Harry Potter and the sorcerer's scope: Latent scope biases in explanatory reasoning

Memory and Cognition

Volumn 39, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 527-535

  Khemlani, Sangeet S ^a   Sussman, Abigail B ^a   Oppenheimer, Daniel M ^a  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Causal reasoning; Explanations; Latent scope

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; COGNITION; FANTASY; HUMAN; INDIVIDUALITY; INTERNET; LEARNING; LINGUISTICS; LITERATURE; MENTAL FUNCTION; PROBLEM SOLVING; READING; SEMANTICS;

ASSOCIATION LEARNING; COGNITION; FANTASY; HUMANS; INDIVIDUALITY; INTERNET; LITERATURE, MODERN; MENTAL PROCESSES; PROBABILITY LEARNING; PROBLEM SOLVING; PSYCHOLINGUISTICS; READING; SEMANTICS;

EID: 79960068677     PISSN: 0090502X     EISSN: 15325946     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3758/s13421-010-0028-1     Document Type: Article

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