Who supported the Deutsche Bundesbank? An empirical investigation

Journal of Policy Modeling

Volumn 24, Issue 9, 2002, Pages 831-851

  Maier, Philipp ^a   Knaap, Thijs ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GRONINGEN   (Netherlands)

^b ERASMUS UNIVERSITY ROTTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Bundesbank; Public choice; Support

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036891589     PISSN: 01618938     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0161-8938(02)00170-9     Document Type: Article

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