Passing probation: Earnings management by interim CEOs and its effect on their promotion prospects

Academy of Management Journal

Volumn 58, Issue 5, 2015, Pages 1389-1418

  Chen, Guoli ^a   Luo, Shuqing ^b   Tang, Yi ^c   Tong, Jamie Y ^d  

^a INSEAD   (United States)

^b NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE   (Singapore)

^c HONG KONG POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY   (Hong Kong)

^d UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84945136911     PISSN: 00014273     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5465/amj.2013.0351     Document Type: Article

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