Varieties of capitalist interests: Power, institutions, and the regulatory welfare state in the United States and Sweden

Studies in American Political Development

Volumn 18, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 1-29

  Swenson, Peter A ^a  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 4043048784     PISSN: 0898588X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s0898588x0400001x     Document Type: Review

References (254)

1. For a discussion of America's "laggard" status, see Ann Shola Orloff, "The Political Origins of America's Belated Welfare State," in The Politics of Social Policy in the United States, ed. Margaret Weir, Ann Shola Orloff, and Theda Skocpol (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 38-80.
2. Detailed evidence for these and other assertions is presented in Peter Swenson, Capitalists against Markets: The Making of Labor Markets and Welfare States in the United States and Sweden (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); on unemployment insurance, see 6, 201-7, and 254-56. On business money for the Democrats, see Louise Overacker, "Campaign Funds in the Presidential Election of 1936," American Political Science Review 31(1937): 485-87; Thomas P. Ferguson, "From Normalcy to New Deal: Industrial Structure, Party Competition, and American Public Policy in the Great Depression," International Organization 38 (1984); Michael J. Webber, "Business, The Democratic Party, and the New Deal: An Empirical Critique of Thomas Ferguson's 'Investment Theory of Politics'," Sociological Perspectives 34 (1991): 486-87.
3. Detailed evidence for these and other assertions is presented in Peter Swenson, Capitalists against Markets: The Making of Labor Markets and Welfare Slates in the United States and Sweden (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); on unemployment insurance, see 6, 201-7, and 254-56. On business money for the Democrats, see Louise Overacker, "Campaign Funds in the Presidential Election of 1936," American Political Science Review 31(1937): 485-87; Thomas P. Ferguson, "From Normalcy to New Deal: Industrial Structure, Party Competition, and American Public Policy in the Great Depression," International Organization 38 (1984); Michael J. Webber, "Business, The Democratic Party, and the New Deal: An Empirical Critique of Thomas Ferguson's 'Investment Theory of Politics'," Sociological Perspectives 34 (1991): 486-87.
4. Detailed evidence for these and other assertions is presented in Peter Swenson, Capitalists against Markets: The Making of Labor Markets and Welfare Slates in the United States and Sweden (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); on unemployment insurance, see 6, 201-7, and 254-56. On business money for the Democrats, see Louise Overacker, "Campaign Funds in the Presidential Election of 1936," American Political Science Review 31(1937): 485-87; Thomas P. Ferguson, "From Normalcy to New Deal: Industrial Structure, Party Competition, and American Public Policy in the Great Depression," International Organization 38 (1984); Michael J. Webber, "Business, The Democratic Party, and the New Deal: An Empirical Critique of Thomas Ferguson's 'Investment Theory of Politics'," Sociological Perspectives 34 (1991): 486-87.
5. Detailed evidence for these and other assertions is presented in Peter Swenson, Capitalists against Markets: The Making of Labor Markets and Welfare Slates in the United States and Sweden (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); on unemployment insurance, see 6, 201-7, and 254-56. On business money for the Democrats, see Louise Overacker, "Campaign Funds in the Presidential Election of 1936," American Political Science Review 31(1937): 485-87; Thomas P. Ferguson, "From Normalcy to New Deal: Industrial Structure, Party Competition, and American Public Policy in the Great Depression," International Organization 38 (1984); Michael J. Webber, "Business, The Democratic Party, and the New Deal: An Empirical Critique of Thomas Ferguson's 'Investment Theory of Politics'," Sociological Perspectives 34 (1991): 486-87.
6. Marquis Childs, Sweden: The Middle Way (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1936,1951) , and This is Democracy: Collective Bargaining in Scandinavia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1938). In his recent study, Edwin Amenta finds that, in 1938, "The American performance outpaced the efforts of Sweden, today's world leader in social spending" (Bold Relief: Institutional Politics and the Origins of Modern American Social Policy [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998], 5). Had Amenta counted "general" not just central government spending, he would have found that Sweden actually surpassed the United States modestly in terms of social spending as a percent of GDP (about 8.5 percent for Sweden, 6.3 percent for the United States) and almost matched it in total government spending as a percent of GDP (27.6 percent in Sweden, 29.4 percent in the United States). The source for these calculations is Peter Flora et al., State, Economy, and Society in Western Europe 1815-1975 (Chicago: St. James, 1983).
7. Marquis Childs, Sweden: The Middle Way (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1936,1951) , and This is Democracy: Collective Bargaining in Scandinavia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1938). In his recent study, Edwin Amenta finds that, in 1938, "The American performance outpaced the efforts of Sweden, today's world leader in social spending" (Bold Relief: Institutional Politics and the Origins of Modern American Social Policy [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998], 5). Had Amenta counted "general" not just central government spending, he would have found that Sweden actually surpassed the United States modestly in terms of social spending as a percent of GDP (about 8.5 percent for Sweden, 6.3 percent for the United States) and almost matched it in total government spending as a percent of GDP (27.6 percent in Sweden, 29.4 percent in the United States). The source for these calculations is Peter Flora et al., State, Economy, and Society in Western Europe 1815-1975 (Chicago: St. James, 1983).
8. Marquis Childs, Sweden: The Middle Way (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1936,1951) , and This is Democracy: Collective Bargaining in Scandinavia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1938). In his recent study, Edwin Amenta finds that, in 1938, "The American performance outpaced the efforts of Sweden, today's world leader in social spending" (Bold Relief: Institutional Politics and the Origins of Modern American Social Policy [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998], 5). Had Amenta counted "general" not just central government spending, he would have found that Sweden actually surpassed the United States modestly in terms of social spending as a percent of GDP (about 8.5 percent for Sweden, 6.3 percent for the United States) and almost matched it in total government spending as a percent of GDP (27.6 percent in Sweden, 29.4 percent in the United States). The source for these calculations is Peter Flora et al., State, Economy, and Society in Western Europe 1815-1975 (Chicago: St. James, 1983).
9. Marquis Childs, Sweden: The Middle Way (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1936,1951) , and This is Democracy: Collective Bargaining in Scandinavia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1938). In his recent study, Edwin Amenta finds that, in 1938, "The American performance outpaced the efforts of Sweden, today's world leader in social spending" (Bold Relief: Institutional Politics and the Origins of Modern American Social Policy [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998], 5). Had Amenta counted "general" not just central government spending, he would have found that Sweden actually surpassed the United States modestly in terms of social spending as a percent of GDP (about 8.5 percent for Sweden, 6.3 percent for the United States) and almost matched it in total government spending as a percent of GDP (27.6 percent in Sweden, 29.4 percent in the United States). The source for these calculations is Peter Flora et al., State, Economy, and Society in Western Europe 1815-1975 (Chicago: St. James, 1983).
10. U.S. Department of Labor, Report of the President's Commission on Industrial Relations in Sweden (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1938); "President's Study of Swedish Labor Finds Peace is Key," New York Times, 25 Sept. 1938, 1.
11. U.S. Department of Labor, Report of the President's Commission on Industrial Relations in Sweden (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1938); "President's Study of Swedish Labor Finds Peace is Key," New York Times, 25 Sept. 1938, 1.
12. Gøsta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 21-22. Of course, employers gain from the disciplinary effect of workers' dependence on market income; however, the question remains whether that truth tidily sums up all of employers' complex managerial and market interests regarding social policy. A recent and growing literature indicates not. See, for example, Margarita Estevez-Abe, Torben Iversen, and David Soskice, "Social Protection and the Formation of Skills: A Reinterpretation of the Welfare State," in Hall and Soskice eds., Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 145-18; Isabela Mares, The Politics of Social Risk: Business and Welfare State Development (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); and Duane Swank and Cathie Jo Martin, "Employers and the Welfare State: The Political Economic Organization of Employers and Social Policy in Contemporary Capitalist Democracies," Comparative Political Studies 34 (2001).
13. Gøsta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 21-22. Of course, employers gain from the disciplinary effect of workers' dependence on market income; however, the question remains whether that truth tidily sums up all of employers' complex managerial and market interests regarding social policy. A recent and growing literature indicates not. See, for example, Margarita Estevez-Abe, Torben Iversen, and David Soskice, "Social Protection and the Formation of Skills: A Reinterpretation of the Welfare State," in Hall and Soskice eds., Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 145-18; Isabela Mares, The Politics of Social Risk: Business and Welfare State Development (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); and Duane Swank and Cathie Jo Martin, "Employers and the Welfare State: The Political Economic Organization of Employers and Social Policy in Contemporary Capitalist Democracies," Comparative Political Studies 34 (2001).
14. Gøsta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 21-22. Of course, employers gain from the disciplinary effect of workers' dependence on market income; however, the question remains whether that truth tidily sums up all of employers' complex managerial and market interests regarding social policy. A recent and growing literature indicates not. See, for example, Margarita Estevez-Abe, Torben Iversen, and David Soskice, "Social Protection and the Formation of Skills: A Reinterpretation of the Welfare State," in Hall and Soskice eds., Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 145-18; Isabela Mares, The Politics of Social Risk: Business and Welfare State Development (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); and Duane Swank and Cathie Jo Martin, "Employers and the Welfare State: The Political Economic Organization of Employers and Social Policy in Contemporary Capitalist Democracies," Comparative Political Studies 34 (2001).
15. Gøsta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 21-22. Of course, employers gain from the disciplinary effect of workers' dependence on market income; however, the question remains whether that truth tidily sums up all of employers' complex managerial and market interests regarding social policy. A recent and growing literature indicates not. See, for example, Margarita Estevez-Abe, Torben Iversen, and David Soskice, "Social Protection and the Formation of Skills: A Reinterpretation of the Welfare State," in Hall and Soskice eds., Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 145-18; Isabela Mares, The Politics of Social Risk: Business and Welfare State Development (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); and Duane Swank and Cathie Jo Martin, "Employers and the Welfare State: The Political Economic Organization of Employers and Social Policy in Contemporary Capitalist Democracies," Comparative Political Studies 34 (2001).
16. Esping-Andersen, Three Worlds, 105-38. See also Esping-Andersen and Roger Friedland, "Class Coalitions in the Making of West European Economies," in Political Power and Social Theory 3 (1982): 17, 47, where they argue that the power of the left "is the key to the evolution of Sweden's postwar political economy." "More than in any other European nation," they argue, the "working class has been capable of initiating and imposing its policy preferences." Recentwork continues in this vein, neglecting to theorize and research about interests in order to draw confident conclusions about the relative power of classes. See especially Evelyn Huber and John D. Stephens, Development and Crisis of the Welfare State: Parties and Policies in Global Markets (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).
17. Esping-Andersen, Three Worlds, 105-38. See also Esping-Andersen and Roger Friedland, "Class Coalitions in the Making of West European Economies," in Political Power and Social Theory 3 (1982): 17, 47, where they argue that the power of the left "is the key to the evolution of Sweden's postwar political economy." "More than in any other European nation," they argue, the "working class has been capable of initiating and imposing its policy preferences." Recentwork continues in this vein, neglecting to theorize and research about interests in order to draw confident conclusions about the relative power of classes. See especially Evelyn Huber and John D. Stephens, Development and Crisis of the Welfare State: Parties and Policies in Global Markets (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).
18. Esping-Andersen, Three Worlds, 105-38. See also Esping-Andersen and Roger Friedland, "Class Coalitions in the Making of West European Economies," in Political Power and Social Theory 3 (1982): 17, 47, where they argue that the power of the left "is the key to the evolution of Sweden's postwar political economy." "More than in any other European nation," they argue, the "working class has been capable of initiating and imposing its policy preferences." Recentwork continues in this vein, neglecting to theorize and research about interests in order to draw confident conclusions about the relative power of classes. See especially Evelyn Huber and John D. Stephens, Development and Crisis of the Welfare State: Parties and Policies in Global Markets (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).
19. See especially Korpi's The Working Class and Welfare Capitalism: Work, Unions and Politics in Sweden (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978); Fred Block, "The Ruling Class Does Not Rule: Notes on the Marxist Theory of the State," Socialist Revolution 33 (1977).
20. See especially Korpi's The Working Class and Welfare Capitalism: Work, Unions and Politics in Sweden (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978); Fred Block, "The Ruling Class Does Not Rule: Notes on the Marxist Theory of the State," Socialist Revolution 33 (1977).
21. Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson, "Business Power and Social Policy: Employers and the Formation of the American Welfare State," Politics and. Society 30 (2002): 277-325. The synthesis is interesting because most historical institutionalist work, starting with Theda Skocpol, seems to have an underlying intellectual agenda against attributing decisive power over legislative events to capitalists. See for a relevant example Theda Skocpol and John Ikenberry, "The Political Formation of the American Welfare State in Historical and Comparative Perspective," Comparative Social Research 6 (1983): 87-148. Recent historical institutionalist work of Kathleen Thelen, by contrast, has begun seriously bringing capitalist interests into the story of labor market governance through social legislation. How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, the United States and Japan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
22. Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson, "Business Power and Social Policy: Employers and the Formation of the American Welfare State," Politics and. Society 30 (2002): 277-325. The synthesis is interesting because most historical institutionalist work, starting with Theda Skocpol, seems to have an underlying intellectual agenda against attributing decisive power over legislative events to capitalists. See for a relevant example Theda Skocpol and John Ikenberry, "The Political Formation of the American Welfare State in Historical and Comparative Perspective," Comparative Social Research 6 (1983): 87-148. Recent historical institutionalist work of Kathleen Thelen, by contrast, has begun seriously bringing capitalist interests into the story of labor market governance through social legislation. How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, the United States and Japan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
23. Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson, "Business Power and Social Policy: Employers and the Formation of the American Welfare State," Politics and. Society 30 (2002): 277-325. The synthesis is interesting because most historical institutionalist work, starting with Theda Skocpol, seems to have an underlying intellectual agenda against attributing decisive power over legislative events to capitalists. See for a relevant example Theda Skocpol and John Ikenberry, "The Political Formation of the American Welfare State in Historical and Comparative Perspective," Comparative Social Research 6 (1983): 87-148. Recent historical institutionalist work of Kathleen Thelen, by contrast, has begun seriously bringing capitalist interests into the story of labor market governance through social legislation. How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, the United States and Japan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
24. Commons, "Constructive Investigation and the Industrial Commission of Wisconsin," Survey, 4 Jan. 1913.
25. Theron F. Schlabach, Edwin E. Witte: Cautious Reformer (Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1969), 194, emphasis added.
26. George J. Stigler, "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2: (1971): 3-17; Sam Peltzman, "The Economic Theory of Regulation after a Decade of Deregulation," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Special Issue (1987): 1-41; James Q. Wilson, "The Politics of Regulation," in James W. McKie, Social Responsibility and the Business Predicament (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1974).
27. George J. Stigler, "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2: (1971): 3-17; Sam Peltzman, "The Economic Theory of Regulation after a Decade of Deregulation," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Special Issue (1987): 1-41; James Q. Wilson, "The Politics of Regulation," in James W. McKie, Social Responsibility and the Business Predicament (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1974).
28. George J. Stigler, "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2: (1971): 3-17; Sam Peltzman, "The Economic Theory of Regulation after a Decade of Deregulation," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Special Issue (1987): 1-41; James Q. Wilson, "The Politics of Regulation," in James W. McKie, Social Responsibility and the Business Predicament (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1974).
29. Albert O. Hirschman, The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy (Cambridge, MA: Belknap/Harvard University Press, 1991).
30. Thomas P. Ferguson presents a deeply problematic logrolling argument for capitalist support of the New Deal. See his "From Normalcy to New Deal: Industrial Structure, Party Competition, and American Public Policy in the Great Depression," International Organization 38 (1984); and Swenson, Capitalists against Markets, 240-42.
31. Thomas P. Ferguson presents a deeply problematic logrolling argument for capitalist support of the New Deal. See his "From Normalcy to New Deal: Industrial Structure, Party Competition, and American Public Policy in the Great Depression," International Organization 38 (1984); and Swenson, Capitalists against Markets, 240-42.
32. John R. Commons, Labor and Administration (New York: Macmillan, 1913), 91, 103-5; Edwin E. Witte, "Economic Aspects of Industry-Wide Collective Bargaining," in Industry-Wide Collective Bargaining; Promise or Menace?, ed. Colston E.Warne (Boston: D.C. Heath, 1950). For FDR's view on the clothing industry, see "The Situation in the Women's Garment Trades," Monthly Labor Review 29 (1929): 30.
33. John R. Commons, Labor and Administration (New York: Macmillan, 1913), 91, 103-5; Edwin E. Witte, "Economic Aspects of Industry-Wide Collective Bargaining," in Industry-Wide Collective Bargaining; Promise or Menace?, ed. Colston E.Warne (Boston: D.C. Heath, 1950). For FDR's view on the clothing industry, see "The Situation in the Women's Garment Trades," Monthly Labor Review 29 (1929): 30.
34. John R. Commons, Labor and Administration (New York: Macmillan, 1913), 91, 103-5; Edwin E. Witte, "Economic Aspects of Industry-Wide Collective Bargaining," in Industry-Wide Collective Bargaining; Promise or Menace?, ed. Colston E.Warne (Boston: D.C. Heath, 1950). For FDR's view on the clothing industry, see "The Situation in the Women's Garment Trades," Monthly Labor Review 29 (1929): 30.
35. John R. Bowman, Capitalist Collective Action: Competition, Cooperation and Conflict in the Coal Industry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Jesse T. Carpenter, Competition and Collective Bargaining in the Needle Trades 1910-1967 (Ithaca, NY: New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, 1972); William Haber, Industrial Relations in the Building Industry (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1930); David Previant, "Economic and Political Implications of the National Trucking Agreement of 1964," Proceedings of New York University Seventeenth Annual Conference on Labor (Washington, DC: BNA Incorporated, 1964), 285-86; Garth Mangum and R. Scott McNabb, The Rise, Fall, and Replacement of Industrywide Bargaining in the Basic Steel Industry (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 13-46.
36. John R. Bowman, Capitalist Collective Action: Competition, Cooperation and Conflict in the Coal Industry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Jesse T. Carpenter, Competition and Collective Bargaining in the Needle Trades 1910-1967 (Ithaca, NY: New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, 1972); William Haber, Industrial Relations in the Building Industry (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1930); David Previant, "Economic and Political Implications of the National Trucking Agreement of 1964," Proceedings of New York University Seventeenth Annual Conference on Labor (Washington, DC: BNA Incorporated, 1964), 285-86; Garth Mangum and R. Scott McNabb, The Rise, Fall, and Replacement of Industrywide Bargaining in the Basic Steel Industry (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 13-46.
37. John R. Bowman, Capitalist Collective Action: Competition, Cooperation and Conflict in the Coal Industry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Jesse T. Carpenter, Competition and Collective Bargaining in the Needle Trades 1910-1967 (Ithaca, NY: New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, 1972); William Haber, Industrial Relations in the Building Industry (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1930); David Previant, "Economic and Political Implications of the National Trucking Agreement of 1964," Proceedings of New York University Seventeenth Annual Conference on Labor (Washington, DC: BNA Incorporated, 1964), 285-86; Garth Mangum and R. Scott McNabb, The Rise, Fall, and Replacement of Industrywide Bargaining in the Basic Steel Industry (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 13-46.
38. John R. Bowman, Capitalist Collective Action: Competition, Cooperation and Conflict in the Coal Industry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Jesse T. Carpenter, Competition and Collective Bargaining in the Needle Trades 1910-1967 (Ithaca, NY: New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, 1972); William Haber, Industrial Relations in the Building Industry (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1930); David Previant, "Economic and Political Implications of the National Trucking Agreement of 1964," Proceedings of New York University Seventeenth Annual Conference on Labor (Washington, DC: BNA Incorporated, 1964), 285-86; Garth Mangum and R. Scott McNabb, The Rise, Fall, and Replacement of Industrywide Bargaining in the Basic Steel Industry (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 13-46.
39. John R. Bowman, Capitalist Collective Action: Competition, Cooperation and Conflict in the Coal Industry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Jesse T. Carpenter, Competition and Collective Bargaining in the Needle Trades 1910-1967 (Ithaca, NY: New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, 1972); William Haber, Industrial Relations in the Building Industry (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1930); David Previant, "Economic and Political Implications of the National Trucking Agreement of 1964," Proceedings of New York University Seventeenth Annual Conference on Labor (Washington, DC: BNA Incorporated, 1964), 285-86; Garth Mangum and R. Scott McNabb, The Rise, Fall, and Replacement of Industrywide Bargaining in the Basic Steel Industry (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 13-46.
40. Swenson, Capitalists against Markets, 146-60.
41. Carpenter, Competition and Collective Bargaining, 572-73; Bowman, Capitalist Collective Action, 203-10.
42. Carpenter, Competition and Collective Bargaining, 572-73; Bowman, Capitalist Collective Action, 203-10.
43. The term segmentalism is suggested by efficiency wage models of "labor market segmentation." Jeremy Bulow and Lawrence Summers, "A Theory of Dual Labor Markets with Application to Industrial Policy, Discrimination, and Keynesian Unemployment," Journal of Labor Economics 4 (1986): 376-414; Alan Krueger and Lawrence Summers, "Efficiency Wages and the Inter-Industry Wage Structure," Econometrica 56 (1988): 259-93; and Erica Groshen, "Five Reasons Why Wages Vary Among Employers," Industrial Relations 30 (1991), esp. 369-73.
44. The term segmentalism is suggested by efficiency wage models of "labor market segmentation." Jeremy Bulow and Lawrence Summers, "A Theory of Dual Labor Markets with Application to Industrial Policy, Discrimination, and Keynesian Unemployment," Journal of Labor Economics 4 (1986): 376-414; Alan Krueger and Lawrence Summers, "Efficiency Wages and the Inter-Industry Wage Structure," Econometrica 56 (1988): 259-93; and Erica Groshen, "Five Reasons Why Wages Vary Among Employers," Industrial Relations 30 (1991), esp. 369-73.
45. The term segmentalism is suggested by efficiency wage models of "labor market segmentation." Jeremy Bulow and Lawrence Summers, "A Theory of Dual Labor Markets with Application to Industrial Policy, Discrimination, and Keynesian Unemployment," Journal of Labor Economics 4 (1986): 376-414; Alan Krueger and Lawrence Summers, "Efficiency Wages and the Inter-Industry Wage Structure," Econometrica 56 (1988): 259-93; and Erica Groshen, "Five Reasons Why Wages Vary Among Employers," Industrial Relations 30 (1991), esp. 369-73.
46. Useful introductions are Andrew Weiss, Efficiency Wages: Models of Unemployment, Layoffs, and Wage Dispersion (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), and George Akerlof and Janet Yellen, "Introduction," in Efficiency Wage Models of the Labor Market, ed. Akerlof and Yellen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 1-21.
47. Useful introductions are Andrew Weiss, Efficiency Wages: Models of Unemployment, Layoffs, and Wage Dispersion (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), and George Akerlof and Janet Yellen, "Introduction," in Efficiency Wage Models of the Labor Market, ed. Akerlof and Yellen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 1-21.
48. Recent literature seems to underplay the importance of workplace relational contracting in "liberal market economies" like the United States, implying that powerful institutions external to the firm are required to bring it about, not the microeconomic rationality of efficiency wage behavior. See, for example, Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, "An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism," in Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage, ed. Hall and Soskice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), esp. 6-33.
49. Michael K. Brown, "Bargaining for Social Rights: Unions and the Reemergence of Welfare Capitalism," Political Science Quarterly 112 (1997-1998).
50. For more details on the rise of segmentalism, see Swenson, Capitalists against Markets, 49-60.
51. "Long Hours in Steel Industry Reduced: Men Generally Satisfied with the Changes," Iron Age, 3 Jan. 1924, 41.
52. Robert Ozanne, Wages in Practice and Theory: McCormick and International Harvester 1860-1960 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968), 52; Ozanne, A Century of Labor-Management Relations at McCormick and International Harvester (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), 159; M.C. Rorty, "Is Collective Bargaining Compatible with a Free Price and Wage System?" The Management Review 24 (1935): 36-38.
53. Robert Ozanne, Wages in Practice and Theory: McCormick and International Harvester 1860-1960 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968), 52; Ozanne, A Century of Labor-Management Relations at McCormick and International Harvester (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), 159; M.C. Rorty, "Is Collective Bargaining Compatible with a Free Price and Wage System?" The Management Review 24 (1935): 36-38.
54. Robert Ozanne, Wages in Practice and Theory: McCormick and International Harvester 1860-1960 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968), 52; Ozanne, A Century of Labor-Management Relations at McCormick and International Harvester (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), 159; M.C. Rorty, "Is Collective Bargaining Compatible with a Free Price and Wage System?" The Management Review 24 (1935): 36-38.
55. See Swenson, Capitalists against Markets, 24-29 for more on the theory. For more on wage rigidity, see David Brody, "The Rise and Decline of Welfare Capitalism," in Workers in Industrial America: Essays on the Twentieth Century Struggle (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 67; Anthony O'Brien, "A Behavioral Explanation for Nominal Wage Rigidity During the Great Depression," Quarterly Journal of Economics 104 (1989); Jason Taylor and George Selgin, "By Our Bootstraps: Origins and Effects of the High-Wage Doctrine and the Minimum Wage," Journal of Labor Research 20 (1999): 447-61; Truman Bewley, Why Wages Don't Fall During a Recession (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).
56. See Swenson, Capitalists against Markets, 24-29 for more on the theory. For more on wage rigidity, see David Brody, "The Rise and Decline of Welfare Capitalism," in Workers in Industrial America: Essays on the Twentieth Century Struggle (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 67; Anthony O'Brien, "A Behavioral Explanation for Nominal Wage Rigidity During the Great Depression," Quarterly Journal of Economics 104 (1989); Jason Taylor and George Selgin, "By Our Bootstraps: Origins and Effects of the High-Wage Doctrine and the Minimum Wage," Journal of Labor Research 20 (1999): 447-61; Truman Bewley, Why Wages Don't Fall During a Recession (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).
57. See Swenson, Capitalists against Markets, 24-29 for more on the theory. For more on wage rigidity, see David Brody, "The Rise and Decline of Welfare Capitalism," in Workers in Industrial America: Essays on the Twentieth Century Struggle (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 67; Anthony O'Brien, "A Behavioral Explanation for Nominal Wage Rigidity During the Great Depression," Quarterly Journal of Economics 104 (1989); Jason Taylor and George Selgin, "By Our Bootstraps: Origins and Effects of the High-Wage Doctrine and the Minimum Wage," Journal of Labor Research 20 (1999): 447-61; Truman Bewley, Why Wages Don't Fall During a Recession (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).
58. See Swenson, Capitalists against Markets, 24-29 for more on the theory. For more on wage rigidity, see David Brody, "The Rise and Decline of Welfare Capitalism," in Workers in Industrial America: Essays on the Twentieth Century Struggle (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 67; Anthony O'Brien, "A Behavioral Explanation for Nominal Wage Rigidity During the Great Depression," Quarterly Journal of Economics 104 (1989); Jason Taylor and George Selgin, "By Our Bootstraps: Origins and Effects of the High-Wage Doctrine and the Minimum Wage," Journal of Labor Research 20 (1999): 447-61; Truman Bewley, Why Wages Don't Fall During a Recession (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).
59. See Swenson, Capitalists against Markets, 24-29 for more on the theory. For more on wage rigidity, see David Brody, "The Rise and Decline of Welfare Capitalism," in Workers in Industrial America: Essays on the Twentieth Century Struggle (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 67; Anthony O'Brien, "A Behavioral Explanation for Nominal Wage Rigidity During the Great Depression," Quarterly Journal of Economics 104 (1989); Jason Taylor and George Selgin, "By Our Bootstraps: Origins and Effects of the High-Wage Doctrine and the Minimum Wage," Journal of Labor Research 20 (1999): 447-61; Truman Bewley, Why Wages Don't Fall During a Recession (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).
60. P.W. Litchfield, The Industrial Republic: Reflections of an Industrial Lieutenant, rev. ed. (Cleveland: Corday & Gross, 1946), 98; Michael J. Piore and Charles F. Sabel, The Second Industrial Divided: Possibilities for Prosperity (New York: Basic, 1984), 57; Ozanne, A Century of Labor-Management Relations, 85-86.
61. P.W. Litchfield, The Industrial Republic: Reflections of an Industrial Lieutenant, rev. ed. (Cleveland: Corday & Gross, 1946), 98; Michael J. Piore and Charles F. Sabel, The Second Industrial Divided: Possibilities for Prosperity (New York: Basic, 1984), 57; Ozanne, A Century of Labor-Management Relations, 85-86.
62. P.W. Litchfield, The Industrial Republic: Reflections of an Industrial Lieutenant, rev. ed. (Cleveland: Corday & Gross, 1946), 98; Michael J. Piore and Charles F. Sabel, The Second Industrial Divided: Possibilities for Prosperity (New York: Basic, 1984), 57; Ozanne, A Century of Labor-Management Relations, 85-86.
63. U.S. Senate, Committee on Finance, Economic Security Act: Hearings on S. 1130 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1935), 284.
64. "What Business Thinks," Fortune, Oct. 1939.
65. "Management's Stake in the Survival of Contributory Social Insurance," box 64:614, Isidore Falk papers, Sterling Library, Yale University.
66. In other words, they worked within an agenda constrained by capitalist power. See Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970); Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (Hampshire, UK: Macmillan, 1974).
67. In other words, they worked within an agenda constrained by capitalist power. See Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970); Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (Hampshire, UK: Macmillan, 1974).
68. Gerard Swope, The Swope Plan: Details, Criticisms, Analysis (New York: The Business Bourse, 1931). On Folsom, see Jill Quadagno, The Transformation of Old Age Security: Class and Politics in the American Welfare State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 112.
69. Gerard Swope, The Swope Plan: Details, Criticisms, Analysis (New York: The Business Bourse, 1931). On Folsom, see Jill Quadagno, The Transformation of Old Age Security: Class and Politics in the American Welfare State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 112.
70. Edwin Witte, Development of the Social Security Act (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1962), 29.
71. Raymond B. Fosdick to John D. Rockefeller, Jr., 27 Apr. 1933, box 16, folder 127, Economic Reform [RG2COMRD], Rockefeller Archive Center (letter supplied to author by G. William Domhoff).
72. Telegrams and letters to Malcolm Muir, President of McGraw Hill Publishing Co., New York, submitted with statement of L.C. Morrow of McGraw-Hill, editor of Factory Management and Maintenance, and representing the National Publishers' Association, Senate Committee on Finance, Economic Security Act: Hearings, 796.
73. Sanford Jacoby, Modern Manors (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 32-34.
74. Possibly for regulatory reasons, though certainly for the sake of the budget, the reformers imposed a $15 limit on earned income to qualify for social security. Had they not done so, some workers over 65, involuntarily retired by segmentalists, might simply have stayed in the labor market to work for low-standard employers, possibly even their competitors, to supplement their limited retirement benefits. Substandard employers could then depress standards even further. Thus, the government might have undermined the regulatory purpose of the new tax. Compare this with the Swedish system below. There, for clear regulatory reasons, all gainful employment was allowed without loss of benefits.
75. Ozanne, A Century of Labor-Management Relations, 85-86.
76. J. Douglas Brown, An American Philosophy of Social Security: Evolution and Issues (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972), 21-22.
77. Jeffrey Manza, Policy Experts and Political Change During the New Deal, (Ph.D. diss., University of California-Berkeley, 1995), 345-50.
78. Stanley P. Farwell in "Discussion by E. Grosvenor Plowman" (Associated Industries of Massachusetts), in Pensions: A Problem of Management (New York: American Management Association, 1928), 33; Manza, Policy Experts and Political Change, 317. In some cases, companies controlled the expected damage by shifting partial funding onto employees. Raymond B. Fosdick to John D. Rockefeller, Jr., 27 Apr. 1933. See also Murray Webb Latimer, Industrial Pension Systems in the United States and Canada (New York: Industrial Relations Counselors, 1932), 902-5; Steven A. Sass, The Promise of Private. Pensions: The First Hundred Years (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 56-96.
79. Stanley P. Farwell in "Discussion by E. Grosvenor Plowman" (Associated Industries of Massachusetts), in Pensions: A Problem of Management (New York: American Management Association, 1928), 33; Manza, Policy Experts and Political Change, 317. In some cases, companies controlled the expected damage by shifting partial funding onto employees. Raymond B. Fosdick to John D. Rockefeller, Jr., 27 Apr. 1933. See also Murray Webb Latimer, Industrial Pension Systems in the United States and Canada (New York: Industrial Relations Counselors, 1932), 902-5; Steven A. Sass, The Promise of Private. Pensions: The First Hundred Years (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 56-96.
80. Stanley P. Farwell in "Discussion by E. Grosvenor Plowman" (Associated Industries of Massachusetts), in Pensions: A Problem of Management (New York: American Management Association, 1928), 33; Manza, Policy Experts and Political Change, 317. In some cases, companies controlled the expected damage by shifting partial funding onto employees. Raymond B. Fosdick to John D. Rockefeller, Jr., 27 Apr. 1933. See also Murray Webb Latimer, Industrial Pension Systems in the United States and Canada (New York: Industrial Relations Counselors, 1932), 902-5; Steven A. Sass, The Promise of Private. Pensions: The First Hundred Years (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 56-96.
81. Stanley P. Farwell in "Discussion by E. Grosvenor Plowman" (Associated Industries of Massachusetts), in Pensions: A Problem of Management (New York: American Management Association, 1928), 33; Manza, Policy Experts and Political Change, 317. In some cases, companies controlled the expected damage by shifting partial funding onto employees. Raymond B. Fosdick to John D. Rockefeller, Jr., 27 Apr. 1933. See also Murray Webb Latimer, Industrial Pension Systems in the United States and Canada (New York: Industrial Relations Counselors, 1932), 902-5; Steven A. Sass, The Promise of Private. Pensions: The First Hundred Years (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 56-96.
82. Rainard B. Robbins, Preliminary Report on the Status of Industrial Pension Plans as Affected by Old Age Benefits Sections of the SSA, (NY: Social Science Research Council, 1936), 17.
83. Latimer, Industrial Pensions Systems, 880-82, 890; Letter to Malcolm Muir, U.S. Senate, Committee on Finance, Economic Security Act: Hearings, 803-15; Testimony of R. G. Wagenet, U.S. Senate, Committee on Education and Labor, To Create a National Labor Board (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1934), pt. I, 283; Swenson, Capitalists against Markets, 201-7.
84. Latimer, Industrial Pensions Systems, 880-82, 890; Letter to Malcolm Muir, U.S. Senate, Committee on Finance, Economic Security Act: Hearings, 803-15; Testimony of R. G. Wagenet, U.S. Senate, Committee on Education and Labor, To Create a National Labor Board (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1934), pt. I, 283; Swenson, Capitalists against Markets, 201-7.
85. Latimer, Industrial Pensions Systems, 880-82, 890; Letter to Malcolm Muir, U.S. Senate, Committee on Finance, Economic Security Act: Hearings, 803-15; Testimony of R. G. Wagenet, U.S. Senate, Committee on Education and Labor, To Create a National Labor Board (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1934), pt. I, 283; Swenson, Capitalists against Markets, 201-7.
86. Latimer, Industrial Pensions Systems, 880-82, 890; Letter to Malcolm Muir, U.S. Senate, Committee on Finance, Economic Security Act: Hearings, 803-15; Testimony of R. G. Wagenet, U.S. Senate, Committee on Education and Labor, To Create a National Labor Board (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1934), pt. I, 283; Swenson, Capitalists against Markets, 201-7.
87. Jill Quadagno, The Transformation of Old Age Security: Class and Politics in the American Welfare State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), esp. 100-119; Colin Gordon, New Deals: Business, Labor, and Politics in America 1920-1935 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), esp. 240-79. See also Manza, Policy Experts and Political Change During the New Deal, 308-44.
88. Jill Quadagno, The Transformation of Old Age Security: Class and Politics in the American Welfare State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), esp. 100-119; Colin Gordon, New Deals: Business, Labor, and Politics in America 1920-1935 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), esp. 240-79. See also Manza, Policy Experts and Political Change During the New Deal, 308-44.
89. Jill Quadagno, The Transformation of Old Age Security: Class and Politics in the American Welfare State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), esp. 100-119; Colin Gordon, New Deals: Business, Labor, and Politics in America 1920-1935 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), esp. 240-79. See also Manza, Policy Experts and Political Change During the New Deal, 308-44.
90. Not surprisingly, the models come from Norway, a country with a history of highly centralized pay setting much like Sweden's. See Michael Hoel, "Efficiency Wages and Local Versus Central Wage Bargaining," Economics Letters 30 (1989): 175-79, and "Union Wage Policy: The Importance of Labour Mobility and the Degree of Centralization," Economica 58 (1991): 139-53; Asb-jørn Rødseth, "Efficiency Wages and Local Versus Central Bargaining," Oxford Economic Papers 45 (1993), 470-81.
91. Not surprisingly, the models come from Norway, a country with a history of highly centralized pay setting much like Sweden's. See Michael Hoel, "Efficiency Wages and Local Versus Central Wage Bargaining," Economics Letters 30 (1989): 175-79, and "Union Wage Policy: The Importance of Labour Mobility and the Degree of Centralization," Economica 58 (1991): 139-53; Asb-jørn Rødseth, "Efficiency Wages and Local Versus Central Bargaining," Oxford Economic Papers 45 (1993), 470-81.
92. Not surprisingly, the models come from Norway, a country with a history of highly centralized pay setting much like Sweden's. See Michael Hoel, "Efficiency Wages and Local Versus Central Wage Bargaining," Economics Letters 30 (1989): 175-79, and "Union Wage Policy: The Importance of Labour Mobility and the Degree of Centralization," Economica 58 (1991): 139-53; Asb-jørn Rødseth, "Efficiency Wages and Local Versus Central Bargaining," Oxford Economic Papers 45 (1993), 470-81.
93. Karl Ove Moene and Michael Wallerstein, "Bargaining Structure and Economic Performance," in Trade Union Behavior, Pay-Bargaining, and Economic Performance, ed. R. J. Flanagan, K.O. Moene, and M. Wallerstein (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), esp. 90-93.
94. On the monitoring and compliance problem, see Hoel, "Efficiency Wages," 175, and Rødseth, "Efficiency Wages," 477.
95. On the monitoring and compliance problem, see Hoel, "Efficiency Wages," 175, and Rødseth, "Efficiency Wages," 477.
96. Compression across firms and industries probably also pays off in efficiency because it prods employers into investment in labor-saving technology by inhibiting the expansion of output to meet demand by using wage increases to hire more workers using more of the old technology. By holding back wages at the high end it also subsidizes more productive newer vintage capital, thus accelerating a Schumpeterian process of creative destruction. See Karl-Ove Moene and Michael Wallerstein, "Pay Inequality," Journal of Labor Economies 15 (1997): 403-30; Wallerstein and Moene, "Solidaristic Wage Bargaining," Nordic Journal of Political Economy 22 (1995): 79-94.
97. Compression across firms and industries probably also pays off in efficiency because it prods employers into investment in labor-saving technology by inhibiting the expansion of output to meet demand by using wage increases to hire more workers using more of the old technology. By holding back wages at the high end it also subsidizes more productive newer vintage capital, thus accelerating a Schumpeterian process of creative destruction. See Karl-Ove Moene and Michael Wallerstein, "Pay Inequality," Journal of Labor Economies 15 (1997): 403-30; Wallerstein and Moene, "Solidaristic Wage Bargaining," Nordic Journal of Political Economy 22 (1995): 79-94.
98. Third, solidarists will seek to manage and ration the supply of labor by coordinating recruitment practices, including restrictions on open advertising and direct poaching, promoting the formation and use of labor exchanges or bureaus for deployment of idle workers and skills, and regulating or collectivizing vocational training. See Swenson, Capitalists against Markets, 33-34.
99. But there will be latent tensions if not open conflict with-in labor on control issues as a result. Egalitarian wage restraint means passing up opportunities to raise wages in highly profitable firms and sectors. For a discussion, see Swenson, Fair Shares: Unions, Pay, and Politics in Sweden and West Germany (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), esp. chaps. 4-5.
100. Swenson, Capitalists against Markets, 121-33.
101. Evidence for this and following paragraphs can be found in Swenson, Capitalists against Markets, 77-82.
102. Von Sydow, Om förslaget till lag angående försäkring för olycksfall i arbete, (Stockholm: Viktor Petterson, 1915), 4.
103. "Utdrag ur protokoll [från] sammanträde med Styrelsen for Göteborgskretsen, den 18 Apr. 1913," Appendix 16 to Textilindustriförbund, Minutes, Överstyrelsen, 26 Apr. 1913.
104. More detail on this and the following can be found in Swenson, Capitalists against Markets, 82-90.
105. "Utdrag ur protokoll [från] sammanträde med Styrelsen för Göteborgskretsen"; Nils Bergsten, Sveriges Textilindustriförbund 1907-1950 (Stockholm: Sveriges Textilindustriförbund 1957), 229-30.
106. Thommy Svensson, Från ackord till månadslön, 118; "Ed strömiana. Utdrag av tal vid direktör J.S. Edströms middag å Riche," 7 Mar. 1939 (Kugelberg P6, Edström, J.S.); Lars Magnusson, Arbetet vid en svensk verkstad: Munktells 1900-1920 (Lund: Arkiv, 1987), 229; Peter Billing, Lars Olsson, and Mikael Stigendal, "Malmö - Our Town": Local Politics in Social Democracy," in Creating Social Democracy; A Century of the Social Democratic Labor Party in Sweden, ed. Klaus Misgeld, Karl Molin, and Klas Åmark (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), 282.
107. Thommy Svensson, Från ackord till månadslön, 118; "Ed strömiana. Utdrag av tal vid direktör J.S. Edströms middag å Riche," 7 Mar. 1939 (Kugelberg P6, Edström, J.S.); Lars Magnusson, Arbetet vid en svensk verkstad: Munktells 1900-1920 (Lund: Arkiv, 1987), 229; Peter Billing, Lars Olsson, and Mikael Stigendal, "Malmö - Our Town": Local Politics in Social Democracy," in Creating Social Democracy; A Century of the Social Democratic Labor Party in Sweden, ed. Klaus Misgeld, Karl Molin, and Klas Åmark (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), 282.
108. Thommy Svensson, Från ackord till månadslön, 118; "Ed strömiana. Utdrag av tal vid direktör J.S. Edströms middag å Riche," 7 Mar. 1939 (Kugelberg P6, Edström, J.S.); Lars Magnusson, Arbetet vid en svensk verkstad: Munktells 1900-1920 (Lund: Arkiv, 1987), 229; Peter Billing, Lars Olsson, and Mikael Stigendal, "Malmö - Our Town": Local Politics in Social Democracy," in Creating Social Democracy; A Century of the Social Democratic Labor Party in Sweden, ed. Klaus Misgeld, Karl Molin, and Klas Åmark (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), 282.
109. Thommy Svensson, Från ackord till månadslön, 118; "Ed strömiana. Utdrag av tal vid direktör J.S. Edströms middag å Riche," 7 Mar. 1939 (Kugelberg P6, Edström, J.S.); Lars Magnusson, Arbetet vid en svensk verkstad: Munktells 1900-1920 (Lund: Arkiv,
110. More on this and the following can be found in Swenson, Capitalists against Markets, 82-90.
111. VF Circular No. 35-1921, 21 Dec. 1921; VF, Direktiv N:r 1-1922, 5 Jan. 1922; SAF, Minutes, Styrelse, 9 Sept. 1932.
112. VF Circular No. 35-1921, 21 Dec. 1921; VF, Direktiv N:r 1-1922, 5 Jan. 1922; SAF, Minutes, Styrelse, 9 Sept. 1932.
113. Aubrey Clayton to Edström, 12 Feb. 1907, Edström E21 [A3a/överstyrelsen]. Neither Metall nor the 1905 agreement blocked the apprentice solution; wages for apprentices were not regulated.
114. Low-pay sectors were particularly disturbed. For example some textile employers wanted to raise wages for fear of losing workers to higher-pay sectors like engineering. Engineering employers, frequently stealing workers from each other, dealt with the matter collectively by sharpening their rules against poaching. In some regions they agreed among themselves not to hire workers within a month of their departure from a fellow engineering employer. See for example SAF, Minutes, Styrelse, 25 Jan., 22 Mar., 26 Apr., 31 May, and 6 Sept. 1945; SAF, Minutes, Ombudsmannakonferens, 26 Sept. 1945.
115. Low-pay sectors were particularly disturbed. For example some textile employers wanted to raise wages for fear of losing workers to higher-pay sectors like engineering. Engineering employers, frequently stealing workers from each other, dealt with the matter collectively by sharpening their rules against poaching. In some regions they agreed among themselves not to hire workers within a month of their departure from a fellow engineering employer. See for example SAF, Minutes, Styrelse, 25 Jan., 22 Mar., 26 Apr., 31 May, and 6 Sept. 1945; SAF, Minutes, Ombudsmannakonferens, 26 Sept. 1945.
116. SAF, Minutes, Styrelse, 29 Aug. 1946; Minutes, Ombudsmannakonferens, 18 Nov. 1946.
117. SAF, Minutes, Styrelse, 29 Aug. 1946; Minutes, Ombudsmannakonferens, 18 Nov. 1946.
118. SAF, Styrelse- och revisionsberättelser för år 1946, 35; SAF, Minutes, Styrelse, 29 Aug. and 24 Oct. 1946; SAF, Minutes, Styrelse, 16 Dec. 1946; "Anteckningar vid ett sammanträde i Göteborg ang. Situationen på arbetsmarknaden," 27 May 1946 (Edström 29/E3i/överstyrelsen).
119. SAF, Styrelse- och revisionsberättelser för år 1946, 35; SAF, Minutes, Styrelse, 29 Aug. and 24 Oct. 1946; SAF, Minutes, Styrelse, 16 Dec. 1946; "Anteckningar vid ett sammanträde i Göteborg ang. Situationen på arbetsmarknaden," 27 May 1946 (Edström 29/E3i/överstyrelsen).
120. SAF, Styrelse- och revisionsberättelser för år 1946, 35; SAF, Minutes, Styrelse, 29 Aug. and 24 Oct. 1946; SAF, Minutes, Styrelse, 16 Dec. 1946; "Anteckningar vid ett sammanträde i Göteborg ang. Situationen på arbetsmarknaden," 27 May 1946 (Edström 29/E3i/överstyrelsen).
121. SAF, Styrelse- och revisionsberättelser för år 1946, 35; SAF, Minutes, Styrelse, 29 Aug. and 24 Oct. 1946; SAF, Minutes, Styrelse, 16 Dec. 1946; "Anteckningar vid ett sammanträde i Göteborg ang. Situationen på arbetsmarknaden," 27 May 1946 (Edström 29/E3i/överstyrelsen).
122. SAF, Styrelse, 27 Nov. 1946; Ombudsmannakonferens, 18 Nov., 16 Dec. 1946.
123. SAF, Styrelse, 27 Nov. 1946; Ombudsmannakonferens, 18 Nov., 16 Dec. 1946.
124. SAF, Arbetsutskott, 25 June 1946, and appendixes (F. Andersson, Nässjö Bryggeri AB to Bryggeriarbetsgivareförbundet, 14 June 1946 and Felix Brandel, Tranås Bryggeri AB to Bryggeriarbetsgivareförbundet, 15 June 1946); SAF, "Cirkulär till Svenska Arbetsgivareföreningens delägare," Appendix A to Minutes, Styrelse, 28 Mar. 1946.
125. SAF, Arbetsutskott, 25 June 1946, and appendixes (F. Andersson, Nässjö Bryggeri AB to Bryggeriarbetsgivareförbundet, 14 June 1946 and Felix Brandel, Tranås Bryggeri AB to Bryggeriarbetsgivareförbundet, 15 June 1946); SAF, "Cirkulär till Svenska Arbetsgivareföreningens delägare," Appendix A to Minutes, Styrelse, 28 Mar. 1946.
126. On tight labor market conditions in 1947, see SAF, Styrelseoch revisionsberättelser för år 1947, 49-50. High level discussions into the 1950s regarding labor scarcity can be found, among other places, in SAF, Minutes, Styrelse, 27 Feb., 28 Aug., and 30 Oct. 1947; 26 Aug., 21 Oct., and 11 Nov. 1948; 17 Feb. and 15 Sept. 1949; 23 May and 19 Oct. 1950; 15 Nov. 1951; 22-23 Apr., 16 Sept., 21-22 Oct., and 18 Nov. 1954; 15 Sept. 1955; 18 Oct. 1956; 17 Oct. and 25 Apr. 1957. See also SAF, Minutes, Ombudsmannakonferens (Förbundsdirektörskonferens), 13-14 Sept. 1954; 11-12 Nov. 1957; and 15 Sept. 1958; and SAF, Minutes, Arbetsutskott, 13 July 1955.
127. On tight labor market conditions in 1947, see SAF, Styrelseoch revisionsberättelser för år 1947, 49-50. High level discussions into the 1950s regarding labor scarcity can be found, among other places, in SAF, Minutes, Styrelse, 27 Feb., 28 Aug., and 30 Oct. 1947; 26 Aug., 21 Oct., and 11 Nov. 1948; 17 Feb. and 15 Sept. 1949; 23 May and 19 Oct. 1950; 15 Nov. 1951; 22-23 Apr., 16 Sept., 21-22 Oct., and 18 Nov. 1954; 15 Sept. 1955; 18 Oct. 1956; 17 Oct. and 25 Apr. 1957. See also SAF, Minutes, Ombudsmannakonferens (Förbundsdirektörskonferens), 13-14 Sept. 1954; 11-12 Nov. 1957; and 15 Sept. 1958; and SAF, Minutes, Arbetsutskott, 13 July 1955.
128. On tight labor market conditions in 1947, see SAF, Styrelseoch revisionsberättelser för år 1947, 49-50. High level discussions into the 1950s regarding labor scarcity can be found, among other places, in SAF, Minutes, Styrelse, 27 Feb., 28 Aug., and 30 Oct. 1947; 26 Aug., 21 Oct., and 11 Nov. 1948; 17 Feb. and 15 Sept. 1949; 23 May and 19 Oct. 1950; 15 Nov. 1951; 22-23 Apr., 16 Sept., 21-22 Oct., and 18 Nov. 1954; 15 Sept. 1955; 18 Oct. 1956; 17 Oct. and 25 Apr. 1957. See also SAF, Minutes, Ombudsmannakonferens (Förbundsdirektörskonferens), 13-14 Sept. 1954; 11-12 Nov. 1957; and 15 Sept. 1958; and SAF, Minutes, Arbetsutskott, 13 July 1955.
129. On tight labor market conditions in 1947, see SAF, Styrelseoch revisionsberättelser för år 1947, 49-50. High level discussions into the 1950s regarding labor scarcity can be found, among other places, in SAF, Minutes, Styrelse, 27 Feb., 28 Aug., and 30 Oct. 1947; 26 Aug., 21 Oct., and 11 Nov. 1948; 17 Feb. and 15 Sept. 1949; 23 May and 19 Oct. 1950; 15 Nov. 1951; 22-23 Apr., 16 Sept., 21-22 Oct., and 18 Nov. 1954; 15 Sept. 1955; 18 Oct. 1956; 17 Oct. and 25 Apr. 1957. See also SAF, Minutes, Ombudsmannakonferens (Förbundsdirektörskonferens), 13-14 Sept. 1954; 11-12 Nov. 1957; and 15 Sept. 1958; and SAF, Minutes, Arbetsutskott, 13 July 1955.
130. The 1952 survey, with a response rate of 86 percent, covered firms with at least 50 workers. Vacation pay was subtracted from the 1952 totals to make them roughly comparable with the 1948 survey. SAF, Utrednings- och Upplysningsbyrå, "Utredning rörande sociala åtgärder inom industrin," Oct. 1948 [SAF A1/27ec]; SAF, "Företagens indirekta personalkostnader år 1952 - Preliminär redogörelse, " SAF, Minutes, Styrelse, Appendix 6, April 1954. On wartime solidarism in the United States, see Swenson, Capitalists against Markets, 168-75.
131. The 1952 survey, with a response rate of 86 percent, covered firms with at least 50 workers. Vacation pay was subtracted from the 1952 totals to make them roughly comparable with the 1948 survey. SAF, Utrednings- och Upplysningsbyrå, "Utredning rörande sociala åtgärder inom industrin," Oct. 1948 [SAF A1/27ec]; SAF, "Företagens indirekta personalkostnader år 1952 - Preliminär redogörelse, " SAF, Minutes, Styrelse, Appendix 6, April 1954. On wartime solidarism in the United States, see Swenson, Capitalists against Markets, 168-75.
132. The 1952 survey, with a response rate of 86 percent, covered firms with at least 50 workers. Vacation pay was subtracted from the 1952 totals to make them roughly comparable with the 1948 survey. SAF, Utrednings- och Upplysningsbyrå, "Utredning rörande sociala åtgärder inom industrin," Oct. 1948 [SAF A1/27ec]; SAF, "Företagens indirekta personalkostnader år 1952 - Preliminär redogörelse, " SAF, Minutes, Styrelse, Appendix 6, April 1954. On wartime solidarism in the United States, see Swenson, Capitalists against Markets, 168-75.
133. Geijer quoted in Frederic Fleisher, The New Sweden: The Challenge of a Disciplined Democracy (New York: David McKay, 1967), 88.
134. For more on this and the following, see Swenson, Capitalists against Markets, 260-65.
135. Fritjof Söderbäck, "Till Konungen," 23 Jan. 1946. SAF A150 (18x). See also "Lag om folkpensionering/yttrande"; Socialvårdskommitténs Betänkande XI - Utredning och förslag angående lag om folkpensionering. SOU 1945:46 (Stockholm: Statens Offentliga Utredningar, 1945), 134-35. SAF accepted incomes-tested supplementary housing benefits for those in high-rent areas only because universalistic benefits would put too much strain on government finances. However, the 1934 deducibility rules for company pensions were preserved, as employers wanted.
136. Fritjof Söderbäck, "Till Konungen," 23 Jan. 1946. SAF A150 (18x). See also "Lag om folkpensionering/yttrande"; Socialvårdskommitténs Betänkande XI - Utredning och förslag angående lag om folkpensionering. SOU 1945:46 (Stockholm: Statens Offentliga Utredningar, 1945), 134-35. SAF accepted incomes-tested supplementary housing benefits for those in high-rent areas only because universalistic benefits would put too much strain on government finances. However, the 1934 deducibility rules for company pensions were preserved, as employers wanted.
137. Dagens Nyheter, 9 Feb. 1946; Åke Elḿer, Folkpensioneringen i Sverige (Lund: CWK Gleerup, 1960), 85, 90, 140.
138. Dagens Nyheter, 9 Feb. 1946; Åke Elḿer, Folkpensioneringen i Sverige (Lund: CWK Gleerup, 1960), 85, 90, 140.
139. Biltrafikens Arbetsgivareförbund to SAF, 5 Jan. 1946. SAF:A150/18x/Lag om folkpensionering/yttranden från förbund; SAF, Styrelse, 30 May 1947 (discussion by Eric Brodén).
140. Biltrafikens Arbetsgivareförbund to SAF, 5 Jan. 1946. SAF:A150/18x/Lag om folkpensionering/yttranden från förbund; SAF, Styrelse, 30 May 1947 (discussion by Eric Brodén).
141. SAF, Minutes, Styrelse, 30 May 1947.
142. For more on this and the following, see Swenson, Capitalists against Markets, 269-74.
143. SAF, Minutes, Styrelse, 12 Nov. 1931.
144. SAF, Utrednings- och Upplysningsbyrå, "P.M. rörande avlösning av sjukförmåner i avtalen" (by Sven Hydén), Sept. 1949.
145. Implementation of earlier legislation, passed in 1946 against SAF's strong opposition, had been repeatedly postponed, until it was actually scrapped in 1951. The evidence indicates that among the Social Democrats' second thoughts were SAF's first: labor and materials shortages for hospital construction and personnel made it "impossible to implement." SAF also strenuously objected to the first law's flat-rate sick pay benefit, which was well above many rural incomes. This would have made it difficult for Swedish industry to continue attracting labor away from agriculture. "Den nya sjukkasselagen," (no date), SAF/A 1350/22å-I/Diverse PM och diskussionsanteckningar; "Högerledaren: Ogenomförbar reform är propagandareform," Svenska Dagbladet, 17 Mar. 1946; Fritjof Söderbäck, Remissyttrande över en inom socialdepartementet upprättad promemoria angående . . . allmän sjukförsäkring, 27 June 1945. SAF/A 1350/22m/Yttrande 1945.
146. Implementation of earlier legislation, passed in 1946 against SAF's strong opposition, had been repeatedly postponed, until it was actually scrapped in 1951. The evidence indicates that among the Social Democrats' second thoughts were SAF's first: labor and materials shortages for hospital construction and personnel made it "impossible to implement." SAF also strenuously objected to the first law's flat-rate sick pay benefit, which was well above many rural incomes. This would have made it difficult for Swedish industry to continue attracting labor away from agriculture. "Den nya sjukkasselagen," (no date), SAF/A 1350/22å-I/Diverse PM och diskussionsanteckningar; "Högerledaren: Ogenomförbar reform är propagandareform," Svenska Dagbladet, 17 Mar. 1946; Fritjof Söderbäck, Remissyttrande över en inom socialdepartementet upprättad promemoria angående . . . allmän sjukförsäkring, 27 June 1945. SAF/A 1350/22m/Yttrande 1945.
147. Erik Brodén, "Memorial, fört vid överläggning angående arbetarnas sjukförmåner," 2 June 1954. (Träindustriförbundet/Arbetarnas sjukförmåner, 1954).
148. Sven Hydén . . . . "Anteckningar från diskussion av SAF:s förslag till yttrande över socialförsäkringsutredningens betänkande om sjukförsäkring och yrkesskadeförsäkring", 10 Jan. 1958 (SAF/A1350/22å-II);
149. "PM angående sjukförsäkring" (by Sven Hydén), 17 Oct. 1952. SAF 1350/22å/Svar från styrelseledamöter; Träindustriförbundet, Yttrande över förslaget till yrkesskadeförsäkring. TIF/ Yrkesskadeförsäkring 1950-51.
150. Tom Söderberg, "Pappersmasseförbundets första halvsekel," in Pappersmasseförbundet 1907-1957, 121.
151. Torsten Svensson, Socialdemokratins dominans - En Studie av den svenska socialdemokratins partistrategi (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1994), 201, 205, 225-27, 236.
152. ALMP's administrative structures and even basic policies were actually introduced earlier, albeit on a limited scale, and with employer support in the 1930s and 1940s. See Swenson, Capitalists against Markets, 277-79.
153. Tommy Svensson, Från ackord till månadslön - En Studie av lönepolitiken, fackföreningarna och rationaliseringarna inom svensk varvsindustri under 1900-talet (Stockholm: Svenska Varv, 1983), 344-45; SAF, Minutes, Ombudsmannakonferens, 13 Dec. 1954; Bertil Kugelberg, "Minnesanteckningar från diskussion på Hotell Tunneln i Malmö," 8 Nov. 1954 (Kugelberg collection, SAF); SAF, Minutes, Styrelse, 21-22 Oct. 1954, and 18 Nov. 1954.
154. Tommy Svensson, Från ackord till månadslön - En Studie av lönepolitiken, fackföreningarna och rationaliseringarna inom svensk varvsindustri under 1900-talet (Stockholm: Svenska Varv, 1983), 344-45; SAF, Minutes, Ombudsmannakonferens, 13 Dec. 1954; Bertil Kugelberg, "Minnesanteckningar från diskussion på Hotell Tunneln i Malmö," 8 Nov. 1954 (Kugelberg collection, SAF); SAF, Minutes, Styrelse, 21-22 Oct. 1954, and 18 Nov. 1954.
155. Tommy Svensson, Från ackord till månadslön - En Studie av lönepolitiken, fackföreningarna och rationaliseringarna inom svensk varvsindustri under 1900-talet (Stockholm: Svenska Varv, 1983), 344-45; SAF, Minutes, Ombudsmannakonferens, 13 Dec. 1954; Bertil Kugelberg, "Minnesanteckningar från diskussion på Hotell Tunneln i Malmö," 8 Nov. 1954 (Kugelberg collection, SAF); SAF, Minutes, Styrelse, 21-22 Oct. 1954, and 18 Nov. 1954.
156. Tommy Svensson, Från ackord till månadslön - En Studie av lönepolitiken, fackföreningarna och rationaliseringarna inom svensk varvsindustri under 1900-talet (Stockholm: Svenska Varv, 1983), 344-45; SAF, Minutes, Ombudsmannakonferens, 13 Dec. 1954; Bertil Kugelberg, "Minnesanteckningar från diskussion på Hotell Tunneln i Malmö," 8 Nov. 1954 (Kugelberg collection, SAF); SAF, Minutes, Styrelse, 21-22 Oct. 1954, and 18 Nov. 1954.
157. Rehn, "Finansministrarna, LO-ekonomerna och arbetsmarknadspolitiken, " Ekonomisk debatt och ekonomisk politik - National-ekonomiska Föreningen 100 år (Stockholm: Norstedts, 1977). "Den nya arbetsmarknadspolitiken," Svensk sparbankstidskrift 43 (1959): 221, emphasis added.
158. Rehn, "Finansministrarna, LO-ekonomerna och arbetsmarknadspolitiken, " Ekonomisk debatt och ekonomisk politik - National-ekonomiska Föreningen 100 år (Stockholm: Norstedts, 1977). "Den nya arbetsmarknadspolitiken," Svensk sparbankstidskrift 43 (1959): 221, emphasis added.
159. "Finansministrarna, LO-ekonomerna och arbetsmarknadspolitiken," 246.
160. The conflict concerned what the LO economists regarded as the government's excessive reliance on traditional and rather clumsy expansionary macroeconomic policies to counteract increases in unemployment, while expecting the unions to exercise voluntary restraint on wages - even with unemployment dipping below 1 percent. Predictably, as in 1948, 1951, and 1955, the result was an explosion of wages and prices triggered by wage drift. Firms systematically violated centrally negotiated wage increases. Paying more than unions had settled for was of course deeply embarrassing to them, so they who would then rush in with militant demands to reclaim leadership in representing workers' interests. Rehn, "Finansministrarna, LO-ekonomerna och arbetsmarknadspolitiken," 234-37.
161. SAF objected, for example, to eliminating AMS's role in procuring nannies (hemvårdarinnor) for families with two working parents. "It is of greatest importance, "SAF wrote, "that the potential manpower reserve consisting of non-gainfully employed women, is supplied to production." Yttrande, 8 Feb. 1951 [SAF A7100(2u) Betr. den offentliga arbetsförmedlingens organisation].
162. Esping-Andersen and Friedland, "Class Coalitions in the Making of West European Economies," Political Power and Social Theory 3 (1982):17, 19, 47.
163. Curt-Steffan Giesecke, Stann-Anders och likheten: Inlägg i arbetsmarknadsfrågor (Stockholm: Albert Bonnier, 1968), esp. 89-92; 100; 103.
164. Rudolf Meidner, "Limits of Active Labour Market Policy, especially with Respect to the Case of Sweden," SAMF-Conference on "Public Policy to Combat Unemployment," (Nürnberg, Germany, 20-21 June 1983), 3; Gösta Rehn, "Swedish Active Labor Market Policy: Retrospect and Prospect," Industrial Relations 24 (1985): 73.
165. Rudolf Meidner, "Limits of Active Labour Market Policy, especially with Respect to the Case of Sweden," SAMF-Conference on "Public Policy to Combat Unemployment," (Nürnberg, Germany, 20-21 June 1983), 3; Gösta Rehn, "Swedish Active Labor Market Policy: Retrospect and Prospect," Industrial Relations 24 (1985): 73.
166. See Swenson, Capitalists against Markets, 306-7.
167. Lars Gunnar Albåge, "Arbetsmarknadspolitiken bör ses som arbetsgivarnas bundsförvant," Arbetsgivaren 8 Mar. 1968, 5; Magnus Jerneck, SAFs Framtidssyn: Förutsägelser, makättningar och dilemman (Stockholm: SAF, 1986), 116.
168. Lars Gunnar Albåge, "Arbetsmarknadspolitiken bör ses som arbetsgivarnas bundsförvant," Arbetsgivaren 8 Mar. 1968, 5; Magnus Jerneck, SAFs Framtidssyn: Förutsägelser, makättningar och dilemman (Stockholm: SAF, 1986), 116.
169. Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson, "Business Power and Social Policy: Employers and the Formation of the American Welfare State," Politics and Society 30 (2002): 277-325.
170. Ibid., 309.
171. Eric Helleiner, States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), 25-50; Lars Jonung, "Riksbankens politik 1945 - En krönika," in Från räntereglering till inflationsnorm - Det finansiella systemet och riksbankens politik 1945-1990, ed. Lars Werin (Stockholm: SNS, 1993), 317-18, 329, 343-44, 361-64, and 370-71.
172. Eric Helleiner, States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), 25-50; Lars Jonung, "Riksbankens politik 1945 - En krönika," in Från räntereglering till inflationsnorm - Det finansiella systemet och riksbankens politik 1945-1990, ed. Lars Werin (Stockholm: SNS, 1993), 317-18, 329, 343-44, 361-64, and 370-71.
173. If we turn to capitalists' "instrumental" power (exercised in electoral financing, lobbying, and opinion making) the puzzle remains: given that the Democratic Party depended heavily on capitalist funds, why would the New Dealers have so brazenly defied capital? A recent work by Mark Smith suggests a possible answer consistent with the power outage argument. The contributors may have invested campaign contributions mostly for particularistic benefits (subsidies, regulations, and tax breaks) that both parties trafficked in. Thus capitalist money for Democrats was for other things than correct social policy. Even had the New Dealers defied unified capital in the social policy realm, they could have continued delivering all manner of particularistic advantages. They could reform with impunity, yet the money would continue to flow. It should be clear by now, however, that it is wrong to starkly differentiate social welfare issues from particularistic ones. Social insurance reform was less a "unifying issue" (in Smith's sense, uniting capitalists against reformers) than meets the eye. Mark Smith, American Business and Political Power: Public Opinion, Elections, and Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000).
174. Hacker and Pierson, "Business Power and Social Policy," 308.
175. That criticism needs no repetition here. See Domhoff, The Power Elite and the State: Haw Policy is Made in America (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1990), 54-57; Domhoff, State Autonomy or Class Dominance: Case Studies of Policy Making in America (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1996), 161-63; Swenson, "Arranged Alliance: Business Interests in the New Deal," Politics and Society 25 (1997): 88-90; Swenson, Capitalists against Markets, 223-26.
176. That criticism needs no repetition here. See Domhoff, The Power Elite and the State: Haw Policy is Made in America (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1990), 54-57; Domhoff, State Autonomy or Class Dominance: Case Studies of Policy Making in America (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1996), 161-63; Swenson, "Arranged Alliance: Business Interests in the New Deal," Politics and Society 25 (1997): 88-90; Swenson, Capitalists against Markets, 223-26.
177. That criticism needs no repetition here. See Domhoff, The Power Elite and the State: Haw Policy is Made in America (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1990), 54-57; Domhoff, State Autonomy or Class Dominance: Case Studies of Policy Making in America (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1996), 161-63; Swenson, "Arranged Alliance: Business Interests in the New Deal," Politics and Society 25 (1997): 88-90; Swenson, Capitalists against Markets, 223-26.
178. That criticism needs no repetition here. See Domhoff, The Power Elite and the State: Haw Policy is Made in America (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1990), 54-57; Domhoff, State Autonomy or Class Dominance: Case Studies of Policy Making in America (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1996), 161-63; Swenson, "Arranged Alliance: Business Interests in the New Deal," Politics and Society 25 (1997): 88-90; Swenson, Capitalists against Markets, 223-26.
179. P. Tecumseh Sherman, "Old Age Pensions and Compulsory Old Age Insurance of Wage Workers," in Charles L. Edgar, William R. Willcox, and P. Tecumseh Sherman, Old Age Pensions Conference (New York: National Civic Federation, 1927), 7.
180. Gerard Swope, The Swope Plan: Details, Criticisms, Analysis (New York: The Business Bourse, 1931), 25-27; Henry I. Harriman, "The Stabilization of Business and Employment," American Economic Review 22 (1932), 63-74. Robert Himmelberg speculates, like Hacker and Pierson, that Swope and Harriman were strategically trying to preempt legislative action "that Congress might begin to move toward," but also trying to sweeten the cartelist "planned production" pill (see discussion of the NRA below). He ignores, inappropriately, Swope's explicit reasoning, which was entirely in line with, not extraneous to the cartelist project. Of course, all three reasons, being noncontradictory, could be correct. Robert F. Himmelberg, The Origins of the National Recovery Administration: Business, Government, and the Trade Association Issue, 1921-1933 (New York: Fordham University Press, 1993), 135.
181. Gerard Swope, The Swope Plan: Details, Criticisms, Analysis (New York: The Business Bourse, 1931), 25-27; Henry I. Harriman, "The Stabilization of Business and Employment," American Economic Review 22 (1932), 63-74. Robert Himmelberg speculates, like Hacker and Pierson, that Swope and Harriman were strategically trying to preempt legislative action "that Congress might begin to move toward," but also trying to sweeten the cartelist "planned production" pill (see discussion of the NRA below). He ignores, inappropriately, Swope's explicit reasoning, which was entirely in line with, not extraneous to the cartelist project. Of course, all three reasons, being noncontradictory, could be correct. Robert F. Himmelberg, The Origins of the National Recovery Administration: Business, Government, and the Trade Association Issue, 1921-1933 (New York: Fordham University Press, 1993), 135.
182. Gerard Swope, The Swope Plan: Details, Criticisms, Analysis (New York: The Business Bourse, 1931), 25-27; Henry I. Harriman, "The Stabilization of Business and Employment," American Economic Review 22 (1932), 63-74. Robert Himmelberg speculates, like Hacker and Pierson, that Swope and Harriman were strategically trying to preempt legislative action "that Congress might begin to move toward," but also trying to sweeten the cartelist "planned production" pill (see discussion of the NRA below). He ignores, inappropriately, Swope's explicit reasoning, which was entirely in line with, not extraneous to the cartelist project. Of course, all three reasons, being noncontradictory, could be correct. Robert F. Himmelberg, The Origins of the National Recovery Administration: Business, Government, and the Trade Association Issue, 1921-1933 (New York: Fordham University Press, 1993), 135.
183. Hacker and Pierson, "Business Power and Social Policy," 300-301.
184. U.S. Senate, Committee on Education and Labor, Violations of Free Speech and Rights of Labor Labor Policies of Employers' Associations, Part III (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1939), 211-12. Filene is quoted in David C.D. Jacobs, Business Lobbies and the Power Structure in America (Westport, CT: Quorum, 1999), 81-92.
185. U.S. Senate, Committee on Education and Labor, Violations of Free Speech and Rights of Labor Labor Policies of Employers' Associations, Part III (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1939), 211-12. Filene is quoted in David C.D. Jacobs, Business Lobbies and the Power Structure in America (Westport, CT: Quorum, 1999), 81-92.
186. U.S. Senate, Committee on Education and Labor, Violations of Free Speech and Rights of labor. Labor Policies of Employers' Associations, Part I, 50-51.
187. J. Douglas Brown to Edwin E. Witte, 13 Feb. 1935. J. Douglas Brown Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University.
188. Sanford Jacoby, "Employers and the Welfare State: The Role of Marion B. Folsom," Journal of American History 80 (1993), 544. See also Domhoff, The Power Elite and the Stale, 56.
189. Sanford Jacoby, "Employers and the Welfare State: The Role of Marion B. Folsom," Journal of American History 80 (1993), 544. See also Domhoff, The Power Elite and the Stale, 56.
190. I.M. Rubinow, "The Movement Toward Unemployment Insurance in Ohio," Social Service Review 7 (1933): 213. When Roosevelt optimistically invited William P. Wrigley of Chicago, who had installed a company unemployment insurance plan, on the advisory committee, the response was a curt and off-putting letter from his secretary. We do not know why, but nevertheless, Wrigley contributed to the Democratic party in 1936. Witte, Development of the Social Security Act, 50; Overacker, "Campaign Funds," 473-98, Berkowitz and McQuaid, Creating the Welfare State, 118; Nelson, Unemployment Insurance, 63.
191. I.M. Rubinow, "The Movement Toward Unemployment Insurance in Ohio," Social Service Review 7 (1933): 213. When Roosevelt optimistically invited William P. Wrigley of Chicago, who had installed a company unemployment insurance plan, on the advisory committee, the response was a curt and off-putting letter from his secretary. We do not know why, but nevertheless, Wrigley contributed to the Democratic party in 1936. Witte, Development of the Social Security Act, 50; Overacker, "Campaign Funds," 473-98, Berkowitz and McQuaid, Creating the Welfare State, 118; Nelson, Unemployment Insurance, 63.
192. I.M. Rubinow, "The Movement Toward Unemployment Insurance in Ohio," Social Service Review 7 (1933): 213. When Roosevelt optimistically invited William P. Wrigley of Chicago, who had installed a company unemployment insurance plan, on the advisory committee, the response was a curt and off-putting letter from his secretary. We do not know why, but nevertheless, Wrigley contributed to the Democratic party in 1936. Witte, Development of the Social Security Act, 50; Overacker, "Campaign Funds," 473-98, Berkowitz and McQuaid, Creating the Welfare State, 118; Nelson, Unemployment Insurance, 63.
193. I.M. Rubinow, "The Movement Toward Unemployment Insurance in Ohio," Social Service Review 7 (1933): 213. When Roosevelt optimistically invited William P. Wrigley of Chicago, who had installed a company unemployment insurance plan, on the advisory committee, the response was a curt and off-putting letter from his secretary. We do not know why, but nevertheless, Wrigley contributed to the Democratic party in 1936. Witte, Development of the Social Security Act, 50; Overacker, "Campaign Funds," 473-98, Berkowitz and McQuaid, Creating the Welfare State, 118; Nelson, Unemployment Insurance, 63.
194. I.M. Rubinow, "The Movement Toward Unemployment Insurance in Ohio," Social Service Review 7 (1933): 213. When Roosevelt optimistically invited William P. Wrigley of Chicago, who had installed a company unemployment insurance plan, on the advisory committee, the response was a curt and off-putting letter from his secretary. We do not know why, but nevertheless, Wrigley contributed to the Democratic party in 1936. Witte, Development of the Social Security Act, 50; Overacker, "Campaign Funds," 473-98, Berkowitz and McQuaid, Creating the Welfare State, 118; Nelson, Unemployment Insurance, 63.
195. "Chamber Distorts Voice of Business," New York Times, 4 May 1935; Raymond Moley, "Misrepresenting American Business," Today, 11 May 1935, 12-13; Folsom, "Millions of Workers Still Lack Adequate Benefits," in Business and Social Progress: Views of Two Generations of Executives, ed. Clarence C. Walton (New York: Praeger, 1970), 99.
196. "Chamber Distorts Voice of Business," New York Times, 4 May 1935; Raymond Moley, "Misrepresenting American Business," Today, 11 May 1935, 12-13; Folsom, "Millions of Workers Still Lack Adequate Benefits," in Business and Social Progress: Views of Two Generations of Executives, ed. Clarence C. Walton (New York: Praeger, 1970), 99.
197. "Chamber Distorts Voice of Business," New York Times, 4 May 1935; Raymond Moley, "Misrepresenting American Business," Today, 11 May 1935, 12-13; Folsom, "Millions of Workers Still Lack Adequate Benefits," in Business and Social Progress: Views of Two Generations of Executives, ed. Clarence C. Walton (New York: Praeger, 1970), 99.
198. Domhoff, State Autonomy or Class Dominance, 131-32.
199. See for example H. W. Story, "The Wisconsin Unemployment Reserves and Compensation System," in Pooled Versus Reserve funds for Unemployment Compensation (New York: American Management Association, 1935), 10-13. Story was vice president for Allis-Chalmers, a major Wisconsin manufacturer. See also Daniel Nelson, Unemployment Insurance: The American Experience 1915-1935 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969), 120, 124, 128.
200. See for example H. W. Story, "The Wisconsin Unemployment Reserves and Compensation System," in Pooled Versus Reserve funds for Unemployment Compensation (New York: American Management Association, 1935), 10-13. Story was vice president for Allis-Chalmers, a major Wisconsin manufacturer. See also Daniel Nelson, Unemployment Insurance: The American Experience 1915-1935 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969), 120, 124, 128.
201. Hacker and Pierson diminish the importance of Domhoff's revealing research on the IRC, relied on here, by mistakenly calling his claims "conspiratorial." Unfortunately, they pay no attention to the strategic element in the personnel choices that no one else but Domhoff has so excellently illuminated. Hacker and Pierson, "Business Power and Social Policy," 307-8.
202. See Swenson, Capitalists against Markets, 195-201.
203. Hacker and Pierson, "Business Power and Social Policy," 312.
204. Ibid.; Witte, Development of the Social Security Act, 157.
205. Ibid.; Witte, Development of the Social Security Act, 157.
206. The other companies included U.S. Steel, Socony-Vacuum, Du Pont, U.S. Rubber, Union Carbide, Western Electric, and "a number of others." Brown to Witte, 13 Feb. 1935 and 23 Feb. 1935. J. Douglas Brown Papers, Mudd Library, Princeton University. See also Domhoff, State Autonomy or Class Dominance?, esp. 167-69, for evidence of big employers' views on the Clark option.
207. The other companies included U.S. Steel, Socony-Vacuum, Du Pont, U.S. Rubber, Union Carbide, Western Electric, and "a number of others." Brown to Witte, 13 Feb. 1935 and 23 Feb. 1935. J. Douglas Brown Papers, Mudd Library, Princeton University. See also Domhoff, State Autonomy or Class Dominance?, esp. 167-69, for evidence of big employers' views on the Clark option.
208. Industrial Relations Counselors, Inc., "Company Pension Plans and the Economic Security Bill," 1 Feb. 1935 (document generously provided to author by G. William Domhoff).
209. J. Douglas Brown to Murray Latimer, 12 Aug. 1935. Murray Latimer Collection, George Washington University Library, Washington D.C.
210. Witte, Development of the Social Security Act, 157.
211. In a letter to Latimer, Brown asks him how he broke the jam, and "did the attitude of the large corporations affect the decision[?]" (Brown to Latimer, 12 Aug. 1935).
212. Brown to Witte, 13 Feb. 1935. Within days after passage the IRC informed its segmentalist clients that "the long debate on this matter was due mainly to a misunderstanding of the issues on the part of some members of Congress and by a few industrial companies, as well as to the pressure from lobbying." Industrial Relations Counselors, "Memorandum to Clients," No. 14, Aug. 16, 1935 (document generously supplied by G. William Domhoff).
213. "Discussion by C. Arthur Kulp [of Rainard Robbins, "The Effect of Social Security Legislation on Private Pension Plans]" Journal of the American Association of University Teachers of Insurance 5 '(1938): 56.
214. Folsom, "Company Annuity Plans and the Federal Old Age Benefit Plan," Harvard Business Review 14 (1936): 420. On "lukewarm," see Folsom quote in Robbins, Preliminary Report, 1936 (document generously supplied by G. William Domhoff from Rockefeller Archive Center). The adverse selection problem was already known, before passage of the SSA, by IRC/CES expert Latimer from the IRC. This may help explain Folsom's earlier lukewarmness. Murray Latimer, "Memorandum on Proposed Amendments Permitting Employers with Private Pension Plans to Contract out of the Government System," unpublished CES study, 1935 (www.ssa.gov/history/reports/ces/ces2latimer.l.html) . See also economist Paul Douglas's view that "the competitive advantage of young employees would enable such a firm to undersell competitors with older employees, and thus force the elimination of older employees or their employment only on the condition that they join the federal plan." Rainard Robbins, Preliminary Report, 24.
215. Folsom, "Company Annuity Plans and the Federal Old Age Benefit Plan," Harvard Business Review 14 (1936): 420. On "lukewarm," see Folsom quote in Robbins, Preliminary Report, 1936 (document generously supplied by G. William Domhoff from Rockefeller Archive Center). The adverse selection problem was already known, before passage of the SSA, by IRC/CES expert Latimer from the IRC. This may help explain Folsom's earlier lukewarmness. Murray Latimer, "Memorandum on Proposed Amendments Permitting Employers with Private Pension Plans to Contract out of the Government System," unpublished CES study, 1935 (www.ssa.gov/history/reports/ces/ces2latimer.l.html) . See also economist Paul Douglas's view that "the competitive advantage of young employees would enable such a firm to undersell competitors with older employees, and thus force the elimination of older employees or their employment only on the condition that they join the federal plan." Rainard Robbins, Preliminary Report, 24.
216. Folsom, "Company Annuity Plans and the Federal Old Age Benefit Plan," Harvard Business Review 14 (1936): 420. On "lukewarm," see Folsom quote in Robbins, Preliminary Report, 1936 (document generously supplied by G. William Domhoff from Rockefeller Archive Center). The adverse selection problem was already known, before passage of the SSA, by IRC/CES expert Latimer from the IRC. This may help explain Folsom's earlier lukewarmness. Murray Latimer, "Memorandum on Proposed Amendments Permitting Employers with Private Pension Plans to Contract out of the Government System," unpublished CES study, 1935 (www.ssa.gov/history/reports/ces/ces2latimer.l.html) . See also economist Paul Douglas's view that "the competitive advantage of young employees would enable such a firm to undersell competitors with older employees, and thus force the elimination of older employees or their employment only on the condition that they join the federal plan." Rainard Robbins, Preliminary Report, 24.
217. Folsom, "Company Annuity Plans and the Federal Old Age Benefit Plan," Harvard Business Review 14 (1936): 420. On "lukewarm," see Folsom quote in Robbins, Preliminary Report, 1936 (document generously supplied by G. William Domhoff from Rockefeller Archive Center). The adverse selection problem was already known, before passage of the SSA, by IRC/CES expert Latimer from the IRC. This may help explain Folsom's earlier lukewarmness. Murray Latimer, "Memorandum on Proposed Amendments Permitting Employers with Private Pension Plans to Contract out of the Government System," unpublished CES study, 1935 (www.ssa.gov/history/reports/ces/ces2latimer.l.html) . See also economist Paul Douglas's view that "the competitive advantage of young employees would enable such a firm to undersell competitors with older employees, and thus force the elimination of older employees or their employment only on the condition that they join the federal plan." Rainard Robbins, Preliminary Report, 24.
218. J. Douglas Brown, "The Basic Philosophy of the Federal Old-Age Security Program," in Practical Aspects of Unemployment Insurance and Old-Age Security (New York: American Management Association, 1935), 41.
219. Industrial Relations Counselors, "Memorandum to Clients."
220. "Dimly" because at one point, Hacker and Pierson admit that the regulatory/cost-shifting effects of OAI were "partly anticipated." Unfortunately, they do not indicate what exactly was known, and how partly, in order to explain why the foreknowledge does not partly weaken their argument. They also explain business support for OAI arising because of later tax incentives for voluntary plans. For criticism of the anticipated cross-class alliance argument this is irrelevant; if anything it confirms the importance of cross-class alliances in American social policy. As the logic of negotiated segmentalism or "unionized welfare capitalism" would predict, employers and organized labor have both benefitted from and defended tax expenditures on employment-based private welfare. To put it another way, the advantages of the tax breaks would have been wholly, not partly anticipated when introduced. Cross-class alliance making was an ongoing process. Hacker and Pierson, "Business Power," 310-11.
221. Robert H. Wiebe, Businessmen and Reform: A Study of the Progressive Movement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962), 48-50; 55-56; Morton Keller, Regulating a New Economy: Public Policy and Economic Change in America 1900-1933 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 46-48.
222. Robert H. Wiebe, Businessmen and Reform: A Study of the Progressive Movement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962), 48-50; 55-56; Morton Keller, Regulating a New Economy: Public Policy and Economic Change in America 1900-1933 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 46-48.
223. Robert F. Himmelberg, The Origins of the National Recovery Administration: Business, Government, and the Trade Association Issue, 1921-1933 (New York: Fordham University Press, 1993).
224. Ellis W. Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly: A Study in Economic Ambivalence (New York: Fordham University Press, 1995), 39-40.
225. Himmelberg, Origins of the National Recovery Administration, xiii.
226. Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly, 27 (quote), 57-62, 67-68, 79-82, 89-90, 93-95, 101-1, 108-9, 120-21, 124; Himmelberg, Origins of the National Recovery Administration, ix, xv, 3, 48-49.
227. Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly, 27 (quote), 57-62, 67-68, 79-82, 89-90, 93-95, 101-1, 108-9, 120-21, 124; Himmelberg, Origins of the National Recovery Administration, ix, xv, 3, 48-49.
228. Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly, 42-43, 101, 126, 143.
229. Material in this and the preceding paragraph is from Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly, 26-28; Himmelberg, Origins of the National Recovery Administration, 81-83, 90-93, 111-14, 187, 202.
230. Material in this and the preceding paragraph is from Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly, 26-28; Himmelberg, Origins of the National Recovery Administration, 81-83, 90-93, 111-14, 187, 202.
231. It neither weakened the political will to install the NRA; nor can it tidily sum up except in a tautological way what happened afterward. For the "state capacity" argument see Theda Skocpol and Kenneth Finegold, "State Capacity and Economic Intervention in the Early New Deal," Political Science Quarterly 97 (1982): 255-78. For critiques, see Donald Brand, Corporatism and the Rule of Law: A Study of the National Recovery Administration (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), 311 , and Domhoff, State Autonomy or Class Dominance?, 56-72, 101-16.
232. It neither weakened the political will to install the NRA; nor can it tidily sum up except in a tautological way what happened afterward. For the "state capacity" argument see Theda Skocpol and Kenneth Finegold, "State Capacity and Economic Intervention in the Early New Deal," Political Science Quarterly 97 (1982): 255-78. For critiques, see Donald Brand, Corporatism and the Rule of Law: A Study of the National Recovery Administration (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), 311 , and Domhoff, State Autonomy or Class Dominance?, 56-72, 101-16.
233. It neither weakened the political will to install the NRA; nor can it tidily sum up except in a tautological way what happened afterward. For the "state capacity" argument see Theda Skocpol and Kenneth Finegold, "State Capacity and Economic Intervention in the Early New Deal," Political Science Quarterly 97 (1982): 255-78. For critiques, see Donald Brand, Corporatism and the Rule of Law: A Study of the National Recovery Administration (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), 311 , and Domhoff, State Autonomy or Class Dominance?, 56-72, 101-16.
234. Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly, 69-70, 79-80, 93, 115, 118, 122.
235. See especially Brand, Corporatism and the Rule of Law, 175-206; and Bernard Bellush, The Failure of the NRA (New York: Norton, 1975), 55-84.
236. See especially Brand, Corporatism and the Rule of Law, 175-206; and Bernard Bellush, The Failure of the NRA (New York: Norton, 1975), 55-84.
237. Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly, 167.
238. Himmelberg, Origins of the National Recovery Administration, 208.
239. Peter Hall, Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 231-33, 283. See also 70, 91, 126-27, 158, 260, and 263 for other references to distributions and balances of power.
240. Hall, Governing the Economy, 19, 233, 277.
241. John Kenneth Galbraith, American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power, rev. ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1956), 114-17.
242. In 1970, Swedish auto workers earned only 110 percent of the average for all manual workers in manufacturing, while their American counterparts earned 126 percent. Add fringe benefits, and the difference is greater. Ingvar Ohlsson, "Den solidariska lönepolitikens resultat," in Lönepolitik och solidaritet - Debattinlägg via Meidnerseminariet 1980 (Stockholm: LO, 1980). On the postNew Deal period, see Howell John Harris, The Right to Manage: Industrial Relations Policies of American Business in the 1940s (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982), 170; Nelson Lichtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuther and the Fate of American Labor (New York: Basic, 1995), 297. Anders Kjellgren, Facklig organisationsutvechling i tolv länder (Lund: Arkiv, 1983), 269-319; Swenson, Capitalists against Markets, 75-76.
243. In 1970, Swedish auto workers earned only 110 percent of the average for all manual workers in manufacturing, while their American counterparts earned 126 percent. Add fringe benefits, and the difference is greater. Ingvar Ohlsson, "Den solidariska lönepolitikens resultat," in Lönepolitik och solidaritet - Debattinlägg via Meidnerseminariet 1980 (Stockholm: LO, 1980). On the postNew Deal period, see Howell John Harris, The Right to Manage: Industrial Relations Policies of American Business in the 1940s (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982), 170; Nelson Lichtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuther and the Fate of American Labor (New York: Basic, 1995), 297. Anders Kjellgren, Facklig organisationsutvechling i tolv länder (Lund: Arkiv, 1983), 269-319; Swenson, Capitalists against Markets, 75-76.
244. In 1970, Swedish auto workers earned only 110 percent of the average for all manual workers in manufacturing, while their American counterparts earned 126 percent. Add fringe benefits, and the difference is greater. Ingvar Ohlsson, "Den solidariska lönepolitikens resultat," in Lönepolitik och solidaritet - Debattinlägg via Meidnerseminariet 1980 (Stockholm: LO, 1980). On the postNew Deal period, see Howell John Harris, The Right to Manage: Industrial Relations Policies of American Business in the 1940s (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982), 170; Nelson Lichtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuther and the Fate of American Labor (New York: Basic, 1995), 297. Anders Kjellgren, Facklig organisationsutvechling i tolv länder (Lund: Arkiv, 1983), 269-319; Swenson, Capitalists against Markets, 75-76.
245. In 1970, Swedish auto workers earned only 110 percent of the average for all manual workers in manufacturing, while their American counterparts earned 126 percent. Add fringe benefits, and the difference is greater. Ingvar Ohlsson, "Den solidariska lönepolitikens resultat," in Lönepolitik och solidaritet - Debattinlägg via Meidnerseminariet 1980 (Stockholm: LO, 1980). On the postNew Deal period, see Howell John Harris, The Right to Manage: Industrial Relations Policies of American Business in the 1940s (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982), 170; Nelson Lichtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuther and the Fate of American Labor (New York: Basic, 1995), 297. Anders Kjellgren, Facklig organisationsutvechling i tolv länder (Lund: Arkiv, 1983), 269-319; Swenson, Capitalists against Markets, 75-76.
246. In 1970, Swedish auto workers earned only 110 percent of the average for all manual workers in manufacturing, while their American counterparts earned 126 percent. Add fringe benefits, and the difference is greater. Ingvar Ohlsson, "Den solidariska lönepolitikens resultat," in Lönepolitik och solidaritet - Debattinlägg via Meidnerseminariet 1980 (Stockholm: LO, 1980). On the postNew Deal period, see Howell John Harris, The Right to Manage: Industrial Relations Policies of American Business in the 1940s (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982), 170; Nelson Lichtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuther and the Fate of American Labor (New York: Basic, 1995), 297. Anders Kjellgren, Facklig organisationsutvechling i tolv länder (Lund: Arkiv, 1983), 269-319; Swenson, Capitalists against Markets, 75-76.
247. Axel Brunius, "De svenska arbetsgivarnas organisationsformer," draft of an article for Chalmerska jubileumsskriften, no date (probably 1929), Edström collection, vol. 34 (A14d); SAF, Minutes, Styrelse, 28 Feb. 1934; Ivar Larson to Axel Palmgren, IS Feb. 1936, Axel Palmgren papers, Åbo Akademin, Åbo, Finland. On the construction conflict, see Swenson, Capitalists against Markets, 100-109.
248. Axel Brunius, "De svenska arbetsgivarnas organisationsformer," draft of an article for Chalmerska jubileumsskriften, no date (probably 1929), Edström collection, vol. 34 (A14d); SAF, Minutes, Styrelse, 28 Feb. 1934;
249. Axel Brunius, "De svenska arbetsgivarnas organisationsformer," draft of an article for Chalmerska jubileumsskriften, no date (probably 1929), Edström collection, vol. 34 (A14d); SAF, Minutes, Styrelse, 28 Feb. 1934; Ivar Larson to Axel Palmgren, IS Feb. 1936, Axel Palmgren papers, Åbo Akademin, Åbo, Finland. On the construction conflict, see Swenson, Capitalists against Markets, 100-109.
250. VF, Minutes, Extra allmänt möte, 21 Feb. 1920; Hjalmar von Sydow to Axel Palmgren, 17 Dec. 1927, Palmgren collection, vol. 7, Åbo Akademin, Åbo, Finland; "P.M. rörande oorganiserade arbetares förhållande under arbetskonflikt," Dec. 1934 [SAF-A555/20b]; Karl-Gustaf Hildebrand, Örjan Armfelt-Hansell and Arne Törnqvist, Sågverksförbundet 1907-1957 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1962), 240.
251. VF, Minutes, Extra allmänt möte, 21 Feb. 1920; Hjalmar von Sydow to Axel Palmgren, 17 Dec. 1927, Palmgren collection, vol. 7, Åbo Akademin, Åbo, Finland; "P.M. rörande oorganiserade arbetares förhållande under arbetskonflikt," Dec. 1934 [SAF-A555/20b]; Karl-Gustaf Hildebrand, Örjan Armfelt-Hansell and Arne Törnqvist, Sågverksförbundet 1907-1957 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1962), 240.
252. VF, Minutes, Extra allmänt möte, 21 Feb. 1920; Hjalmar von Sydow to Axel Palmgren, 17 Dec. 1927, Palmgren collection, vol. 7, Åbo Akademin, Åbo, Finland; "P.M. rörande oorganiserade arbetares förhållande under arbetskonflikt," Dec. 1934 [SAF-A555/20b]; Karl-Gustaf Hildebrand, Örjan Armfelt-Hansell and Arne Törnqvist, Sågverksförbundet 1907-1957 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1962), 240.
253. This conclusion applies to the major pension reform of 1959 as well. Employers, despite initial strong opposition, turned out to be happy with the final form the legislation took. See Swenson, Labor Markets and Welfare States, 281-92.
254. See Peter Hall and David Soskice, "An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism," in Hall and Soskice eds., Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 1-68, and an extension of the "Varieties" analysis in Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice, "Social Protection and the Formation of Skills: A Reinterpretation of the Welfare State."