The behavioralist as tax collector: Using natural field experiments to enhance tax compliance

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 148, Issue , 2017, Pages 14-31

  Hallsworth, Michael ^a   List, John A ^b   Metcalfe, Robert D ^b   Vlaev, Ivo ^c  

^a IMPERIAL COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Natural field experiment; Social norms; Taxation

Indexed keywords

EID: 85013680576     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.02.003     Document Type: Article

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