Undeclared work, deterrence and social norms: The case of Germany

Undeclared Work, Deterrence and Social Norms: The Case of Germany

Volumn 9783540874010, Issue , 2012, Pages 1-143

  Feld, Lars P ^a   Larsen, Claus ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF FREIBURG   (Germany)

^b 2tv DK 1307 Copenhagen   (Denmark)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84929912523     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-87401-0     Document Type: Book

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