The use of field experiments to increase tax compliance

Oxford Review of Economic Policy

Volumn 30, Issue 4, 2014, Pages 658-679

  Hallsworth, Michael ^a  

^a IMPERIAL COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Behavioural economics; Natural field experiments; Tax compliance; Tax evasion

Indexed keywords

COMPLIANCE; ECONOMIC THEORY; POLICY IMPLEMENTATION; TAX SYSTEM;

EID: 84929720700     PISSN: 0266903X     EISSN: 14602121     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/oxrep/gru034     Document Type: Article

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