Robust Large-Scale Spectrum Auctions against False-Name Bids

IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing

Volumn 16, Issue 6, 2017, Pages 1730-1743

  Wang, Qinhui ^a,b   Ye, Baoliu ^a   Tang, Bin ^a   Xu, Tianyin ^c   Guo, Song ^d   Lu, Sanglu ^a   Zhuang, Weihua ^e  

^a NANJING UNIVERSITY   (China)

^b Army Command College   (China)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^d HONG KONG POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY   (Hong Kong)

^e UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO   (Canada)

Author keywords

cognitive radio networks; false name proofness; Spectrum auctions

Indexed keywords

COMMERCE; EFFICIENCY; SPECTROSCOPY;

ANALYSIS AND SIMULATION; COGNITIVE RADIO NETWORK; DYNAMIC SPECTRUM ACCESS; FALSE-NAME-PROOFNESS; LARGE-SCALE DYNAMICS; SPECTRUM ALLOCATION; SPECTRUM AUCTIONS; SPECTRUM UTILIZATION;

COGNITIVE RADIO;

EID: 85019242030     PISSN: 15361233     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1109/TMC.2016.2601908     Document Type: Article

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