Disclosure: Psychology changes everything

Annual Review of Economics

Volumn 6, Issue , 2014, Pages 391-419

  Loewenstein, George ^a   Sunstein, Cass R ^b   Golman, Russell ^a  

^a CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HARVARD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

behavioral economics; mandatory disclosure; moral licensing; nudges; regulation; telltale heart effect

Indexed keywords

EID: 84905682814     PISSN: 19411383     EISSN: 19411391     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev-economics-080213-041341     Document Type: Article

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