On the Supposed Evidence for Libertarian Paternalism

Review of Philosophy and Psychology

Volumn 6, Issue 3, 2015, Pages 361-383

  Gigerenzer, Gerd ^a  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84937475164     PISSN: 18785158     EISSN: 18785166     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s13164-015-0248-1     Document Type: Article

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