Tax evasion and the psychological tax contract

Developing Alternative Frameworks for Explaining Tax Compliance

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 74-94

  Feld, Lars P ^a   Frey, Bruno S ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84892839582     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

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