Regulation as delegation

Journal of Legal Analysis

Volumn 7, Issue 1, 2015, Pages 1-36

  Bar Gill, Oren ^a   Sunstein, Cass R ^a  

^a HARVARD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84937426284     PISSN: 21617201     EISSN: 19465319     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jla/lav005     Document Type: Article

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