy, 1967-1970 (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot, 1989), 121-36.
46. For Example, Lieberman, Deterrence theory, 13; Dan Schueftan, Attrition: Egypt Post-War Political Strategy, 1967-1970 (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot, 1989), 121-36.
47. Alexander L. George, Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), 5. George's distinction between defensive uses of coercive threats (that is, "coercive diplomacy") and the offensive uses of this strategy, which he terms "blackmail," is also useful. Blackmail, according to George, is the use of coercive threats to "persuade a victim to give up something of value without putting up resistance" (ibid.). George's defensive and offensive uses of coercive diplomacy constitute Schelling's classic term "compellence."
48. Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence, 5;,38.
49. Benny Morris, Israel's Border Wars, 1949-1956 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 421; Blechman, "The Consequences of Israeli Reprisals: An Assessment," 49.
50. Benny Morris, Israel's Border Wars, 1949-1956 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 421; Blechman, "The Consequences of Israeli Reprisals: An Assessment," 49.
51. The term "specific deterrence" has been used, wrongly in my opinion, as a substitute for Morgan's "immediate deterrence" (for example, Evron, Israel's Nuclear Dilemma, 37-38). Morgan's "immediate deterrence" implies the use of threats in order to persuade the opponent to refrain from action in the immediate future. "Specific deterrence," in contrast, implies the use of threats in order to persuade the opponent to avoid taking specific action. The collapse of specific deterrence (for example, Nasser's 1967 decision to deploy the Egyptian army in the Sinai and to block the Straits of Tiran) creates the crisis context (in this case, the crisis that preceded the Six Day War) in which each side uses immediate deterrence, in order to persuade the other not to resort to arms.
52. For other, rather similar, definitions of 'red lines' in the context of Israeli strategy, see Yoav Ben-Horin and Barry Posan, Israel's Strategic Doctrine (Santa Monica: RAND, 1981), 16-17; Avner Yaniv, "Deterrence and Defense in Israeli Strategy" ("in Hebrew), State, Government, and International Relations, no. 27 (1985): 27-62, 37; and Micha Bar, Red Lines in Israel's Deterrence Strategy (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot, 1990), 16.
53. For other, rather similar, definitions of 'red lines' in the context of Israeli strategy, see Yoav Ben-Horin and Barry Posan, Israel's Strategic Doctrine (Santa Monica: RAND, 1981), 16-17; Avner Yaniv, "Deterrence and Defense in Israeli Strategy" ("in Hebrew), State, Government, and International Relations, no. 27 (1985): 27-62, 37; and Micha Bar, Red Lines in Israel's Deterrence Strategy (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot, 1990), 16.
54. For other, rather similar, definitions of 'red lines' in the context of Israeli strategy, see Yoav Ben-Horin and Barry Posan, Israel's Strategic Doctrine (Santa Monica: RAND, 1981), 16-17; Avner Yaniv, "Deterrence and Defense in Israeli Strategy" ("in Hebrew), State, Government, and International Relations, no. 27 (1985): 27-62, 37; and Micha Bar, Red Lines in Israel's Deterrence Strategy (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot, 1990), 16.
55. For a discussion of the Rotem crisis, see Uri Bar-Joseph, "Rotem: The Forgotten Crisis on the Road to the 1967 War," Journal of Contemporary History 31, no. 3 (1996): 547-66; and Bar-Joseph, "Israel Caught Unaware: Egypt's Sinai Surprise of 1960," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 8, no. 2 (summer 1995): 203-19.
56. For a discussion of the Rotem crisis, see Uri Bar-Joseph, "Rotem: The Forgotten Crisis on the Road to the 1967 War," Journal of Contemporary History 31, no. 3 (1996): 547-66; and Bar-Joseph, "Israel Caught Unaware: Egypt's Sinai Surprise of 1960," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 8, no. 2 (summer 1995): 203-19.
57. Abba Eban, Story of My Life (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Ma'ariv, 1978), 222-46.
58. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, 15.
59. According to one source, there were some in Israel, including Shimon Peres, who, at the height of the 1967 crisis, suggested a demonstrative use of the nation's newly acquired nuclear capabilities in order to persuade Nasser to end the crisis without a war. See Avner Cohen, "Cairo, Dimona, and the June 1967 War," MiMe East Journal 50, no. 2 (spring 1996): 190-210, 209-10. According to a number of sources, during the critical stages of the 1973 war, Israel placed its nuclear force on alert for demonstrative purposes in order to deter further advancement of the Arab armies, and blackmail the United States to start airlifting replacement arms and ammunition. See, for example, Seymor M. Hersh, Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1991), 225-240.
60. According to one source, there were some in Israel, including Shimon Peres, who, at the height of the 1967 crisis, suggested a demonstrative use of the nation's newly acquired nuclear capabilities in order to persuade Nasser to end the crisis without a war. See Avner Cohen, "Cairo, Dimona, and the June 1967 War," MiMe East Journal 50, no. 2 (spring 1996): 190-210, 209-10. According to a number of sources, during the critical stages of the 1973 war, Israel placed its nuclear force on alert for demonstrative purposes in order to deter further advancement of the Arab armies, and blackmail the United States to start airlifting replacement arms and ammunition. See, for example, Seymor M. Hersh, Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1991), 225-240.
61. Avraham Tamir, A Soldier in Search of Peace (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Edanim, 1988), 233. This section as well as many others does not appear in the English edition of the book.
62. Yehoshafat Harkabi, Israel's Fateful Hour (New York: Harper & Row, 1988), 2.
63. David Ben Gurion in a talk with Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan, 16 December 1955, in Moshe Dayan, Story of My Life (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Edanim, 1976), 174. This section does not appear in the English version of Dayan's memoirs.
64. Ben Gurion's speech to Israel Defense Force (IDF) officers, 1 March 1962, in Ben Gurion, Singularity and Mission (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Am Ovcd, 1975), 367.
65. See, for example: Yigal Alon, A. Curtain of Sand (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Ha'Kibbutz Ha'Meuchad, 1959), 363-64; and Shimon Peres, Next Phase (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Am Ha'Sefer, 1965), 216.
66. See, for example: Yigal Alon, A. Curtain of Sand (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Ha'Kibbutz Ha'Meuchad, 1959), 363-64; and Shimon Peres, Next Phase (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Am Ha'Sefer, 1965), 216.
67. For a short discussion of this type of goal in the theoretical literature, see George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, 5. Notably, in some respects Israel's cumulative deterrence is similar to the strategy of containment during the cold war.
68. Moshe Dayan, "Military Actions at Times of Peace" (in Hebrew), Ma'arachot, no. 119 (1959): 54-61, 57.
69. Yitzhak Rabin, "Deterrence in an Israeli Security Context," in Deterrence in the Middle East: Where Theory and Practice Converge, ed. Aharon Kleinman and Ariel Levite (Jerusalem: JCCS Studies, 1993), 9.
70. Blechman, "The Consequences of Israeli Reprisals: An Assessment," 49; Morris, Israel's Border Wars, 1949-1956, 449; Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence, 118-19.
71. Blechman, "The Consequences of Israeli Reprisals: An Assessment," 49; Morris, Israel's Border Wars, 1949-1956, 449; Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence, 118-19.
72. Blechman, "The Consequences of Israeli Reprisals: An Assessment," 49; Morris, Israel's Border Wars, 1949-1956, 449; Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence, 118-19.
73. Avner Yaniv, Politics and Strategy in Israel (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv. Sifriat Poalim, 1994), 111.
74. Zeev Schiff and Eitan Haber, Israel, Army and Defense: A Dictionary (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Zmora-Bitan-Modan, 1976), 197, 395; Morris, Israel's Bordtr Wars, 1949-1956, 358, 360.
75. Zeev Schiff and Eitan Haber, Israel, Army and Defense: A Dictionary (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Zmora-Bitan-Modan, 1976), 197, 395; Morris, Israel's Bordtr Wars, 1949-1956, 358, 360.
76. Schiff and Haber, Israel, Amy and Defense, 410; 466; Morris, Israel's Border Wars, 1949-1956, 392, 396.
77. Schiff and Haber, Israel, Amy and Defense, 410; 466; Morris, Israel's Border Wars, 1949-1956, 392, 396.
78. Schiff and Haber, Israel, Amy and Defense, 355, 533, 326.
79. Ibid., 431.
80. For a firsthand account of these difficulties, see John Bagot Glubb (Glubb Pasha), A Soldier with the Arabs (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1957), 313-43.
81. The main sources for this list are Avner Yaniv, Dilemmas of Security: Politics, Strategy, and the Israeli Experience in Lebanon (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987); and Bar, Red Lines in Israel's Deterrence Strategy.
82. The main sources for this list are Avner Yaniv, Dilemmas of Security: Politics, Strategy, and the Israeli Experience in Lebanon (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987); and Bar, Red Lines in Israel's Deterrence Strategy.
83. Bar-Joseph, "Rotem: The Forgotten Crisis," 553-54.
84. Ibid., 560.
85. Ben Gurion Diary, The IDF Archives, Giv'ataim, Israel, entries for 14, 27, 28, 29 February 1960.
86. Haim Laskov, "The Armored Corps Become the Decisive Force of the IDF," in Military and Security, pt. A (in Hebrew), ed. Jacob Erez and Ilan Kfir (Tel Aviv: Ma'ariv, 1982), 143-49, 147-48; Yitzhak Rabin, The Ratin Memoirs (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 57; Ezer Weizman, On Eagles Wings (New York: Macmillan, 1976), 199; Eitan Haber, Today a War Will Break Out (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Edanim, 1987), 147.
87. Haim Laskov, "The Armored Corps Become the Decisive Force of the IDF," in Military and Security, pt. A (in Hebrew), ed. Jacob Erez and Ilan Kfir (Tel Aviv: Ma'ariv, 1982), 143-49, 147-48; Yitzhak Rabin, The Ratin Memoirs (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 57; Ezer Weizman, On Eagles Wings (New York: Macmillan, 1976), 199; Eitan Haber, Today a War Will Break Out (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Edanim, 1987), 147.
88. Haim Laskov, "The Armored Corps Become the Decisive Force of the IDF," in Military and Security, pt. A (in Hebrew), ed. Jacob Erez and Ilan Kfir (Tel Aviv: Ma'ariv, 1982), 143-49, 147-48; Yitzhak Rabin, The Ratin Memoirs (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 57; Ezer Weizman, On Eagles Wings (New York: Macmillan, 1976), 199; Eitan Haber, Today a War Will Break Out (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Edanim, 1987), 147.
89. Haim Laskov, "The Armored Corps Become the Decisive Force of the IDF," in Military and Security, pt. A (in Hebrew), ed. Jacob Erez and Ilan Kfir (Tel Aviv: Ma'ariv, 1982), 143-49, 147-48; Yitzhak Rabin, The Ratin Memoirs (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 57; Ezer Weizman, On Eagles Wings (New York: Macmillan, 1976), 199; Eitan Haber, Today a War Will Break Out (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Edanim, 1987), 147.
90. For a typical explanation of this genre, see Mohamed Abdul Ghani El-Gamasy, The October War: Memoirs of Field Marshal El-Gamasy of Egypt (Cairo: American University of Cairo Press, 1993), 20.
91. The body of literature on the crisis and on Nasser's conduct is too large to be quoted here. For a concise discussion of psychological and brinkmanship explanations and their weaknesses, see Ben D. Mor, "Nasser's Decision-making in the 1967 Middle East Crisis: A Rational-choice Explanation," Journal of Peace Research, 28, no. 4 (1991): 359-75, 361-64. For the rational-choice explanation see, ibid., 364-72.
92. The body of literature on the crisis and on Nasser's conduct is too large to be quoted here. For a concise discussion of psychological and brinkmanship explanations and their weaknesses, see Ben D. Mor, "Nasser's Decision-making in the 1967 Middle East Crisis: A Rational-choice Explanation," Journal of Peace Research, 28, no. 4 (1991): 359-75, 361-64. For the rational-choice explanation see, ibid., 364-72.
93. This was not only the view outside Israel at the time of the crisis, but also of experienced Israeli policymakers such as Ben Gurion and Dayan, who accused Eshkol's government of acting against Syria in a way that compelled Nasser to react. See, for example, Michael Bar-Zohar, Ben Gurion (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1977), 1588; Arie Brown, Moshe Dayan and the Six Day War (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Yediot Achronot, 1997), 22-23.
94. This was not only the view outside Israel at the time of the crisis, but also of experienced Israeli policymakers such as Ben Gurion and Dayan, who accused Eshkol's government of acting against Syria in a way that compelled Nasser to react. See, for example, Michael Bar-Zohar, Ben Gurion (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1977), 1588; Arie Brown, Moshe Dayan and the Six Day War (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Yediot Achronot, 1997), 22-23.
95. Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Yaari, Israel's Lebanon War (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Shocken, 1984), 86. This section does not appear in the English edition of the book.
96. General Dr. Mustafa Tlas, ed., The Israeli Invasion to Lebanon (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Ma'rachot, 1988), 74. Originally published in Damascus in 1983, this book is the Syrian official history of the war. Tlas served during the war as Syria's minister of defense.
97. Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Yaari, Israel's Lebanon War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), 33. The Syrians believed that Israel encouraged the LF to provoke the incidents in order to create a pretext for an Israeli invasion (Tlas, The Israeli Invasion to Lebanon, 69).
98. Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Yaari, Israel's Lebanon War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), 33. The Syrians believed that Israel encouraged the LF to provoke the incidents in order to create a pretext for an Israeli invasion (Tlas, The Israeli Invasion to Lebanon, 69).
99. Schiff and Yaari, Israel's Libanon War (in English), 33.
100. It is possible that the Israeli government never gave the order to shoot down the helicopters for fear of Syrian reaction. According to some sources, it merely gave the order to make the preparations for such action, and Raphael Eitan, the trigger-happy chief of staff, gave the order to shoot down the helicopters. See, for example, Yaniv, Dilemmas of Security, 86.
101. Tlas, The Israeli Invasion to Lebanon, 183.
102. Ibid., 93.
103. The Egyptian chief of staff, Muhamad Fawzi, who was sent to Syria to observe the Israeli troop concentrations, reported that he found no evidence for their existence and that "aerial photographs taken by Syrian reconnaissance on 12 and 13 May showed no change in normal military positions" (Gamasy, The October War, 23).
104. For a concise analysis of Israel's strategic deterrence success during this period, see Stein, "Deterrence and Learning," 118-24. Stein concludes that "Analysis of Egyptian thinking from 1956 to the spring of 1967 provides considerable support for the proposition that tactical learning from military defeat induces caution" (123).
105. Gamasy, The October War, 38.
106. For a description and analysis of this war, sec Lawrence Whetten, The Canal War: Four-Power Conflict in the Middle East (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1974); Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, The Israeli-Egyptian War of Attrition, 1969-1970: A Case Study of Local Limited War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980); and Schueftan, Attrition.
107. For a description and analysis of this war, sec Lawrence Whetten, The Canal War: Four-Power Conflict in the Middle East (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1974); Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, The Israeli-Egyptian War of Attrition, 1969-1970: A Case Study of Local Limited War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980); and Schueftan, Attrition.
108. For a description and analysis of this war, sec Lawrence Whetten, The Canal War: Four-Power Conflict in the Middle East (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1974); Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, The Israeli-Egyptian War of Attrition, 1969-1970: A Case Study of Local Limited War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980); and Schueftan, Attrition.
109. Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence, 208.
110. Stein, "Deterrence and Learning," 133.
111. Janice Gross Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence I: The View from Cairo," in Jervis, Lebow, and Stein, Psychology and Deterrence, 45.
112. Lieberman, Deterrence Theory, 7, 13, 34. Mearsheimer concludes similarly: "That the Egyptians had to resort to the war of attrition is evidence that they were deterred from starting a conventional war" (Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, 163).
113. Lieberman, Deterrence Theory, 7, 13, 34. Mearsheimer concludes similarly: "That the Egyptians had to resort to the war of attrition is evidence that they were deterred from starting a conventional war" (Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, 163).
114. Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence, 211.
115. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, 163.
116. Stein, "The view from Cairo," 37; "Deterrence and Learning," 143-45.
117. Stein, "The view from Cairo," 37; "Deterrence and Learning," 143-45.
118. Stein, "Deterrence and Learning," 145.
119. Following first incidents along the canal in which Israeli guns shelled civilian targets Egypt decided to evacuate a million citizens from the front area (Gamasy, The October War, 101).
120. Nasser's republican regime had placed the responsibility for the 1948 and 1956 defeats on its predecessors. The 1967 defeat, however, occurred fifteen years after the 1952 revolution, so the one responsible for the failure could only have been the regime in power.
121. For a discussion of the concept of "design around" credible deterrence, see George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, 400-403, 428-29.
122. Ibid., 355.
123. For some of the theoretical aspects of this problem, but not necessarily in enduring rivalry, see I. William Zartman, "Prenegotiation: Phases and Functions," in Getting to the Table: The Process of International Negotiation, ed. Janice Gross Stein (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 1-17.
124. Ihn Pappe, Tbc Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: 1947-1951 (London: I. B. Tauris, 1994), 273. For a detailed discussion of Arab-Israeli peace negotiation after the war, see Itamar Rabinovich, The Road Not Taken (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). On peace negotiations with Jordan after the war, see Shlaim, The Politics of Partition, 513-623. On peace negotiations with Syria, see Moshe Maoz, Syria and Israel: From War to Peacemaking (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 20-41; and Avi Shlaim, "Husni Zaim and the Plan to Resettle Palestinian Refugees in Syria," Journal of Palestine Studies 15, no. 4 (1986): 68-90.
125. Ihn Pappe, Tbc Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: 1947-1951 (London: I. B. Tauris, 1994), 273. For a detailed discussion of Arab-Israeli peace negotiation after the war, see Itamar Rabinovich, The Road Not Taken (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). On peace negotiations with Jordan after the war, see Shlaim, The Politics of Partition, 513-623. On peace negotiations with Syria, see Moshe Maoz, Syria and Israel: From War to Peacemaking (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 20-41; and Avi Shlaim, "Husni Zaim and the Plan to Resettle Palestinian Refugees in Syria," Journal of Palestine Studies 15, no. 4 (1986): 68-90.
126. Ihn Pappe, Tbc Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: 1947-1951 (London: I. B. Tauris, 1994), 273. For a detailed discussion of Arab-Israeli peace negotiation after the war, see Itamar Rabinovich, The Road Not Taken (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). On peace negotiations with Jordan after the war, see Shlaim, The Politics of Partition, 513-623. On peace negotiations with Syria, see Moshe Maoz, Syria and Israel: From War to Peacemaking (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 20-41; and Avi Shlaim, "Husni Zaim and the Plan to Resettle Palestinian Refugees in Syria," Journal of Palestine Studies 15, no. 4 (1986): 68-90.
127. Ihn Pappe, Tbc Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: 1947-1951 (London: I. B. Tauris, 1994), 273. For a detailed discussion of Arab-Israeli peace negotiation after the war, see Itamar Rabinovich, The Road Not Taken (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). On peace negotiations with Jordan after the war, see Shlaim, The Politics of Partition, 513-623. On peace negotiations with Syria, see Moshe Maoz, Syria and Israel: From War to Peacemaking (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 20-41; and Avi Shlaim, "Husni Zaim and the Plan to Resettle Palestinian Refugees in Syria," Journal of Palestine Studies 15, no. 4 (1986): 68-90.
128. Ihn Pappe, Tbc Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: 1947-1951 (London: I. B. Tauris, 1994), 273. For a detailed discussion of Arab-Israeli peace negotiation after the war, see Itamar Rabinovich, The Road Not Taken (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). On peace negotiations with Jordan after the war, see Shlaim, The Politics of Partition, 513-623. On peace negotiations with Syria, see Moshe Maoz, Syria and Israel: From War to Peacemaking (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 20-41; and Avi Shlaim, "Husni Zaim and the Plan to Resettle Palestinian Refugees in Syria," Journal of Palestine Studies 15, no. 4 (1986): 68-90.
129. Harkabi, Israel's Fateful Hour, 35.
130. Fayez Sayegh, "A Handful of Fog - A Study on the Meanings and the Slogans of Bourguibism," in The Arabs and Israel, no. 5 (in Hebrew), ed. Yehoshafat Harkabi (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1975), 23-38, 24, 38. The article was published originally in Arabic in 1965.
131. Ariel E. Levite and Emily B. Landau, Israel's Nuclear Image: Arab Perceptions of Israel's Nuclear Posture (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1994), 39-42, 76-77.
132. A typical example of Sadat's logic was given by the Egyptian pro-Sadat paper, al-Akhbar, which wrote shortly after the visit: "The alternative to peace is awful....If a fifth war will break out it will be more horrible than any other war; it will be a war based on elements of fear and desperation....Therefore, in our support for peace, logic overcomes emotion" (quoted in Levite and Landau, Israel's Nuclear Image, 66-67 n. 35).
133. Newsweek, 1 June 1974; 25 February 1975. For a discussion of this subject, see Patrick Seale, Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 255-61; and Moshe Maoz, The Sphinx of Damascus (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1988), 107-10.
134. Newsweek, 1 June 1974; 25 February 1975. For a discussion of this subject, see Patrick Seale, Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 255-61; and Moshe Maoz, The Sphinx of Damascus (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1988), 107-10.
135. Newsweek, 1 June 1974; 25 February 1975. For a discussion of this subject, see Patrick Seale, Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 255-61; and Moshe Maoz, The Sphinx of Damascus (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1988), 107-10.
136. This is Maoz's interpretation (The Sphinx of Damascus, 110-13).
137. Maoz, Syria and Israel, 208.
138. Harkabi, Israel's Fateful Hour, 28-29.
139. Ibid., 24.
140. Amir Oren, Ha'aretz, 23 May 1997.