Crowdsourced judgement elicitation with endogenous proficiency

WWW 2013 - Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on World Wide Web

Volumn , Issue , 2013, Pages 319-329

  Dasgupta, Anirban ^a   Ghosh, Arpita ^b  

^a YAHOO RESEARCH   (United States)

^b Department of Obstetrics Gynecology   (United States)

Author keywords

Crowdsourcing; Game theory; Information elicitation; Mechanism design; Peer prediction

Indexed keywords

CURRICULA; GAME THEORY; GRADING; MACHINE DESIGN; WORLD WIDE WEB;

BINARY INFORMATION; DIRECT MONITORING; INFORMATION ELICITATION; MECHANISM DESIGN; OPEN ONLINE COURSE; REPORTING STATISTICS; STRATEGIC CHOICE; STUDENT ASSIGNMENTS;

CROWDSOURCING;

EID: 84893032455     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/2488388.2488417     Document Type: Conference Paper

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