Shareholders' voting at general meetings: Evidence from the Netherlands

Journal of Management and Governance

Volumn 10, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 353-380

  De Jong, Abe ^a   Mertens, Gerard ^a   Roosenboom, Peter ^a  

^a ERASMUS UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Corporate governance; General meetings

Indexed keywords

EID: 33845328053     PISSN: 13853457     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10997-006-9006-1     Document Type: Article

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