A state within the state? An event study on the Bundesbank (1948-1973)

Scottish Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 46, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 17-39

  Berger, Helge ^a   De Haan, Jakob ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF GRONINGEN   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BANKING; HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY; STATE ROLE;

GERMANY;

EID: 0032902894     PISSN: 00369292     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9485.00118     Document Type: Article

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