The storrs lectures: Behavioral economics and paternalism

Yale Law Journal

Volumn 122, Issue 7, 2013, Pages 1826-1899

  Sunstein, Cass R ^a  

^a HARVARD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

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EID: 84878289726     PISSN: 00440094     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (246)

1. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 80 (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., 2003) (1859).
2. EPA, Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards: EPA Response to Comments Document for Joint Rulemaking 5-413 (2010), http://www.epa.gov/oms/climate/regulations/420r10012a.pdf (footnotes omitted).
3. A catalogue of regulatory actions during the first term of the Obama Administration can be found in Cass R. Sunstein, Simpler: The Future of Government (forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter Sunstein, Simpler].
4. Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1349 (2011) [hereinafter Sunstein, Empirically Informed].
5. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys /pkg/FR-2011-01-21/pdf/2011-1385.pdf.
6. See Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness (2008).
7. See Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness (2008).
8. See David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. Econ. 443, 445 (1997).
9. For a discussion of some of the foundational issues, see Pedro Bordalo, Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, Salience in Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect, 102 Am. Econ. Rev. 47 (2012).
10. Pedro Bordalo, Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, Salience Theory of Choice Under Risk, 127 Q.J. Econ. 1243 (2012).
11. See Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Choice and Procrastination, 116 Q.J. Econ. 121, 121-22 (2001); Richard H. Thaler & Shlomo Benartzi, Save More Tomorrow™: Using Behavioral Economics To Increase Employee Saving, 112 J. Pol. Econ. S164, S168-69 (2004).
12. Richard H. Thaler & Shlomo Benartzi, Save More Tomorrow™: Using Behavioral Economics To Increase Employee Saving, 112 J. Pol. Econ. S164, S168-69 (2004).
13. See Duncan J. Watts, Everything Is Obvious Once You Know the Answer: How Common Sense Fails Us 30-31 (2011).
14. Eric J. Johnson & Daniel G. Goldstein, Decisions by Default, in Behavioral Foundations of Public Policy 417 (Eldar Shafir ed., 2013)
15. Eric J. Johnson & Daniel Goldstein, Do Defaults Save Lives?, 302 Science 1338 (2003).
16. See Tali Sharot, The Optimism Bias: A Tour of the Irrationally Positive Brain (2011).
17. See, e.g., Elizabeth W. Dunn, Daniel T. Gilbert & Timothy D. Wilson, If Money Doesn't Make You Happy, Then You Probably Aren't Spending It Right, 21 J. Consumer Psychol. 115 (2011).
18. Daniel T. Gilbert et al., Immune Neglect: A Source of Durability Bias in Affective Forecasting, 75 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 617 (1998).
19. See Richard H. Thaler & Will Tucker, Smarter Information, Smarter Consumers, Harv. Bus. Rev., Jan.-Feb. 2013, http://hbr.org/2013/01/smarter-information-smarter-consumers/ar/1.
20. See, e.g., Apps for Healthy Kids, http://appsforhealthykids.com (last visited Feb. 21, 2013).
21. Jocelyn K. Glei, 10 Online Tools for Better Attention & Focus, 99U, http://99u.com/articles /6969/10-Online-Tools-for-Better-Attention-Focus (last visited Feb. 21, 2013)
22. Paige Waehner, Best Exercise and Fitness Apps for iPhone and iPod Touch: Let Your iPod Be Your Trainer, About. com, http://exercise.about.com/od/videosmusicsoftware/tp/fitnessapps.htm (last updated Oct. 30, 2012).
23. For valuable discussion, see Ian Ayres, Carrots and Sticks (2010).
24. See Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Contract: Law, Economics, and Psychology in Consumer Markets (2012).
25. See Andrei Shleifer, Psychologists at the Gate: A Review of Daniel Kahneman's Thinking, Fast and Slow, 50 J. Econ. Literature 1080 (2012).
26. Michael Greenstone, Toward a Culture of Persistent Regulatory Experimentation and Evaluation, in New Perspectives on Regulation 111 (David Moss & John Cisternino eds., 2009).
27. Abhijit V. Banerjee & Esther Duflo, Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way To Fight Global Poverty (2011).
28. Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1349 (2011) [hereinafter Sunstein, Empirically Informed].
29. Theresa M. Marteau, Gareth J. Hollands & Paul C. Fletcher, Changing Human Behavior To Prevent Disease: The Importance of Targeting Automatic Processes, 337 Science 1492 (2012) (exploring the role of automatic processing in behavior in the domain of health).
30. See Behavioural Insights Team, Cabinet Off., http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk /behavioural-insights-team (last visited Jan. 28, 2013).
31. Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History-and Through It, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1627, 1654-55 (1997).
32. Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History-and Through It, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1627, 1654-55 (1997).
33. See Oliver Wright, Steve Hilton's 'Nudge Unit' Goes Global, Independent (London), Sept. 20, 2012, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/steve-hiltons-nudge-unit-goes-global-8157492.html.
34. See Consumer Policy Toolkit, Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev. (July 2010), http://www.oecd.org/sti/consumerpolicy/consumerpolicytoolkit.htm.
35. See Directorate-Gen. for Health & Consumers, Consumer Behaviour: The Road to Effective Policy-Making, Eur. Commission (2010), http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/docs/1dg-sanco-brochure-consumer-behaviour-final.pdf.
36. See Sci. for Env't Policy, Future Brief: Green Behavior, Eur. Commission (Oct. 2012), http://ec.europa.eu/environment/integration/research/newsalert/pdf/FB4.pdf.
37. Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 133 (2006).
38. Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and Economics: Its Origins, Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty, 106 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1033 (2012).
39. See Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness (2008).
40. For one example, see Paul Rozin et al., Nudge to Nobesity I: Minor Changes in Accessibility Decrease Food Intake, 6 Judgment & Decision Making 323, 329 (2011).
41. Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1349 (2011) [hereinafter Sunstein, Empirically Informed].
42. See Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Contract: Law, Economics, and Psychology in Consumer Markets (2012).
43. Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1349 (2011) [hereinafter Sunstein, Empirically Informed].
44. See Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness (2008).
45. George Loewenstein & Peter Ubel, Op-Ed., Economics Behaving Badly, N.Y. Times, July 14, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/15/opinion /15loewenstein.html.
46. George Loewenstein & Peter Ubel, Op-Ed., Economics Behaving Badly, N.Y. Times, July 14, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/15/opinion /15loewenstein.html.
47. See Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness (2008).
48. See Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness (2008).
49. See Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness (2008).
50. See Anuj K. Shah, Sendhil Mullainathan & Eldar Shafir, Some Consequences of Having Too Little, 338 Science 682 (2012).
51. An especially valuable treatment of these issues is Esther Duflo, Abdul Latif Jameel Professor of Poverty Alleviation & Dev. Econ., Mass. Inst. of Tech., Tanner Lectures on Human Values and the Design of the Fight Against Poverty (May 2, 2012), http://economics.mit.edu/files/7904.
52. See generally Advances in Behavioral Economics (Colin F. Camerer et al. eds., 2003).
53. Advances in Behavioral Finance (Richard H. Thaler ed., 2005)
54. Choices, Values, and Frames (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000)
55. Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002).
56. Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1349 (2011) [hereinafter Sunstein, Empirically Informed].
57. See Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness (2008).
58. See Andrei Shleifer, Psychologists at the Gate: A Review of Daniel Kahneman's Thinking, Fast and Slow, 50 J. Econ. Literature 1080 (2012).
59. See Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness (2008).
60. Colin Camerer et al., Neuroeconomics: How Neuroscience Can Inform Economics, 43 J. Econ. Literature 9, 17 (2005).
61. See Elizabeth A. Phelps, The Human Amygdala and the Control of Fear, in The Human Amygdala 204 (Paul J. Whalen & Elizabeth A. Phelps eds., 2009).
62. See Jason P. Mitchell et al., Medial Prefrontal Cortex Predicts Intertemporal Choice, 23 J. Cognitive Neuroscience 1, 6 (2010).
63. Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History-and Through It, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1627, 1654-55 (1997).
64. Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History-and Through It, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1627, 1654-55 (1997).
65. See Jason P. Mitchell et al., Medial Prefrontal Cortex Predicts Intertemporal Choice, 23 J. Cognitive Neuroscience 1, 6 (2010).
66. See Drew Westen et al., Neural Bases of Motivated Reasoning: An fMRI Study of Emotional Constraints on Partisan Political Judgment in the 2004 U.S. Presidential Election, 18 J. Cognitive Neuroscience 1947, 1955 (2006).
67. Boaz Keysar, Sayuri L. Hayakawa & Sun Gyu An, The Foreign-Language Effect: Thinking in a Foreign Tongue Reduces Decision Biases, 23 Psychol. Sci. 661 (2012).
68. Compare Samuel Beckett's decision to write some of his greatest works in French rather than English. Beckett said that the French language had an "aura of unfamiliarity about it, " and that it allowed him to "escape the habits inherent in the use of a native language. " The Grove Companion to Samuel Beckett: A Reader's Guide to His Works, Life, and Thought 206 (C.J. Ackerly & S.E. Gontarski eds., 2004).
69. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Rational Risk Policy (1998).
70. Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1349 (2011) [hereinafter Sunstein, Empirically Informed].
71. Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1349 (2011) [hereinafter Sunstein, Empirically Informed].
72. See Paul Slovic, The Feeling of Risk: New Perspectives on Risk Perception 3-20 (2010).
73. See Paul Slovic, The Feeling of Risk: New Perspectives on Risk Perception 3-20 (2010).
74. See Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion (2012) (arguing that many judgments are automatic and intuitive, and explaining how our deliberative system works hard to justify those judgments ex post).
75. See Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion (2012) (arguing that many judgments are automatic and intuitive, and explaining how our deliberative system works hard to justify those judgments ex post).
76. See Andrei Shleifer, Psychologists at the Gate: A Review of Daniel Kahneman's Thinking, Fast and Slow, 50 J. Econ. Literature 1080 (2012).
77. For a related finding in the political domain, testifying to the power of System 1, see Christopher H. Achen & Larry M. Bartels, Blind Retrospection: Electoral Responses to Drought, Flu, and Shark Attacks (Fundación Juan March, Working Paper No. 2004/199, 2004), http://www.march.es/ceacs/publicaciones/working/archivos/2004_199.pdf.
78. See, e.g., Hunt Allcott, Sendhil Mullainathan & Dmitry Taubinsky, Energy Policy with Externalities and Internalities (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17,977, 2012), http://www.nber.org/papers/w17977.pdf (explaining that people often do not consider the long-term effects of energy efficiency and exploring how policies might help them to do so, thus combating "internalities").
79. See Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Choice and Procrastination, 116 Q.J. Econ. 121, 121-22 (2001); Richard H. Thaler & Shlomo Benartzi, Save More Tomorrow™: Using Behavioral Economics To Increase Employee Saving, 112 J. Pol. Econ. S164, S168-69 (2004).
80. See, e.g., Jess Benhabib, Alberto Bisin & Andrew Schotter, Present-Bias, Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting, and Fixed Costs, 69 Games & Econ. Behav. 205 (2010).
81. Cf. Dean Karlan et al., Getting to the Top of Mind: How Reminders Increase Saving 1, 14 (Yale Econ. Dep't, Working Paper No. 82, 2010), http://www.econ.yale.edu/ddp/ddp75 /ddp0082.pdf (showing the value of reminders in getting people to attend to savings).
82. See Esther Duflo, Michael Kremer & Jonathan Robinson, Nudging Farmers To Use Fertilizer: Evidence from Kenya, 101 Am. Econ. Rev. 2350, 2351-54 (2011) (finding that farmers in western Kenya do not make economically advantageous fertilizer investments, but that a small, time-limited discount on the cost of fertilizer can increase investments, thus producing higher welfare than either a laissez-faire approach or large subsidies).
83. Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1349 (2011) [hereinafter Sunstein, Empirically Informed].
84. See Hunt Allcott & Nathan Wozny, Gasoline Prices, Fuel Economy, and the Energy Paradox (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18,583, 2012), http://www.nber.org /papers/w18583.
85. See David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. Econ. 443, 445 (1997).
86. See Richard H. Thaler & H.M. Shefrin, An Economic Theory of Self-Control, 89 J. Pol. Econ. 392 (1981).
87. For an interesting application, discussed in more detail below, see Jonathan H. Gruber & Sendhil Mullainathan, Do Cigarette Taxes Make Smokers Happier?, 5 Advances Econ. Analysis & Pol'y 1, 20-21 (2005).
88. See generally Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle, 110 Q.J. Econ. 73, 88 (1995).
89. See Haiyan Shui & Lawrence M. Ausubel, Time Inconsistency in the Credit Card Market (SSRN Elec. Library, Working Paper No. 586,622, 2004), http://ssrn.com/abstract=586622.
90. For a technical treatment, see Roland Bénabou & Marek Pycia, Dynamic Inconsistency and Self-Control: A Planner-Doer Interpretation, 77 Econ. Letters 419 (2002).
91. See Jason P. Mitchell et al., Medial Prefrontal Cortex Predicts Intertemporal Choice, 23 J. Cognitive Neuroscience 1, 6 (2010).
92. Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History-and Through It, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1627, 1654-55 (1997).
93. Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History-and Through It, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1627, 1654-55 (1997).
94. Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History-and Through It, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1627, 1654-55 (1997).
95. See Hunt Allcott & Nathan Wozny, Gasoline Prices, Fuel Economy, and the Energy Paradox (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18,583, 2012), http://www.nber.org /papers/w18583.
96. For valuable discussion, see Ian Ayres, Carrots and Sticks (2010).
97. See Hunt Allcott & Nathan Wozny, Gasoline Prices, Fuel Economy, and the Energy Paradox (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18,583, 2012), http://www.nber.org /papers/w18583.
98. See Hunt Allcott & Nathan Wozny, Gasoline Prices, Fuel Economy, and the Energy Paradox (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18,583, 2012), http://www.nber.org /papers/w18583.
99. George Loewenstein & Peter Ubel, Op-Ed., Economics Behaving Badly, N.Y. Times, July 14, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/15/opinion /15loewenstein.html.
100. See generally Harry C. Ways, The Washington Aqueduct, 1852-1992 [1996] (providing background on the need for and construction of the aqueduct).
101. See Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Contract: Law, Economics, and Psychology in Consumer Markets (2012).
102. See Victor Stango & Jonathan Zinman, Limited and Varying Consumer Attention: Evidence from Shocks to the Salience of Bank Overdraft Fees 27-28 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 11-17, 2011), http://www.phil.frb.org/phil_mailing_list/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2011/wp11-17.pdf.
103. Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History-and Through It, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1627, 1654-55 (1997).
104. See Alix Peterson Zwane et al., Being Surveyed Can Change Later Behavior and Related Parameter Estimates, 108 Proc. Nat'l Acad. Sci. 1821, 1825-26 (2011).
105. See Ximena Cadena & Antoinette Schoar, Remembering To Pay? Reminders vs. Financial Incentives for Loan Payments 4, 18 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17,020, 2011), http://www.nber.org/papers/w17020. Checklists work for similar reasons.
106. See Marty Makary, Unaccountable: What Hospitals Won't Tell You and How Transparency Can Revolutionize Health Care 177-78 (2012).
107. See Steffen Altmann & Christian Traxler, Nudges at the Dentist (Inst. for the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 6699, 2012), http://ftp.iza.org/dp6699.pdf.
108. See David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. Econ. 443, 445 (1997).
109. Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1349 (2011) [hereinafter Sunstein, Empirically Informed].
110. See Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Dep't of Transp., Final Regulatory Impact Analysis: Corporate Average Fuel Economy for MY 2017-MY 2025 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks (2012), http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/pdf/cafe/FRIA _2017-2025.pdf.
111. Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History-and Through It, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1627, 1654-55 (1997).
112. George Loewenstein & Peter Ubel, Op-Ed., Economics Behaving Badly, N.Y. Times, July 14, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/15/opinion /15loewenstein.html.
113. See Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1653, 1659 (1998).
114. See Tali Sharot, The Optimism Bias: A Tour of the Irrationally Positive Brain (2011).
115. See Tali Sharot, The Optimism Bias: A Tour of the Irrationally Positive Brain (2011).
116. See Tali Sharot, The Optimism Bias: A Tour of the Irrationally Positive Brain (2011).
117. See Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Contract: Law, Economics, and Psychology in Consumer Markets (2012).
118. Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1349 (2011) [hereinafter Sunstein, Empirically Informed].
119. See Tali Sharot, The Optimism Bias: A Tour of the Irrationally Positive Brain (2011).
120. See Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Susceptibility to Health Problems: Conclusions from a Community-Wide Sample, 10 J. Behav. Med. 481, 494-96 (1987).
121. Don A. Moore & Deborah A. Small, Error and Bias in Comparative Judgment: On Being Both Better and Worse than We Think We Are, 92 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 972 (2007).
122. See Paul Slovic, Do Adolescent Smokers Know the Risks?, 47 Duke L.J. 1133, 1136-37 (1998).
123. See David Eil & Justin M. Rao, The Good News-Bad News Effect: Asymmetric Processing of Objective Information About Yourself, 3 Am. Econ. J.: Microeconomics 114, 116-17 (2011).
124. See Tali Sharot, The Optimism Bias: A Tour of the Irrationally Positive Brain (2011).
125. Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History-and Through It, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1627, 1654-55 (1997).
126. See Tali Sharot, The Optimism Bias: A Tour of the Irrationally Positive Brain (2011).
127. See Tali Sharot, The Optimism Bias: A Tour of the Irrationally Positive Brain (2011).
128. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 Cognitive Psychol. 207, 221 (1973).
129. See Elke U. Weber, Experience-Based and Description-Based Perceptions of Long-Term Risk: Why Global Warming Does Not Scare Us (Yet), 77 Climatic Change 103, 107-08 (2006).
130. See Laurette Dubé-Rioux & J. Edward Russo, An Availability Bias in Professional Judgment, 1 J. Behav. Decision Making 223, 233-34 (1988).
131. Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff & Sarah Lichtenstein, Cognitive Processes and Societal Risk Taking, in The Perception of Risk 32, 37-38 (Paul Slovic ed., 2000).
132. Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1349 (2011) [hereinafter Sunstein, Empirically Informed].
133. See Yuval Rottenstreich & Christopher K. Hsee, Money, Kisses, and Electric Shocks: On the Affective Psychology of Risk, 12 Psychol. Sci. 185, 185 (2001).
134. There are important questions, not explored here, about the grounds for distinguishing between paternalism from government and paternalism from nongovernmental actors. One obvious ground involves coercion, but (as discussed in detail below), some forms of government paternalism are not coercive, and some forms of private paternalism can be understood as coercive (for example, when an employer threatens an employee with discharge if he or she does not manage a self-control problem that does not affect others). And while I cannot discuss the complexities here, it is reasonable to wonder whether some of these findings provide new support for paternalistic steps-at least nudges-from those with expertise, including doctors.
135. See, e.g., Kevin Loria, New York Soda Ban Proposal: Public Hearing Gets Impassioned, Christian Sci. Monitor, July 24, 2012, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Society /2012/0724/New-York-soda-ban-proposal-Public-hearing-gets-impassioned.
136. See, e.g., Michael M. Grynbaum & Marjorie Connelly, 60% in City Oppose Bloomberg's Soda Ban, Poll Finds, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/23 /nyregion/most-new-yorkers-oppose-bloombergs-soda-ban.html.
137. For a valuable and relevant discussion, bearing particularly on means paternalism, see B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel, Beyond Revealed Preference: Choice-Theoretic Foundations for Behavioral Welfare Economics, 124 Q.J. Econ. 51 (2009).
138. Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1349 (2011) [hereinafter Sunstein, Empirically Informed].
139. Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1349 (2011) [hereinafter Sunstein, Empirically Informed].
140. It is possible, of course, that a fine could affect beliefs, not just actions. For example, a fine could convey information about the appropriate attitude to have toward an activity or a product, and that information could influence beliefs.
141. To be sure, it might affect people's beliefs (for example, by making people think that the risks are very serious), and influence their behavior for that reason.
142. George Loewenstein & Peter Ubel, Op-Ed., Economics Behaving Badly, N.Y. Times, July 14, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/15/opinion /15loewenstein.html.
143. Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1349 (2011) [hereinafter Sunstein, Empirically Informed].
144. Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1349 (2011) [hereinafter Sunstein, Empirically Informed].
145. I am bracketing here any questions about personal identity over time. See generally Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (1986).
146. George Loewenstein & Peter Ubel, Op-Ed., Economics Behaving Badly, N.Y. Times, July 14, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/15/opinion /15loewenstein.html.
147. See Robert A. Kagan & Jerome H. Skolnick, Banning Smoking: Compliance Without Enforcement, in Smoking Policy: Law, Politics, and Culture 69, 72 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 1993) (finding high compliance in part because of the expressive function of law).
148. See Josh Kizler, Update: The Efficacy of Washington, D.C.'s Bag Fee, plasticbaglaws. org (Mar. 23, 2011), http://plasticbaglaws.org/update-the-efficacy-of-washington-d-c-'s-bag-fee.
149. See Tatiana A. Homonoff, Can Small Incentives Have Large Effects? The Impact of Taxes Versus Bonuses on Disposable Bag Use (Mar. 27, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.princeton.edu/~homonoff/THomonoff_JobMarketPaper.
150. See Tatiana A. Homonoff, Can Small Incentives Have Large Effects? The Impact of Taxes Versus Bonuses on Disposable Bag Use (Mar. 27, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.princeton.edu/~homonoff/THomonoff_JobMarketPaper.
151. George Loewenstein & Peter Ubel, Op-Ed., Economics Behaving Badly, N.Y. Times, July 14, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/15/opinion /15loewenstein.html.
152. George Loewenstein & Peter Ubel, Op-Ed., Economics Behaving Badly, N.Y. Times, July 14, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/15/opinion /15loewenstein.html.
153. It is possible, however, that paternalistic justifications could be offered for these laws, involving the effects of discrimination on choosers. There is also a possibility of auto-paternalism, as for example when people seek to bind themselves, perhaps through law. See Jon Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality (1984). With the exception of a few brief remarks, I do not explore auto-paternalism here, though it does have an obvious relationship to some responses to behavioral market failures from which people might be attempting to protect themselves.
154. See Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Dep't of Transp., Final Regulatory Impact Analysis: Corporate Average Fuel Economy for MY 2017-MY 2025 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks (2012), http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/pdf/cafe/FRIA _2017-2025.pdf.
155. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 80 (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., 2003) (1859).
156. George Loewenstein & Peter Ubel, Op-Ed., Economics Behaving Badly, N.Y. Times, July 14, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/15/opinion /15loewenstein.html.
157. See Tips from Former Smokers, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/campaign/tips/resources/videos (last updated Jan. 3, 2013).
158. See Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628 (June 22, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141).
159. Michael Howard Saul, Mayor's Soda Plan Fails, Wall St. J., Aug. 20, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903596904576518902332775160.html.
160. For example, an effect might be framed as a gain or as a loss. For an excellent collection, see Perspectives on Framing (Gideon Keren ed., 2011).
161. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 845 F. Supp. 2d 266, 272 (D.D.C. 2012), aff'd, 696 F.3d 1205.
162. See Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Contract: Law, Economics, and Psychology in Consumer Markets (2012).
163. See Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Contract: Law, Economics, and Psychology in Consumer Markets (2012).
164. It may be a freestanding concept insofar as government action is challenged as insufficiently democratic, but I am stipulating that there is no such objection here. If not, an objection from "legitimacy" would seem to add nothing. The question is whether the action at issue makes people's lives better (understanding that idea very capaciously) or intrudes on their autonomy.
165. See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 Am. Econ. Rev. 519, 524-26 (1945).
166. See, e.g., Gabriel D. Carroll et al., Optimal Defaults and Active Decisions, 124 Q.J. Econ. 1639 (2009).
167. Bruce Ian Carlin, Simon Gervais & Gustavo Manso, Libertarian Paternalism, Information Production, and Financial Decision-Making (June 6, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu /~sgervais/Research/Papers/LibertarianPaternalism.WP.pdf.
168. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 80 (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., 2003) (1859).
169. Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1349 (2011) [hereinafter Sunstein, Empirically Informed].
170. Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History-and Through It, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1627, 1654-55 (1997).
171. Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History-and Through It, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1627, 1654-55 (1997).
172. Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History-and Through It, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1627, 1654-55 (1997).
173. See, e.g., Gordon Tullock, Arthur Seldon & Gordon L. Brady, Government Failure: A Primer in Public Choice (2002).
174. Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1349 (2011) [hereinafter Sunstein, Empirically Informed].
175. Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1349 (2011) [hereinafter Sunstein, Empirically Informed].
176. Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1349 (2011) [hereinafter Sunstein, Empirically Informed].
177. Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1349 (2011) [hereinafter Sunstein, Empirically Informed].
178. Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1349 (2011) [hereinafter Sunstein, Empirically Informed].
179. See Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion (2012) (arguing that many judgments are automatic and intuitive, and explaining how our deliberative system works hard to justify those judgments ex post).
180. George Loewenstein & Peter Ubel, Op-Ed., Economics Behaving Badly, N.Y. Times, July 14, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/15/opinion /15loewenstein.html.
181. George Loewenstein & Peter Ubel, Op-Ed., Economics Behaving Badly, N.Y. Times, July 14, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/15/opinion /15loewenstein.html.
182. See Tatiana A. Homonoff, Can Small Incentives Have Large Effects? The Impact of Taxes Versus Bonuses on Disposable Bag Use (Mar. 27, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.princeton.edu/~homonoff/THomonoff_JobMarketPaper.
183. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 Cognitive Psychol. 207, 221 (1973).
184. Daniel J. Benjamin et al., What Do You Think Would Make You Happier? What Do You Think You Would Choose?, 102 Am. Econ. Rev. 2083, 2085-86 (2012).
185. See Niklas Karlsson, George Loewenstein & Jane McCafferty, The Economics of Meaning, 30 Nordic J. Pol. Econ. 61, 62 (2004).
186. Peter A. Ubel & George Loewenstein, Pain and Suffering Awards: They Shouldn't Be (Just) About Pain and Suffering, 37 J. Legal Stud. S195, S207 (2008).
187. Daniel J. Benjamin et al., What Do You Think Would Make You Happier? What Do You Think You Would Choose?, 102 Am. Econ. Rev. 2083, 2085-86 (2012).
188. Daniel T. Gilbert et al., Immune Neglect: A Source of Durability Bias in Affective Forecasting, 75 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 617 (1998).
189. Daniel T. Gilbert et al., Immune Neglect: A Source of Durability Bias in Affective Forecasting, 75 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 617 (1998).
190. For an interesting application, discussed in more detail below, see Jonathan H. Gruber & Sendhil Mullainathan, Do Cigarette Taxes Make Smokers Happier?, 5 Advances Econ. Analysis & Pol'y 1, 20-21 (2005).
191. Wendy Koch, Biggest U.S. Tax Hike on Tobacco Takes Effect, USA Today, Apr. 3, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/taxes/2009-03-31-cigarettetax_N.htm.
192. See, e.g., Jeff Strnad, Conceptualizing the "Fat Tax": The Role of Food Taxes in Developed Economies, 78 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1221 (2005); Lucia Reisch & Wencke Gwozdz, Smart Defaults and Soft Nudges: How Insights from Behavioral Economics Can Inform Effective Nutrition Policy (May 31, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing the uses and limits of nudges and outlining and apparently approving of steps in Denmark, Hungary, and France to tax certain foods).
193. It is possible, however, that paternalistic justifications could be offered for these laws, involving the effects of discrimination on choosers. There is also a possibility of auto-paternalism, as for example when people seek to bind themselves, perhaps through law. See Jon Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality (1984). With the exception of a few brief remarks, I do not explore auto-paternalism here, though it does have an obvious relationship to some responses to behavioral market failures from which people might be attempting to protect themselves.
194. Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 133 (2006).
195. I am bracketing here the inevitability of choice architecture and the fact that a number of choices are made for people already.
196. Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 133 (2006).
197. This point holds whether the social environment is a product of self-conscious designers or some kind of invisible-hand mechanism. There can be choice architecture without choice architects. For a valuable discussion, see Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Invisible-Hand Explanations, 39 Synthese 263 (1978).
198. See Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness (2008).
199. Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1349 (2011) [hereinafter Sunstein, Empirically Informed].
200. Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1349 (2011) [hereinafter Sunstein, Empirically Informed].
201. See, e.g., James Madison, Preface to Debates in the Convention of 1787.
202. For one account, see Senate Legislative Process, U.S. Senate, http://www.senate.gov /legislative/common/briefing/Senate_legislative_process.htm (last visited Dec. 5, 2012).
203. George Loewenstein & Peter Ubel, Op-Ed., Economics Behaving Badly, N.Y. Times, July 14, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/15/opinion /15loewenstein.html.
204. See Tatiana A. Homonoff, Can Small Incentives Have Large Effects? The Impact of Taxes Versus Bonuses on Disposable Bag Use (Mar. 27, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.princeton.edu/~homonoff/THomonoff_JobMarketPaper.
205. See, e.g., Gabriel D. Carroll et al., Optimal Defaults and Active Decisions, 124 Q.J. Econ. 1639 (2009).
206. George Loewenstein & Peter Ubel, Op-Ed., Economics Behaving Badly, N.Y. Times, July 14, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/15/opinion /15loewenstein.html.
207. Those who emphasize autonomy tend to allow override when compelling reason exists. For an overview, see Larry Alexander, Deontology at the Threshold, 37 San Diego L. Rev. 893, 898-901 (2000).
208. George Loewenstein & Peter Ubel, Op-Ed., Economics Behaving Badly, N.Y. Times, July 14, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/15/opinion /15loewenstein.html.
209. George Loewenstein & Peter Ubel, Op-Ed., Economics Behaving Badly, N.Y. Times, July 14, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/15/opinion /15loewenstein.html.
210. Susan Parker, Esther Duflo Explains Why She Believes Randomized Controlled Trials Are So Vital, Center for Effective Philanthropy Blog (June 23, 2011), http://www.effectivephilanthropy.org/blog/2011/06/esther-duflo-explains-why-she-believes-randomized-controlled-trials-are-so-vital. Duflo develops these ideas in detail in her 2012 Tanner Lectures.
211. I explore below some possible answers involving the behavioral difficulties of supposedly easy reversibility.
212. A view of this sort is defended and elaborated by Joshua Greene. See, e.g., Joshua D. Greene et al., Cognitive Load Selectively Interferes with Utilitarian Moral Judgment, 107 Cognition 1144 (2008) ("[O]ur theory associates utilitarian moral judgment (approving of harmful actions that maximize good consequences) with controlled cognitive processes and associates non-utilitarian moral judgment with automatic emotional responses. Consistent with this theory, we find that a cognitive load manipulation selectively interferes with utilitarian judgment. This interference effect provides direct evidence for the influence of controlled cognitive processes in moral judgment, and utilitarian moral judgment more specifically. ").
213. Joshua D. Greene, The Cognitive Neuroscience of Moral Judgment, in The Cognitive Neurosciences 987 (Michael S. Gazzaniga ed., 4th ed. 2009).
214. Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1349 (2011) [hereinafter Sunstein, Empirically Informed].
215. I am noting this possibility, but I am not aware of any evidence to support it.
216. See, e.g., F.M. Kamm, Intricate Ethics: Rights, Responsibilities, and Permissible Harm 78-90 (2007).
217. For relevant discussion, see 1 Derek Parfit, On What Matters (2011).
218. For relevant discussion, see 1 Derek Parfit, On What Matters (2011).
219. George Loewenstein & Peter Ubel, Op-Ed., Economics Behaving Badly, N.Y. Times, July 14, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/15/opinion /15loewenstein.html.
220. Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1349 (2011) [hereinafter Sunstein, Empirically Informed].
221. Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1349 (2011) [hereinafter Sunstein, Empirically Informed].
222. Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1349 (2011) [hereinafter Sunstein, Empirically Informed].
223. Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History-and Through It, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1627, 1654-55 (1997).
224. Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1349 (2011) [hereinafter Sunstein, Empirically Informed].
225. Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 133 (2006).
226. Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1349 (2011) [hereinafter Sunstein, Empirically Informed].
227. See Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Dep't of Transp., Final Regulatory Impact Analysis: Corporate Average Fuel Economy for MY 2017-MY 2025 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks (2012), http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/pdf/cafe/FRIA _2017-2025.pdf.
228. See Building Technologies Program: Appliance and Equipment Standards, U.S. Dep't of Energy, https://www1.eere.energy.gov/buildings/appliance_standards (last updated Dec. 27, 2012).
229. See Hunt Allcott & Nathan Wozny, Gasoline Prices, Fuel Economy, and the Energy Paradox (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18,583, 2012), http://www.nber.org /papers/w18583.
230. See Tatiana A. Homonoff, Can Small Incentives Have Large Effects? The Impact of Taxes Versus Bonuses on Disposable Bag Use (Mar. 27, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.princeton.edu/~homonoff/THomonoff_JobMarketPaper.
231. See Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
232. Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History-and Through It, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1627, 1654-55 (1997).
233. F.A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty 155 (1960).
234. Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 133 (2006).
235. George Loewenstein & Peter Ubel, Op-Ed., Economics Behaving Badly, N.Y. Times, July 14, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/15/opinion /15loewenstein.html.
236. Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 133 (2006).
237. Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1349 (2011) [hereinafter Sunstein, Empirically Informed].
238. See John Beshears et al., The Limitations of Defaults 8 (Sept. 15, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.nber.org/programs/ag/rrc/NB10-02,%20Beshears,%20Choi,%20 Laibson,%20Madrian.pdf.
239. See Tatiana A. Homonoff, Can Small Incentives Have Large Effects? The Impact of Taxes Versus Bonuses on Disposable Bag Use (Mar. 27, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.princeton.edu/~homonoff/THomonoff_JobMarketPaper.
240. See Tatiana A. Homonoff, Can Small Incentives Have Large Effects? The Impact of Taxes Versus Bonuses on Disposable Bag Use (Mar. 27, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.princeton.edu/~homonoff/THomonoff_JobMarketPaper.
241. Antonio Damasio, Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain 192-93 (2006).
242. Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History-and Through It, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1627, 1654-55 (1997).
243. George Loewenstein & Peter Ubel, Op-Ed., Economics Behaving Badly, N.Y. Times, July 14, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/15/opinion /15loewenstein.html.
244. George Loewenstein & Peter Ubel, Op-Ed., Economics Behaving Badly, N.Y. Times, July 14, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/15/opinion /15loewenstein.html.
245. George Loewenstein & Peter Ubel, Op-Ed., Economics Behaving Badly, N.Y. Times, July 14, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/15/opinion /15loewenstein.html.
246. Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1349 (2011) [hereinafter Sunstein, Empirically Informed].