Central Bank Independence - Economic and Political Dimensions

National Institute Economic Review

Volumn 196, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 66-76

  Issing, Ottmar ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Central bank independence; credibility; monetary policy; stability culture

Indexed keywords

EID: 84992784737     PISSN: 00279501     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0027950106067048     Document Type: Article

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