The association between the SEC's 1992 compensation disclosure rule and executive compensation policy changes

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy

Volumn 17, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 27-54

  Vafeas, Nikos ^a   Afxentiou, Zaharoulla ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CYPRUS   (Cyprus)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002317412     PISSN: 02784254     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0278-4254(97)10006-0     Document Type: Article

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