Herding with and without payoff externalities - an internet experiment

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 25, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 391-415

  Drehmann, Mathias ^a   Oechssler, Jörg ^b   Roider, Andreas ^c  

^a BANK OF ENGLAND   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG   (Germany)

^c UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Experiment; Herding; Information cascades; Internet; Network effects; Reputation

Indexed keywords

HERDING; INFORMATION CASCADES; NETWORK EFFECTS;

INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT; INFORMATION ANALYSIS; INTERNET; MATHEMATICAL MODELS;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 33847348789     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.04.016     Document Type: Article

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