Frequency, Probability, and Prediction: Easy Solutions to Cognitive Illusions?

Cognitive Psychology

Volumn 38, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 48-78

  Griffin, Dale ^a   Buehler, Roger ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX   (United Kingdom)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; BAYES THEOREM; COGNITION; DECISION MAKING; HUMAN; ILLUSION; PROBABILITY;

BAYES THEOREM; COGNITION; DECISION MAKING; HUMANS; ILLUSIONS; PROBABILITY;

EID: 0033070632     PISSN: 00100285     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/cogp.1998.0707     Document Type: Article

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