Corporate governance reform and the German party paradox

Comparative Politics

Volumn 39, Issue 4, 2007, Pages

  Höpner, Martin ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 34548661721     PISSN: 00104159     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (81)

1. Ian Budge and David Robertson, "Comparative Analysis of Post-war Election Programs: Do Parties Differ and How?," in Ian Budge, David Robertson, and Derek Herl, eds., Ideology, Strategy and Party Change: Spatial Analysis of Post-war Election Programs in 19 Democracies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 388-416.
2. Manfred G. Schmidt, "The Impact of Political Parties, Constitutional Structures and Veto Players in Public Policy," in Hans Keman, ed., Comparative Democratic Politics (London: Sage, 2002), 166-84.
3. James E. Alt, "Political Parties, World Demand, and Unemployment: Domestic and International Sources of Economic Activity," American Political Science Review, 79 (December 1985), 1016-40;
4. Douglas Hibbs, "Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policies," American Political Science Review, 71 (December 1977), 467-87.
5. Louis M. Imbeau, François Pétry, and Moktar Lamari, "Left-Right Party Ideology and Government Policies: A Meta-analysis," European Journal of Political Research, 40 (March 2001), 1-29;
6. M anfred G. Schmidt, "When Parties Matter: A Review of the Possibilities and Limits of Partisan Influence on Public Policy," European Journal of Political Research, 30 (June 1996), 155-83.
7. Gøsta Esping-Andersen, Politics against Markets: The Social Democratic Road to Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).
8. Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, "An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism," in Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, eds., Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 21.
9. Michel Albert, Capitalism vs. Capitalism: How America's Obsession with Individual Achievement and Short-Term Profit Has Led It to the Brink of Collapse. (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 1993), p. 205.
10. Hall and Soskice;
11. Bruno Amable, "Institutional Complementarity and Diversity of Social Systems of Innovation and Production," Review of International Political Economy, 7 (December 2000), 645-87;
12. Martin Höpner, "What Connects Industrial Relations with Corporate Governance? Explaining Complementarity," Socio-Economic Review, 3 (September 2005), 331-57.
13. Mark J. Roe, Political Determinants of Corporate Governance: Political Context, Corporate Impact (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
14. Mark J. Roe, Political Foundations for Separating Ownership from Corporate Control (New York: Columbia Law School Center for Law and Economic Studies Working Paper No. 155, 2000), p. 19.
15. Peter A. Gourevitch and James Shinn, Political Power and Corporate Control: The New Global Politics of Corporate Governance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).
16. See, for example, Howard Gospel and Andrew Pendleton, eds., Corporate Governance and Labor Management: An International Comparison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
17. Examples for target companies are ATU (2004), Celanese (2004), Debitel (2004), Demag (2002), Deutsche Börse (2005), Duales System Deutschland (2004), Dynamit Nobel (2004), Gagfah (2004), Gerresheimer Glas (2004), HDW (2002), Hypovereinsbank (2004), Klöckner (2001), Minimax (2003), MTU (2003), ProSiebenSat.1 (2003), Rodenstock (2003), SGL Carbon (2004), Siemens Nixdorf (1999), Tank & Rast (2004), and TUI (2004).
18. Henry Manne, "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, 73 (April 1965), 110-20.
19. Hall and Soskice, p. 21.
20. Henk Wouter de Jong, "The Governance Structure and Performance of Large European Corporations," The Journal of Management and Governance, 1 (March 1997), 5-27.
21. Martin Höpner and Gregory Jackson, An Emerging Market for Corporate Control? The Mannesmann Takeover and German Corporate Governance, MPIfG Discussion Paper 2001-4 (Cologne: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies), pp. 12-14; de Jong.
22. Jürgen Beyer and Anke Hassel, "The Effects of Convergence: Internationalization and the Changing Distribution of Net Value Added in Large German Firms," Economy and Society, 31 (August 2002), 309-32.
23. Andrei Shleifer and Lawrence H. Summers, "Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers," in Alan J. Auerbach, ed., Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).
24. John W. Cioffi and Stephen S. Cohen, "The State, Law and Corporate Governance," in Stephen S. Cohen and Gavin Boyd, eds., Corporate Governance and Globalization (Cheltenham: Elgar, 2000), 307-49;
25. R ichard Deeg, Finance Capitalism Unveiled: Banks and the German Political Economy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999).
26. See Otto Graff Lambsdorff in the debate over the KonTraG, minutes of the Bundestag debate 13/222 from March 5, 1998. All translations are by the author.
27. See ibid., Hartmut Schauerte.
28. See ibid., Hans-Martin Bury.
29. See ibid., Margarete Wolf.
30. See ibid., Uwe-Ernst Heuer.
31. Marie Bolt, Stellungnahme des DGB zum Fragenkatalog der Regierungskommission Corporate Governance-Unternehmensführung- Unternehmenskontrolle-Modernisierung des Aktienrechts (Berlin: Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, 2000);
32. Roland Köstler and Matthias Müller, Unternehmensführung - Unternehmenskontrolle - Modernisierung des Aktienrechts, Arbeitshilfe Nr. 15 für Arbeitnehmervertreter in Aufsichtsräten (Düsseldorf: Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, 2001);
33. Hans-Detlev Küller, "Das Shareholder-Value-Konzept aus Gewerkschaftssicht," Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung und Praxis, 49 (1997), 517-31;
34. H einz Putzhammer and Roland Köstler, "Eckpunkte für ein Übernahmegesetz," Die Mitbestimmung, 46 (May 2000), 22-23;
35. Ingrid Scheibe-Lange and Arno Prangenberg, "Mehr Mitbestimmung via US-Börsenaufsicht?," Die Mitbestimmung, 43 (November 1997), 45-49;
36. H ubertus Schmoldt, "Corporate Governance und Mitbestimmung," Die Mitbestimmung, 48 (June 2002), 10-16.
37. Martin Höpner and Lothar Krempel, "The Politics of the German Company Network," Competition and Change, 8 (December 2004), 339-56.
38. Otto Graf Lambsdorff in the debate on the KonTraG, minutes of the Bundestag debate 13/222 from March 5, 1998.
39. Other elements of the 2000 Tax Reduction Act were a personal income tax reduction (the highest tax rate was reduced to 42 percent) and a corporate income tax cut (25 percent). As a result, after 2000 the corporate and personal income tax rates were lowest in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany.
40. Peter Rauen in the debate over the Steuersenkungsgesetz, minutes of the Bundestag debate 14/105 from May 18, 2000.
41. See ibid., Lothar Binding.
42. Rainer Funke in the debate on the takeover law, minutes of the Bundestag debate 14/192 from October 11, 2001.
43. Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des Finanzausschusses, Drucksache 14/7477, November 14, 2001.
44. Nina Hauer in the debate on the takeover law, minutes of the Bundestag debate 14/201 from November 15, 2001.
45. See, for example, Margaret M. Blair, Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First Century (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995);
46. William Lazonick and Mary O'Sullivan, "Maximizing Shareholder Value: A New Ideology for Corporate Governance," in William Lazonick and Mary O'Sullivan, eds., Corporate Governance and Sustainable Prosperity (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2001);
47. Cioffi and Cohen;
48. Gourevitch and Shinn.
49. Rudolf Hilferding, Das Finanzkapital (Vienna: Verlag der Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, 1910);
50. Vladimir I. Lenin, Der Imperialismus als höchstes Stadium des Kapitalismus (Berlin: Dietz, 1985 [1917]), pp. 45-50.
51. Fritz Naphtali, Wirtschaftsdemokratie: Ihr Wesen, Weg und Ziel, 3rd ed. (Frankfurt a.M.: Europische Verlagsanstalt, 1969 [1928]), pp. 35-36.
52. Ibid., p. 37.
53. Quote from Anne Weiss-Hartmann and Wolfgang Hecker, "Die Entwicklung der Gewerkschaftsbewegung 1945-1949," in Frank Deppe, Georg Fülberth, and Jürgen Harrer, eds., Geschichte der deutschen Gewerkschaftsbewegung (Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1977), p. 291.
54. Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, Dokumente der Gewerkschaften: Programmatische Dokumente zur Politik des Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes (Frankfurt a.M.: Nachrichten-Verlag, 1970), p. 202.
55. Gerhard Leminsky and Bernd Otto, Politik und Programmatik des Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes (Cologne: Bund-Verlag, 1974), p. 248.
56. A detailed empirical analysis of this reorientation can be found in Martin Höpner, Sozialdemokratie, Gewerkschaften und organisierter Kapitalismus, MPIfG Discussion Paper No. 04/5 (Cologne: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, 2004).
57. Armin Gutowski, "Die wirtschaftspolitischen Vorstellungen des DGB in neoliberaler Sicht," in Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, ed., Wirtschaftsordnung und Wirtschaftsverfassung im DGB-Grundsatzprogramm: Referate einer öffentlichen Tagung der DGB-Bundesschule Bad Kreuznach am 4. und 5. April 1966 (Düsseldorf: Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, 1966), p. 17.
58. Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, Grundsatzprogramm der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands: Beschlossen vom Programm-Parteitag der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands am 20. Dezember 1989 in Berlin, geändert auf dem Parteitag in Leipzig am 17. April 1998 (Berlin: SPD, 1998), p. 46.
59. John Kenneth Galbraith, Economics, Peace and Laughter (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971), pp. 91-92;
60. John Kenneth Galbraith, Economics and the Public Purpose (London: Deutsch, 1973), pp. 186-97;
61. Gardiner C. Means, "Industrial Prices and Their Relative Inflexibility," in Frederic S. Lee and Warren J. Samuels, eds., The Heterodox Economics of Gardiner C. Means: A Collection: Studies in Institutional Economics (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1992), pp. 32-72.
62. Der Spiegel, Jan. 25, 1971, p. 20.
63. Deeg, pp. 49-50.
64. Der Spiegel, May 1, 1970, p. 71.
65. Studienkommission "Grundsatzfragen der Kreditwirtschaft," Bericht der Studienkommission "Grundsatzfragen der Kreditwirtschaft" (Bonn: Wilhelm Stollfuss Verlag, 1979), p. 267.
66. Isabela Mares, The Politics of Social Risk: Business and Welfare State Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 3.
67. This model applies to corporations in dispersed ownership. If ownership is concentrated, blockholders may be introduced as a fourth party, or they may be added to the management side of the triangle. The crucial point is that shareholders in this model are minority shareholders, those that benefit from increased transparency and shareholder protection.
68. Beyer and Hassel. Changes in the relative distribution of net value added may be due to cyclical variations as dividends decline faster than wages when earnings shrink. The crucial point in Beyer and Hassel's comparison of fifty-nine large German companies between 1992 and 1998 is that the shareholder value orientation turns out to be the best predictor for changing distributional patterns.
69. See, for example, trade union expert Roland Köstler, "Grundsätze der Unteraehmensführung und -kontrolle in der Diskussion," in Die Mitbestimmung, 46 (May 2000), 34.
70. See Bolt, p. 9;
71. Scheibe-Lange and Prangenberg, p. 47.
72. In addition, trade unionists point out that minority shareholder protection becomes increasingly important for workers because more and more of them hold shares. See, for example, Putzhammer and Köstler, p. 22.
73. Thus, trade unions also explicitly supported the introduction of the one share, one vote rule. Similarly, trade unions support extension of shareholders' rights to sue. See, for example, Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, Stellungnahme des DGB zum Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Unternehmensintegrität und Modernisierung des Anfechtungsrechts (Berlin: Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, 2004), p. 3.
74. Müller, p. 529.
75. Antje Kurdelbusch, "The Rise of Variable Pay in Germany: Evidence and Explanations," in Anthony Ferner, Richard Hyman, and Javier Quintanilla, eds., Multinational Companies and Globalisation, European Journal of Industrial Relations, 8 (September 2002), 325-50.
76. Höpner and Jackson.
77. Fiona Ross, "Beyond Left and Right: The New Partisan Politics of Welfare," Governance, 13 (2000), 155-83.
78. Mares.
79. Peter A. Hall and Daniel W. Gingerich, Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional Complementarity in the Macroeconomy: An Empirical Analysis, MPIfG Discussion Paper No. 04/5 (Cologne: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, 2004).
80. Hall and Soskice, p. 21.
81. See Roe.