Uncertain potential output: Implications for monetary policy

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

Volumn 27, Issue 9, 2003, Pages 1611-1638

  Ehrmann, Michael ^a   Smets, Frank ^a,b  

^a EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK   (Germany)

^b GHENT UNIVERSITY   (Belgium)

Author keywords

Monetary policy rules; Potential output; Uncertainty

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037410961     PISSN: 01651889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-1889(02)00073-8     Document Type: Article

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