Social norms and conditional cooperative taxpayers

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 26, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 89-103

  Traxler, Christian ^a,b  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON COLLECTIVE GOODS   (Germany)

^b CESIFO   (Germany)

Author keywords

Belief management; Conditional cooperation; Multiple equilibria; Social norms; Tax evasion

Indexed keywords

EID: 72149119696     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2009.11.001     Document Type: Article

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