Does central bank independence really matter?: New evidence for developing countries using a new indicator

Journal of Banking and Finance

Volumn 24, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 643-664

  Haan, Jakob De ^a   Kooi, Willem J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GRONINGEN   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Central bank independence; Developing countries; E42; E58; Economic growth; Inflation; Turnover rate

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000040878     PISSN: 03784266     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0378-4266(99)00084-9     Document Type: Article

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