Cooling off in negotiations: Does it work?

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

Volumn 171, Issue 4, 2015, Pages 565-588

  Oechssler, Jörg ^a   Roider, Andreas ^b   Schmitz, Patrick W ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF REGENSBURG   (Germany)

^c UNIVERSITY OF COLOGNE   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84944909236     PISSN: 09324569     EISSN: 16140559     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1628/093245615X14307212950056     Document Type: Article

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