Default and renegotiation: A dynamic model of debt

Quarterly Journal of Economics

Volumn 113, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 1-41

  Hart, Oliver ^a   Moore, John ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039993932     PISSN: 00335533     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/003355398555496     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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