How to restore higher-powered incentives in multitask agencies

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volumn 15, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 418-433

  Sinclair Desgagné, Bernard ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033243685     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/15.2.418     Document Type: Article

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