A model of tax evasion with group conformity and social customs

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 12, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 49-66

  Myles, Gareth D ^a   Naylor, Robin A ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EXETER   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Equilibria; Social norms; Tax evasion

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030121881     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0176-2680(95)00037-2     Document Type: Article

References (17)

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