Output Agreement Mechanisms and Common Knowledge

Proceedings of the 2nd AAAI Conference on Human Computation and Crowdsourcing, HCOMP 2014

Volumn , Issue , 2014, Pages 220-226

  Waggoner, Bo ^a   Chen, Yiling ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

MACHINE DESIGN;

COMMON KNOWLEDGE; CONCEPTUAL QUESTIONS; HUMAN COMPUTATION; INFERENCE PROCESS; INFORMATION STRUCTURES; MECHANISM DESIGN; PRACTICAL METHOD; SIMPLE++; SOCIAL COMPUTING; TWO AGENTS;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 85167458387     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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