Personalizing default rules and disclosure with big data

Michigan Law Review

Volumn 112, Issue 8, 2014, Pages 1417-1478

  Porat, Ariel ^a,b   Jacob Strahilevitz, Lior ^b  

^a TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84893356825     PISSN: 00262234     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (282)

1. Daphna Hacker, The Gendered Dimensions of Inheritance: Empirical Food for Legal Thought, 7 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 322, 334 (2010)
2. Debra S. Judge & Sarah Blaffer Hardy, Allocation of Accumulated Resources Among Close Kin: Inheritance in Sacramento, California, 1890-1984, 13 Ethology & Sociobiology 495 (1992).
3. Daphna Hacker, The Gendered Dimensions of Inheritance: Empirical Food for Legal Thought, 7 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 322, 334 (2010)
4. Debra S. Judge, American Legacies and the Variable Life Histories of Women and Men, 6 Hum. Nature 291, 307-08 (1995).
5. Daphna Hacker, The Gendered Dimensions of Inheritance: Empirical Food for Legal Thought, 7 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 322, 334 (2010)
6. Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search of Its Context, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 1031, 1073 (2004) (noting that intestates are poorer than testators and that this factor may engender selection effects).
7. We take for granted the law's assumption that ordinarily the decedent's wishes should be the overriding factor in determining how her estate will be divided.
8. Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (2013). Under a regime of active choice, individuals are forced to decide among various options-the contract cannot be silent with respect to a particular term.
9. Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (2013). Under a regime of active choice, individuals are forced to decide among various options-the contract cannot be silent with respect to a particular term.
10. Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (2013). Under a regime of active choice, individuals are forced to decide among various options-the contract cannot be silent with respect to a particular term.
11. Ian Ayres, Preliminary Thoughts on Optimal Tailoring of Contractual Rules, 3 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 1, 4 & n.15 (1993);
12. see also Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1591, 1593, 1596-06 (1999) (identifying several types of contracting party heterogeneity and showing how they might affect the law's choice among defaults preferred by the majority of contracting parties or those preferred only by a minority).
13. George S. Geis, An Experiment in the Optimal Precision of Contract Default Rules, 80 Tul. L. Rev. 1109 (2006).
14. Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (2013). Under a regime of active choice, individuals are forced to decide among various options-the contract cannot be silent with respect to a particular term.
15. Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (2013). Under a regime of active choice, individuals are forced to decide among various options-the contract cannot be silent with respect to a particular term.
16. Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (2013). Under a regime of active choice, individuals are forced to decide among various options-the contract cannot be silent with respect to a particular term.
17. Ian Ayres, Preliminary Thoughts on Optimal Tailoring of Contractual Rules, 3 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 1, 4 & n.15 (1993);
18. George S. Geis, An Experiment in the Optimal Precision of Contract Default Rules, 80 Tul. L. Rev. 1109 (2006).
19. See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 341 (6th ed. 2012) ("Default rules fill gaps in contracts in order to reduce transaction costs. ")
20. Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law 302 & nn. 13-14 (2004) (arguing that in order to reduce writing costs, courts should complete gaps in contracts using rules that are most likely to be desired by the parties).
21. Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law 302 & nn. 13-14 (2004) (arguing that in order to reduce writing costs, courts should complete gaps in contracts using rules that are most likely to be desired by the parties).
22. Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law 302 & nn. 13-14 (2004) (arguing that in order to reduce writing costs, courts should complete gaps in contracts using rules that are most likely to be desired by the parties).
23. See Omri Ben-Shahar & John A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 651 (2006) (using the term "sticky" to define default rules in settings where the default rule is rarely changed due to high transaction costs or for other reasons, such as fear of unknown contract provisions).
24. Adam J. Hirsch, Text and Time: A Theory of Testamentary Obsolescence, 86 Wash. U. L. Rev. 609, 636 (2009) ("But a testator's failure to consider the risk of premature death is entirely plausible, psychologically. ").
25. See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 341 (6th ed. 2012) ("Default rules fill gaps in contracts in order to reduce transaction costs. ")
26. See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 341 (6th ed. 2012) ("Default rules fill gaps in contracts in order to reduce transaction costs. ")
27. But see Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87, 117-18 (1989) (arguing that adopting tailored rules to fill gaps in the contract creates costs of distinguishing different types of parties and transactions);
28. Ian Ayres, Preliminary Thoughts on Optimal Tailoring of Contractual Rules, 3 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 1, 4 & n.15 (1993);
29. See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 341 (6th ed. 2012) ("Default rules fill gaps in contracts in order to reduce transaction costs. ")
30. Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law 302 & nn. 13-14 (2004) (arguing that in order to reduce writing costs, courts should complete gaps in contracts using rules that are most likely to be desired by the parties).
31. U.C.C. § 2-308 (2013).
32. U.C.C. § 2-308 (2013).
33. U.C.C. § 2-308 (2013).
34. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 356 (1981) (stating that the parties can decide in advance the amount of damages payable in case of breach and that such an agreement replaces the court's inquiry about the correct level of damages)
35. E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 12.18 (4th ed. 2004) (stating that parties can agree on remedial rights different from the remedies usually supplied by the courts).
36. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 356 (stating that the parties' power to set liquidated damages is limited and that the liquidated damages provision must regard the principle of compensation)
37. E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 12.18 (4th ed. 2004) (stating that parties can agree on remedial rights different from the remedies usually supplied by the courts).
38. U.C.C. § 2-719(3) ("Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable. ").
39. See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 341 (6th ed. 2012) ("Default rules fill gaps in contracts in order to reduce transaction costs. ")
40. David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1815, 1820-23 (1991) (arguing that default rules should be the most likely result of a hypothetical bargaining between the parties).
41. See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 341 (6th ed. 2012) ("Default rules fill gaps in contracts in order to reduce transaction costs. ")
42. Richard R.W. Brooks & Alexander Stremitzer, Remedies On and Off Contract, 120 Yale L.J. 690 (2011) (arguing that the remedy of rescission followed by restitution is socially desirable and that the parties to the contract would want it ex ante, since it incentivizes them to invest in the contract to the level that maximizes the joint surplus)
43. Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1581, 1588 (2005) ("Each party [to the contract] wants to maximize his gain from the transaction, and that is usually best done by agreeing to terms that maximize the surplus created by the transaction-the excess of benefits over costs, the excess being divided between the parties. ").
44. See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 341 (6th ed. 2012) ("Default rules fill gaps in contracts in order to reduce transaction costs. ")
45. Steven Shavell, Why Breach of Contract May Not Be Immoral Given the Incompleteness of Contracts, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1569, 1573-74 (2009) (arguing that the promisor's option to breach and pay expectation damages is a default rule incorporated into an incomplete contract).
46. See Omri Ben-Shahar, A Bargaining Power Theory of Default Rules, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 396 (2009) (arguing that some default rules have a distributive, rather than an efficiency, effect, and proposing criteria for giving these default rules content)
47. Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 489 (1989) (explaining how nonefficiency theories of contract law could be the source of default rules but arguing that efficiency is the much better source).
48. Ian Ayres, Preliminary Thoughts on Optimal Tailoring of Contractual Rules, 3 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 1, 4 & n.15 (1993);
49. E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 12.18 (4th ed. 2004) (stating that parties can agree on remedial rights different from the remedies usually supplied by the courts).
50. Anthony T. Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 351, 355-56 (1978) (stating that courts typically grant specific performance in contracts for the sale of a "unique" item, such as the sale of land, antiques, and patent rights)
51. Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 Yale L.J. 271, 272-74 (1979) (same).
52. Ian Ayres, Preliminary Thoughts on Optimal Tailoring of Contractual Rules, 3 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 1, 4 & n.15 (1993);
53. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 Yale L.J. 541, 569-70 (2003) (arguing that sophisticated parties prefer textualist interpretation of contracts).
54. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 Yale L.J. 541, 569-70 (2003) (arguing that sophisticated parties prefer textualist interpretation of contracts).
55. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 Yale L.J. 541, 569-70 (2003) (arguing that sophisticated parties prefer textualist interpretation of contracts).
56. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 Yale L.J. 541, 569-70 (2003) (arguing that sophisticated parties prefer textualist interpretation of contracts).
57. Business practices in American grocery stores track this default rule to some extent. A grocery bagger is likely to ask an elderly customer with a large order whether she would like assistance unloading groceries into her car, but he would probably not bother asking the same question to a twenty-year-old who has purchased a box of corn flakes and a magazine.
58. see also Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1591, 1593, 1596-06 (1999) (identifying several types of contracting party heterogeneity and showing how they might affect the law's choice among defaults preferred by the majority of contracting parties or those preferred only by a minority).
59. see also Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1591, 1593, 1596-06 (1999) (identifying several types of contracting party heterogeneity and showing how they might affect the law's choice among defaults preferred by the majority of contracting parties or those preferred only by a minority).
60. Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145; 9 Ex. 341.
61. see also Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1591, 1593, 1596-06 (1999) (identifying several types of contracting party heterogeneity and showing how they might affect the law's choice among defaults preferred by the majority of contracting parties or those preferred only by a minority).
62. see also Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1591, 1593, 1596-06 (1999) (identifying several types of contracting party heterogeneity and showing how they might affect the law's choice among defaults preferred by the majority of contracting parties or those preferred only by a minority).
63. See Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 629 (1988) (describing the various stages where the promisor makes decisions affecting the likelihood of breach)
64. Thomas S. Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of Contract Remedies, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 341 (1984) (describing different remedies for breach of contract and examining when parties may take them into account).
65. Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 Yale L.J. 615, 617 (1990) (arguing that the Hadley default penalty rule will not incentivize promisees to reveal private information since revealing the value the promisee ascribes to the contract with the promisor would allow the promisor to raise the contract price substantially).
66. Barry E. Adler, The Questionable Ascent of Hadley v. Baxendale, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1547, 1551 (1999) (arguing that parties with private information would not reveal their types when they benefit from the cross subsidization entailed by pooling them with other parties).
67. Eric A. Posner, There Are No Penalty Default Rules in Contract Law, 33 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 563, 586-87 (2006).
68. Eric A. Posner, There Are No Penalty Default Rules in Contract Law, 33 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 563, 586-87 (2006).
69. Eric A. Posner, There Are No Penalty Default Rules in Contract Law, 33 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 563, 586-87 (2006).
70. see also Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Steven Shavell, Reconsidering Contractual Liability and the Incentive to Reveal Information, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1615, 1619-26 (1999) (assessing the Hadley default rule of limited liability and arguing that the rule entails some costs in different situations and should be adopted only where the parties would have most likely wanted it in advance, which makes it a majoritarian default rule)
71. Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 Yale L.J. 615, 617 (1990) (arguing that the Hadley default penalty rule will not incentivize promisees to reveal private information since revealing the value the promisee ascribes to the contract with the promisor would allow the promisor to raise the contract price substantially).
72. see also Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1591, 1593, 1596-06 (1999) (identifying several types of contracting party heterogeneity and showing how they might affect the law's choice among defaults preferred by the majority of contracting parties or those preferred only by a minority).
73. Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 489 (1989) (explaining how nonefficiency theories of contract law could be the source of default rules but arguing that efficiency is the much better source).
74. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 Yale L.J. 541, 569-70 (2003) (arguing that sophisticated parties prefer textualist interpretation of contracts).
75. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 178-199 (1981).
76. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 178-199 (1981).
77. But see Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and Supplementation, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1710, 1723-24 (1997) ("Despite [section 207's] broad formulation, it is assumed that this rule only applies to contracts 'which affect a public interest.' ")
78. see also Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1591, 1593, 1596-06 (1999) (identifying several types of contracting party heterogeneity and showing how they might affect the law's choice among defaults preferred by the majority of contracting parties or those preferred only by a minority).
79. Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (2013). Under a regime of active choice, individuals are forced to decide among various options-the contract cannot be silent with respect to a particular term.
80. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 Yale L.J. 781, 807-08 (2005).
81. See Robert Steinbuch, Kidneys, Cash, and Kashrut: A Legal, Economic, and Religious Analysis of Selling Kidneys, 45 Hous. L. Rev. 1529, 1566 n.268 (2009).
82. See Robert Steinbuch, Kidneys, Cash, and Kashrut: A Legal, Economic, and Religious Analysis of Selling Kidneys, 45 Hous. L. Rev. 1529, 1566 n.268 (2009).
83. See generally Joslyn R. Muller, Comment, Haven't Women Obtained Equality? An Analysis of the Constitutionality of Dower in Michigan, 87 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 533 (2010) (surveying gender-sensitive dower statutes in various states).
84. See generally Joslyn R. Muller, Comment, Haven't Women Obtained Equality? An Analysis of the Constitutionality of Dower in Michigan, 87 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 533 (2010) (surveying gender-sensitive dower statutes in various states).
85. See generally Joslyn R. Muller, Comment, Haven't Women Obtained Equality? An Analysis of the Constitutionality of Dower in Michigan, 87 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 533 (2010) (surveying gender-sensitive dower statutes in various states).
86. We thank Lauren Willis for this example.
87. See Gordon T. Butler, American Paternalism and the One Fund Solution, 9 Wyo. L. Rev. 485, 521 (2009).
88. N. Craig Smith et al., Smart Defaults: From Hidden Persuaders to Adaptive Helpers 18 (INSEAD Working Paper Series, Paper No. 2009/03/ISIC, 2009) available at https:// flora.insead.edu/fichiersti_wp/inseadwp2009/2009-03.pdf. This proposal for "smart defaults" is similar to the "personalized defaults" approaches discussed in the legal literature, although the authors' discussion of smart defaults is quite abbreviated.
89. N. Craig Smith et al., Smart Defaults: From Hidden Persuaders to Adaptive Helpers 18 (INSEAD Working Paper Series, Paper No. 2009/03/ISIC, 2009) available at https:// flora.insead.edu/fichiersti_wp/inseadwp2009/2009-03.pdf. This proposal for "smart defaults" is similar to the "personalized defaults" approaches discussed in the legal literature, although the authors' discussion of smart defaults is quite abbreviated.
90. N. Craig Smith et al., Smart Defaults: From Hidden Persuaders to Adaptive Helpers 18 (INSEAD Working Paper Series, Paper No. 2009/03/ISIC, 2009) available at https:// flora.insead.edu/fichiersti_wp/inseadwp2009/2009-03.pdf. This proposal for "smart defaults" is similar to the "personalized defaults" approaches discussed in the legal literature, although the authors' discussion of smart defaults is quite abbreviated.
91. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 2010, 2021 (2013).
92. Nick Kolakowski, Big Data Spending Will Hit $28 Billion in 2012: Gartner, Slashdot (Oct. 17, 2012), http://slashdot.org/topic/bi/big-data-spending-will-hit-28-billion-in-2012-gartner/.
93. GDP-Countries-List, Trading Economics, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/ country-list/gdp (last visited Feb. 13, 2014).
94. See Somini Sengupta & Claire Cain Miller, Search Option from Facebook Is Privacy Test, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 2013, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/19/technology/ with-graph-search-facebook-bets-on-more-sharing.html.
95. See Marc Perry, Please Be eAdvised, N.Y. Times, July 22, 2012, at ED24, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/22/education/edlife/colleges-awakening-to-the-opportunities-of-data-mining.html.
96. See, e.g., Derrick Harris, Better Medicine, Brought to You by Big Data, GigaOM (July 15, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://gigaom.com/cloud/better-medicine-brought-to-you-by-big-data/?utm_source=Social&utm_medium=twitter&utm_campaign=gigaom.
97. See Laurie Sullivan, Credit Ratings Aid Marketers in Targeting Ads, Media Post News (Aug. 17, 2012, 4:29 PM), http://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/181075/credit-ratings-aid-marketers-in-targeting-ads.html#axzz2F2rHWmiH.
98. Alistair Croll, Big Data Is Our Generation's Civil Rights Issue, and We Don't Know It, O'Reilly Radar (Aug. 2, 2012), http://radar.oreilly.com/2012/08/big-data-is-our-generationscivil-rights-issue-and-we-dont-know-it.html.
99. Bill Carter, Republicans Like Golf, Democrats Prefer Cartoons, TV Research Suggests, N.Y. Times Media Decoder (Oct. 11, 2012, 7:42 PM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes. com/2012/10/11/republicans-like-golf-democrats-prefer-cartoons-tv-research-suggests/?smid= tw-nytimes.
100. See Christi Parsons & Kathleen Hennessey, Obama's Math Geeks Raised the Odds, L.A. Times, Nov. 14, 2012, at A8, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/13/nation/ la-na-obama-analytics-20121113.
101. See, e.g., Natasha Singer, Shoppers, Meet Your Scorekeeper, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 2012, at BU1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/19/business/electronic-scores-rank-consumers-by-potential-value.html (profiling eBureau, a technology company that uses data mining to determine which individuals are likely to be profitable customers for firms).
102. Susanne Craig, Getting to Know You, N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 2012, at D1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/05/dining/what-restaurants-know-about-you.html?pagewanted= all&_r=0.
103. Susanne Craig, Getting to Know You, N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 2012, at D1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/05/dining/what-restaurants-know-about-you.html?pagewanted= all&_r=0.
104. Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction-or-How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Start Preparing for the Data-Driven Future of the Legal Services Industry, 62 Emory L.J. 909 (2013).
105. Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction-or-How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Start Preparing for the Data-Driven Future of the Legal Services Industry, 62 Emory L.J. 909 (2013).
106. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 2010, 2021 (2013).
107. Murray R. Barrick & Michael K. Mount, The Big Five Personality Dimensions and Job Performance: A Meta-Analysis, 44 Personnel Psychol. 1, 1-5 (1991).
108. The legal literature employing the Big Five analysis in a sophisticated way, by contrast, is relatively sparse. For examples of successful interdisciplinary work of this sort, see Stuart P. Green & Matthew B. Kugler, When Is It Wrong to Trade Stocks on the Basis of Non-Public Information? Public Views of the Morality of Insider Trading, 39 Fordham Urb. L.J. 445 (2011)
109. Margaret C. Stevenson & Tracy L. Caldwell, Personality in Juror Decision-Making: Toward an Idiographic Approach in Research, 33 Law & Psychol. Rev. 93 (2009). Although it characterizes individuals in a way that diverges somewhat from the Big Five framework, the Cultural Cognition Project has done the most influential legal work applying research about personality heterogeneity to legal problems.
110. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan et al., Cultural Cognition and Public Policy: The Case of Outpatient Commitment Laws, 34 Law & Hum. Behav. 118 (2010).
111. Baiyun Chen & Justin Marcus, Students' Self-Presentation on Facebook: An Examination of Personality and Self-Construal Factors, 28 Computers in Hum. Behav. 2091, 2097 (2012)
112. Tracii Ryan & Sophia Xenos, Who Uses Facebook? An Investigation into the Relationship Between the Big Five, Shyness, Narcissism, Loneliness, and Facebook Usage, 27 Computers in Hum. Behav. 1658, 1662 (2011).
113. Dana R. Carney et al., The Secret Lives of Liberals and Conservatives: Personality Profiles, Interaction Styles, and the Things They Leave Behind, 29 Pol. Psychol. 807, 824 (2008).
114. David P. Schmitt et al., The Geographic Distribution of Big Five Personality Traits, 38 J. Cross-Cultural Psychol. 173, 185 tbl.2 (2007).
115. See, e.g., John Duckitt, Authoritarianism and Group Identification: A New View of an Old Construct, 10 Pol. Psychol. 63 (1989).
116. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 2010, 2021 (2013).
117. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 2010, 2021 (2013).
118. Margaret C. Stevenson & Tracy L. Caldwell, Personality in Juror Decision-Making: Toward an Idiographic Approach in Research, 33 Law & Psychol. Rev. 93 (2009). Although it characterizes individuals in a way that diverges somewhat from the Big Five framework, the Cultural Cognition Project has done the most influential legal work applying research about personality heterogeneity to legal problems.
119. Cf. Anya Bernstein, The Hidden Costs of Terrorist Watch Lists, 61 Buff. L. Rev. 461, 473-74 (2013) (discussing related problems in the context of governmental use of Big Data to predict national security threats).
120. See Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Judged by the Tin Man: Individual Rights in the Age of Big Data, 11 J. on Telecomm. & High Tech. L. 351, 366 (2013).
121. Gokul Chittaranjan et al., Mining Large-Scale Smartphone Data for Personality Studies, 17 Pers. & Ubiquitous Computing 433 (2013).
122. Gokul Chittaranjan et al., Mining Large-Scale Smartphone Data for Personality Studies, 17 Pers. & Ubiquitous Computing 433 (2013).
123. Jacopo Staiano et al., Friends Don't Lie: Inferring Personality Traits from Social Network Structure, U. Trento Department Info. Engineering & Computer Sci. (Sept. 2012), http://disi.unitn.it/~staiano/pubs/SLAPSP_UBICOMP12.pdf ("[W]e believe that our results have provided compelling evidence that mobile phones-based behavioral data can be superior to survey ones for the purposes of personality classification.").
124. David Pogue, Look Ma! A No-Hands Smartphone!, N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 2013, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/07/technology/personaltech/the-moto-x-fromgoogle-iphones-latest-challenger.html?pagewanted=all.
125. See, e.g., David John Hughes et al., A Tale of Two Sites: Twitter vs. Facebook and the Personality Predictors of Social Media Usage, 28 Computers in Hum. Behav. 561 (2012)
126. Lin Qiu et al., You Are What You Tweet: Personality Expression and Perception on Twitter, 46 J. Res. Personality 710 (2012)
127. J. William Stoughton et al., Big Five Personality Traits Reflected in Job Applicants' Social Media Postings, 16 Cyberpsychology, Behav. & Soc. Networking 800 (2013)
128. Golnoosh Farnadi et al., Recognizing Personality Traits Using Facebook Status Updates, Proc. Seventh Int'l AAAI Conf. on Weblogs & Soc. Media 14 (2013)
129. Daniele Quercia et al., Facebook and Privacy: The Balancing Act of Personality, Gender, and Relationship Currency, Proc. Sixth Int'l AAAI Conf. on Weblogs & Soc. Media 306 (2012).
130. Yoram Bachrach et al., Personality and Patterns of Facebook Usage, Proc. 3rd Ann. ACM Web Sci. Conf. 24 (2012).
131. See Scott R. Peppet, Freedom of Contract in an Augmented Reality: The Case of Consumer Contracts, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 676, 699 (2012) (defining the Internet of Things as "a connected web of 'smart' objects capable of generating and transmitting data on themselves").
132. Charles Duhigg, Psst, You in Aisle 5, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 2012, (Magazine), at MM30, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html?_ r=0.
133. Charles Duhigg, Psst, You in Aisle 5, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 2012, (Magazine), at MM30, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html?_ r=0.
134. Charles Duhigg, Psst, You in Aisle 5, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 2012, (Magazine), at MM30, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html?_ r=0.
135. Benny Evangelista, Online Organs, S.F. Chron., May 2, 2012, at D1, available at http://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/Facebook-hopes-to-expand-organ-donationawareness-3525917.php.
136. Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (2013). Under a regime of active choice, individuals are forced to decide among various options-the contract cannot be silent with respect to a particular term.
137. Zackary Hawley et al., Increasing Organ Donation via Changes in the Default Choice or Allocation Rule 18-19 (Ga. State Univ., Working Paper No. 2012-15, 2012), available at http://excen.gsu.edu/workingpapers/GSU_EXCEN_WP_2012-15.pdf.
138. M. Kalantari-Khandan et al., Personality Characteristics and Mental Health of Organ Donor and Non-Donor Families, 16 World Applied Sci. J. 1183, 1187 (2012).
139. Başar Demir & G. Tarcan Kumkale, Individual Differences in Willingness to Become an Organ Donor: A Decision Tree Approach to Reasoned Action, 55 Personality & Individual Differences 63, 65, 67 (2013).
140. Sophie Bolt et al., Personality and Motivation for Body Donation, 193 Annals of Anatomy 112, 114 (2011).
141. Agreeableness correlated most strongly with organ-donor status and organ-donation support, although this correlation was not significant. Openness and neuroticism also had the anticipated relationships with organ-donation status and attitudes, although they were also not significant.
142. John Duckitt et al., A Tripartite Approach to Right-Wing Authoritarianism: The Authoritarianism-Conservatism-Traditionalism Model, 31 Pol. Psychol. 685 (2010).
143. John Duckitt et al., A Tripartite Approach to Right-Wing Authoritarianism: The Authoritarianism-Conservatism-Traditionalism Model, 31 Pol. Psychol. 685 (2010).
144. See, e.g., Canesi ex rel. Canesi v. Wilson, 730 A.2d 805, 812 (N.J. 1999).
145. Jeremy M. Simon, New Medical FICO Score Sparks Controversy, Questions, Credit-Cards. com (July 28, 2011), http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/fico-score-medication-adherence-1270.php.
146. See generally Gil Siegal et al., Personalized Disclosure by Information-on-Demand: Attending to Patients' Needs in the Informed Consent Process, 40 J.L. Med. & Ethics 359, 360 (2012) (discussing the issues doctors consider when determining how much information to provide to patients in attempting to gain informed consent).
147. With a 95% chance that the patient would consume the drug for a long enough time to render the side effect a possibility, the risk of the side effect is 19 times higher than with a 5% chance. We assume for purposes of simplicity that once the patient uses the drug for a sufficient amount of time, the side effect's likelihood does not increase with the time of consumption. Relaxing this assumption would enhance the risk differentials between the two hypothetical patients.
148. See Gary E. Marchant, Foreword: Law and the New Era of Personalized Medicine, 48 Jurimetrics J. 131 (2008) (introducing a symposium on the law of personalized medicine).
149. Edward R. Morrison & Arpit Gupta, Health Shocks and Household Financial Fragility: Evidence from Automobile Crashes and Consumer Bankruptcy Filings 3 (Feb. 13, 2013) (unpublished draft), available at http://economics.uchicago.edu/workshops/Morrison%20Edward% 20Health%20Shocks.pdf.
150. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 571, 615-16 (1998) (discussing medical malpractice litigation and hindsight bias).
151. Annette Rid & David Wendler, Treatment Decision Making for Incapacitated Patients: Is Development and Use of a Patient Preference Predictor Feasible?, 39 J. Med. & Phil. 130, 131 (2014) [hereinafter Rid & Wendler, Feasibility];
152. Annette Rid & David Wendler, Treatment Decision Making for Incapacitated Patients: Is Development and Use of a Patient Preference Predictor Feasible?, 39 J. Med. & Phil. 130, 131 (2014) [hereinafter Rid & Wendler, Feasibility];
153. see also Annette Rid & David Wendler, Use of a Patient Preference Predictor to Help Make Medical Decisions for Incapacitated Patients, 39 J. Med. & Phil. 104 (2014)
154. Eamonn Ferguson, Personality as a Predictor of Hypochondriacal Concerns: Results from Two Longitudinal Studies, 56 J. Psychosomatic Res. 307, 311 (2004).
155. See, e.g., Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202, 207 (Vt. 1984).
156. See, e.g., P.H. Inv. v. Oliver, 818 P.2d 1018, 1021-22 (Utah 1991).
157. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Moore, 441 N.E.2d 690, 696 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
158. See, e.g., K & S Enters. v. Kennedy Office Supply Co., 520 S.E.2d. 122, 126 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999).
159. See, e.g., K & S Enters. v. Kennedy Office Supply Co., 520 S.E.2d. 122, 126 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999).
160. See Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1353 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
161. See Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1353 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
162. What We Do: Conduct Elections, Nat'l Lab. Rel. Board, http://www.nlrb.gov/whatwe-do/conduct-elections (last visited Nov. 17, 2013).
163. Union Members Summary, Bureau of Lab. Stat., (Jan. 24, 2013, 10:00 AM), http:// www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm. An important caveat is in order. We do not know about workers' preferences regarding unionization in an environment where there are no transaction costs for forming a union. Moreover, some workers' decisions not to be part of a union may result from coercion or collective action problems.
164. See Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Communication Breakdown: Reviving the Role of Discourse in the Regulation of Employee Collective Action, 44 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1091, 1097, 1126-27 (2011).
165. K.R. Parkes & T.D.B. Razavi, Personality and Attitudinal Variables as Predictors of Voluntary Union Membership, 37 Personality & Individual Differences 333, 342-43 (2004).
166. See Kelly L. Zellars et al., Burnout in Health Care: The Role of the Five Factors of Personality, 30 J. Applied Soc. Psychol. 1570, 1588-89 (2000).
167. Michael Ashton et al., Personality Traits of Municipal Politicians and Staff, 50 Can. Pub. Admin. 273, 285 (2007).
168. Murray R. Barrick & Michael K. Mount, The Big Five Personality Dimensions and Job Performance: A Meta-Analysis, 44 Personnel Psychol. 1, 1-5 (1991).
169. Vijaya Murali & Femi Oyebode, Poverty, Social Inequality and Mental Health, 10 Advances in Psychiatric Treatment 216 (2004).
170. We ignore the (realistic) problem of multiple unions competing to represent the same workforce. See generally Agnes Akkerman, Union Competition and Strikes: The Need for Analysis at the Sector Level, 61 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 445, 446-49 (2008) (reviewing comparative data on competition among unions)
171. Ann C. Hodges, Southern Solutions for Wisconsin Woes, 43 U. Tol. L. Rev. 633, 647 (2012) (discussing informal noncompetition arrangements among unions in Virginia).
172. An introductory analysis of these questions is offered in Nicola-Maria Riley, Determinants of Union Membership: A Review, 11 Labour 265 (1997).
173. See, e.g., Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Will Increased Disclosure Help? Evaluating the Recommendations of the ALI's "Principles of the Law of Software Contracts", 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 165, 182 (2011) (pointing out that almost no consumer making transactions through the internet read the contract before accepting it).
174. See, e.g., Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Will Increased Disclosure Help? Evaluating the Recommendations of the ALI's "Principles of the Law of Software Contracts", 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 165, 182 (2011) (pointing out that almost no consumer making transactions through the internet read the contract before accepting it).
175. The guinea pigs' attributes and decisions would be closely scrutinized so that other people would not need to be subjected to high decision costs and such exacting scrutiny.
176. Obviously, the devil is in the details with respect to how these clusters will be created and what happens to consumers whose profiles place them at the borderline between different clusters. For further discussion, see Ankit Agrawal et al., High Performance Big Data Clustering, in Cloud Computing and Big Data 192 (Charlie Catlett et al. eds., 2013).
177. Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 545 (2014).
178. Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 545 (2014).
179. Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 545 (2014).
180. The closest analogue for the guinea pigs proposal in existing legal scholarship would be the sort of legal experimentation proposed in Michael Abramowicz et al., Randomizing Law, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 929 (2011) (proposing randomized trials to test the efficacy of laws and regulations). For another recent article advocating greater regulatory experimentalism, especially continuous learning and updating
181. The closest analogue for the guinea pigs proposal in existing legal scholarship would be the sort of legal experimentation proposed in Michael Abramowicz et al., Randomizing Law, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 929 (2011) (proposing randomized trials to test the efficacy of laws and regulations). For another recent article advocating greater regulatory experimentalism, especially continuous learning and updating
182. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative State, 100 Geo. L.J. 53 (2011).
183. See Clive Thompson, If You Liked This, You're Sure to Love That, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 2008, (Magazine), at MM74, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/23/magazine/23 Netflix-t.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
184. See Clive Thompson, If You Liked This, You're Sure to Love That, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 2008, (Magazine), at MM74, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/23/magazine/23 Netflix-t.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
185. Taste Preferences, Netflix, http://dvd.netflix.com/TastePreferences (last visited Jan. 25, 2014).
186. Securing individuals' active participation in constructing their profiles could also occur under our guinea-pigs scheme: each individual would be able to identify her profile and request changes to it.
187. Charles Duhigg, Psst, You in Aisle 5, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 2012, (Magazine), at MM30, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html?_ r=0.
188. In New York, unless the retailer opts out by displaying a "return and refund policy, " the default rule provides a right to return for cash up to thirty days after the purchase. See N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 218-a (McKinney 2012);
189. In New York, unless the retailer opts out by displaying a "return and refund policy, " the default rule provides a right to return for cash up to thirty days after the purchase. See N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 218-a (McKinney 2012);
190. see also Cal. Civ. Code § 1723 (West 2009) (applying the same default as in New York).
191. If the impersonal default rule is "no right to return, " there is no cross subsidization, although not every consumer gets her preferred default rule, a problem that our personalized default-rule regime aims to resolve.
192. Charles Duhigg, What Does Your Credit-Card Company Know About You?, N.Y. Times, May 17, 2009, (Magazine), at MM40, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/17/ magazine/17credit-t.html?pagewanted=all.
193. Charles Duhigg, What Does Your Credit-Card Company Know About You?, N.Y. Times, May 17, 2009, (Magazine), at MM40, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/17/ magazine/17credit-t.html?pagewanted=all.
194. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Signaling Exhaustion and Perfect Exclusion, 10 J. on Telecomm. & High Tech. L. 321, 327 (2012).
195. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Signaling Exhaustion and Perfect Exclusion, 10 J. on Telecomm. & High Tech. L. 321, 327 (2012).
196. Ian Ayres, Preliminary Thoughts on Optimal Tailoring of Contractual Rules, 3 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 1, 4 & n.15 (1993);
197. George S. Geis, An Experiment in the Optimal Precision of Contract Default Rules, 80 Tul. L. Rev. 1109 (2006).
198. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 557 (1992) (describing the tradeoff between the use of rules and standards in law generally);
199. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685 (1976) (introducing the distinction between rules and standards).
200. Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. Legal Stud. 257, 262-71 (1974) (comparing rules and standards on the complexity dimension); Kaplow, supra note 161 (comparing rules with standards in various dimensions).
201. George S. Geis, An Experiment in the Optimal Precision of Contract Default Rules, 80 Tul. L. Rev. 1109 (2006).
202. George S. Geis, An Experiment in the Optimal Precision of Contract Default Rules, 80 Tul. L. Rev. 1109 (2006).
203. Thompson S.H. Teo, Attitudes Toward Online Shopping and the Internet, 21 Behav. & Info. Tech. 259, 265 (2002) (noting that in 2002 consumer concerns about the security of financial information used to make purchases over the internet remained a significant impediment to e-commerce).
204. Thompson S.H. Teo, Attitudes Toward Online Shopping and the Internet, 21 Behav. & Info. Tech. 259, 265 (2002) (noting that in 2002 consumer concerns about the security of financial information used to make purchases over the internet remained a significant impediment to e-commerce).
205. See generally Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950 (1979) (discussing "shadow of the law" effects in the context of divorce).
206. See generally Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950 (1979) (discussing "shadow of the law" effects in the context of divorce).
207. See Forbo-Giubiasco S.A. v. Congoleum Corp., 516 F. Supp. 1210, 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("The fact that Congoleum used the identical language in the Giubiasco Related Company Clause as it had used six years earlier in the Krommenie Related Company Clause would suggest that the two provisions should be interpreted in the same manner only if the same negotiating context for both contracts existed. However, Congoleum has presented uncontradicted evidence... that the understanding between Congoleum and Giubiasco in 1971 was not the same as the understanding between Congoleum and Krommenie in 1965. ").
208. See, e.g., United States ex rel. B's Co. v. Cleveland Elec. Co. of S.C., 373 F.2d 585, 588 (4th Cir. 1967).
209. Hall v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 691 F.2d 1184, 1194-95, 1195 n.19 (5th Cir. 1982).
210. We note in passing that our analysis of personalization has implications for the law of class-action suits. Class certification is only appropriate under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if the "claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class. " Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). As the consumers' differences become increasingly regularized and the law comes to depend more heavily on the characteristics of particular consumers, the proper scope of class-action litigation will be substantially diminished.
211. See Alex Stein, Foundations of Evidence Law 206-07 (2005).
212. See Alex Stein, Foundations of Evidence Law 206-07 (2005).
213. Cf. Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 Yale L.J. 2032, 2084-09 (2012) (describing sticky default rules as quasimandatory rules and arguing that sometimes the law makes opting out of certain default rules hard, but not impossible, in order to enhance paternalism or prevent externalities).
214. Elizabeth F. Emens, Changing Name Changing: Framing Rules and the Future of Marital Names, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 761 (2007).
215. Elizabeth F. Emens, Changing Name Changing: Framing Rules and the Future of Marital Names, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 761 (2007).
216. Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (2013). Under a regime of active choice, individuals are forced to decide among various options-the contract cannot be silent with respect to a particular term.
217. Elizabeth F. Emens, Changing Name Changing: Framing Rules and the Future of Marital Names, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 761 (2007).
218. Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (2013). Under a regime of active choice, individuals are forced to decide among various options-the contract cannot be silent with respect to a particular term.
219. Elizabeth F. Emens, Changing Name Changing: Framing Rules and the Future of Marital Names, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 761 (2007).
220. Elizabeth F. Emens, Changing Name Changing: Framing Rules and the Future of Marital Names, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 761 (2007).
221. Elizabeth F. Emens, Changing Name Changing: Framing Rules and the Future of Marital Names, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 761 (2007).
222. Elizabeth F. Emens, Changing Name Changing: Framing Rules and the Future of Marital Names, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 761 (2007).
223. Elizabeth F. Emens, Changing Name Changing: Framing Rules and the Future of Marital Names, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 761 (2007).
224. Elizabeth F. Emens, Changing Name Changing: Framing Rules and the Future of Marital Names, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 761 (2007).
225. See Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1649 (2000)
226. Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (2013). Under a regime of active choice, individuals are forced to decide among various options-the contract cannot be silent with respect to a particular term.
227. The crude personalized default would be that men keep their surnames upon marriage, and women adopt their husbands' surnames upon marriage.
228. Elizabeth F. Emens, Changing Name Changing: Framing Rules and the Future of Marital Names, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 761 (2007).
229. Elizabeth F. Emens, Changing Name Changing: Framing Rules and the Future of Marital Names, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 761 (2007).
230. Elizabeth F. Emens, Changing Name Changing: Framing Rules and the Future of Marital Names, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 761 (2007).
231. Elizabeth F. Emens, Changing Name Changing: Framing Rules and the Future of Marital Names, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 761 (2007).
232. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 336-41 (2003) (holding that a holistic higher education admissions process in which race is one of many factors considered survives strict scrutiny).
233. 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
234. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 62.
235. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 62.
236. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 62.
237. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 62.
238. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 62.
239. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 62.
240. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 62.
241. Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (2013). Under a regime of active choice, individuals are forced to decide among various options-the contract cannot be silent with respect to a particular term.
242. See In re Estate of Miltenberger, 737 N.W.2d 513, 519 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007) ("It remains an unfortunate fact that there are still circumstances in which the surviving wife may be significantly disadvantaged, in a way that surviving husbands generally are not, in the absence of dower, and the Legislature may properly consider such circumstances through the enacted dower statute. ").
243. Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (2013). Under a regime of active choice, individuals are forced to decide among various options-the contract cannot be silent with respect to a particular term.
244. Paul M. Schwartz, The E.U.-U.S. Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions and Procedures, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1966, 1974-79 (2013).
245. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Surveillance, and Law, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 245 (2008)
246. Daniel J. Solove, Data Mining and the Security-Liberty Debate, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 343 (2008).
247. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information and Exclusion 127-56 (2011).
248. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 Yale L.J. 2117 (1996).
249. See, e.g., Ethan S. Bernstein, The Transparency Paradox: A Role for Privacy in Organizational Learning and Operational Control, 57 Admin. Sci. Q. 181, 202-04 (2012)
250. Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1904, 1918-27 (2013).
251. Alan F. Westin, "Whatever Works": The American Public's Attitudes Toward Regulation and Self-Regulation on Consumer Privacy Issues, Nat'l Telecomm. & Info. Admin., http:// www.ntia.doc.gov/page/chapter-1-theory-markets-and-privacy (last visited Mar. 26, 2014);
252. Natasha Singer, Do Not Track? Advertisers Say "Don't Tread on Us", N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 2012, at BU3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/14/technology/do-not-trackmovement-is-drawing-advertisers-fire.html.
253. Natasha Singer, Do Not Track? Advertisers Say "Don't Tread on Us", N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 2012, at BU3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/14/technology/do-not-trackmovement-is-drawing-advertisers-fire.html.
254. The default provisions contained in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act concerning the downstream sharing of consumers' financial information are extraordinarily sticky, with only one in 200 consumers opting out of the prosharing statutory default. See Edward J. Janger & Paul M. Schwartz, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Information Privacy, and the Limits of Default Rules, 86 Minn. L. Rev. 1219, 1230 (2002).
255. See Scott R. Peppet, Unraveling Privacy: The Personal Prospectus and the Threat of a Full-Disclosure Future, 105 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1153, 1177-82 (2011)
256. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 2010, 2021 (2013).
257. See, e.g., Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 723 (1999)
258. Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2055 (2004).
259. Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (2013). Under a regime of active choice, individuals are forced to decide among various options-the contract cannot be silent with respect to a particular term.
260. A longitudinal study that tracked people's personality over a nine-year period from ages thirty-three to forty-two found very high levels of consistency in each of the Big Five characteristics among both men and women. See Johanna Rantanen et al., Long-Term Stability in the Big Five Personality Traits in Adulthood, 48 Scandinavian J. Psychol. 511, 515 (2007)
261. Stephen Soldz & George E. Vaillant, The Big Five Personality Traits and the Life Course: A 45-Year Longitudinal Study, 33 J. Res. Personality 208 (1999).
262. Kerry L. Jang et al., Heritability of the Big Five Personality Dimensions and Their Facets: A Twin Study, 64 J. Personality 577, 577 (1996).
263. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 647, 684-90 (2011).
264. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 647, 684-90 (2011).
265. See, e.g., Jacob B. Hirsh et al., Personalized Persuasion: Tailoring Persuasive Appeals to Recipients' Personality Traits, 23 Psychol. Sci. 578 (2012).
266. See, e.g., Jacob B. Hirsh et al., Personalized Persuasion: Tailoring Persuasive Appeals to Recipients' Personality Traits, 23 Psychol. Sci. 578 (2012).
267. See, e.g., Jacob B. Hirsh et al., Personalized Persuasion: Tailoring Persuasive Appeals to Recipients' Personality Traits, 23 Psychol. Sci. 578 (2012).
268. Kavita Kumar, Shoppers with Smartphones Put Retailers in Glass Boxes, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Feb. 15, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.stltoday.com/business/local/mobile-shoppers-shaking-up-retail-industry/article_4fccd0af-7447-5f2f-8f81-45d52e56520b.html.
269. See, e.g., Richard H. Thaler & Will Tucker, Smarter Information, Smarter Consumers, Harv. Bus. Rev., Jan.-Feb. 2013, at 3
270. Elisa Brody, Product Attribute Information and Product Use Information: Smart Disclosure and New Policy Implications for Consumers' Protection (Sept. 25, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfm?abstract_id=2142734.
271. See generally Gil Siegal et al., Personalized Disclosure by Information-on-Demand: Attending to Patients' Needs in the Informed Consent Process, 40 J.L. Med. & Ethics 359, 360 (2012) (discussing the issues doctors consider when determining how much information to provide to patients in attempting to gain informed consent).
272. See generally Gil Siegal et al., Personalized Disclosure by Information-on-Demand: Attending to Patients' Needs in the Informed Consent Process, 40 J.L. Med. & Ethics 359, 360 (2012) (discussing the issues doctors consider when determining how much information to provide to patients in attempting to gain informed consent).
273. See generally Gil Siegal et al., Personalized Disclosure by Information-on-Demand: Attending to Patients' Needs in the Informed Consent Process, 40 J.L. Med. & Ethics 359, 360 (2012) (discussing the issues doctors consider when determining how much information to provide to patients in attempting to gain informed consent).
274. See generally Gil Siegal et al., Personalized Disclosure by Information-on-Demand: Attending to Patients' Needs in the Informed Consent Process, 40 J.L. Med. & Ethics 359, 360 (2012) (discussing the issues doctors consider when determining how much information to provide to patients in attempting to gain informed consent).
275. See generally Gil Siegal et al., Personalized Disclosure by Information-on-Demand: Attending to Patients' Needs in the Informed Consent Process, 40 J.L. Med. & Ethics 359, 360 (2012) (discussing the issues doctors consider when determining how much information to provide to patients in attempting to gain informed consent).
276. To the extent that a patient or consumer is informed of the right to opt out, it may cause some stress, especially during the transition to personalized disclosure. Decisions to trust guinea pigs will resemble leaps of faith that would decrease as time passes and as consumers become more comfortable with using guinea pigs' preferences as proxies.
277. See generally Gil Siegal et al., Personalized Disclosure by Information-on-Demand: Attending to Patients' Needs in the Informed Consent Process, 40 J.L. Med. & Ethics 359, 360 (2012) (discussing the issues doctors consider when determining how much information to provide to patients in attempting to gain informed consent).
278. By contrast, we would support legal liability for negligent or reckless profiling that results in harm because an individual was incorrectly categorized.
279. See Adam M. Samaha, Litigant Sensitivity in First Amendment Law, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1291 (2004).
280. See, e.g., Dennis Klimchuck, Causation, Thin Skulls, and Equality, 11 Can. J.L. & Jurisprudence 115, 124 (1998).
281. One research paper suggests that juvenile recidivists and nonrecidivists differ significantly in terms of Big Five agreeableness and neuroticisms, with repeat offenders scoring higher on neuroticism and lower on agreeableness. The paper also finds that offenders in general are less agreeable and less open to new experiences than nonoffenders. Coleta van Dam et al., PEN, Big Five, Juvenile Delinquency and Criminal Recidivism, 39 Personality & Individual Differences 7, 14 (2005). If these results are generalizable-the research is very sparse-they suggest that personality might be relevant in personalizing sentencing and parole decisions as well as in developing offender profiles. That said, we have normative misgivings about such an approach to criminal law in light of concerns about stigmatization, incorrect use, and manipulability. These concerns become particularly forceful in light of personality's strong genetic component.
282. Kerry L. Jang et al., Heritability of the Big Five Personality Dimensions and Their Facets: A Twin Study, 64 J. Personality 577, 577 (1996).