Iterated expectations and common priors

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 24, Issue 1-2, 1998, Pages 131-141

  Samet, Dov ^a  

^a TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0007154362     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1997.0616     Document Type: Article

References (9)

1. Aumann, R. (1976). "Agreeing to Disagree," Ann. Statist. 4, 1236-1239.
2. Bonanno, G., and Nehring, K. (1996). "Fundamental Agreement: A New Foundation for the Harsanyi Doctrine," Working Paper 96-02, University of California, Davis.
3. Feinberg, Y. (1995). "Converse to the Agreement Theorem," Discussion Paper 83, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
4. Gaifman, H. (1986). "A Theory of Higher Order Probabilities," in: Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge: Proc. 1986 Conf., ed. J. Y. Halpern (Morgan Kaufman) pp. 275-292.
5. Harsanyi, J. C. (1967-1968). "Games with Incomplete Information Played by Bayesian Players, I, II, III," Manag. Sci. 14, 159-182, 320-334, 486-502.
6. Monderer, D., and Samet, D. (1989). "Approximating Common Knowledge with Common Belief," Games Econ. Behav. 1, 170-190.
7. Morris, S. (1995). "Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information," Econometrica 62, 1327-1347.
8. Samet, D. (1997), "On the Triviality of High-Order Probabilistic Beliefs," Journal of Philosophical Logic, forthcoming.
9. Samet, D. (1998). "Common Priors and Separation of Convex Sets," Games Econ. Behav. 24, 173-175.