Philosophers' biased judgments persist despite training, expertise and reflection

Cognition

Volumn 141, Issue , 2015, Pages 127-137

  Schwitzgebel, Eric ^a   Cushman, Fiery ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Expertise; Framing effects; Loss aversion; Order effects; Reasoning; Social cognition

Indexed keywords

ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT; ADOLESCENT; ADULT; AGED; ARTICLE; CONTROLLED STUDY; DECISION MAKING; ENDOWMENT EFFECT; FEMALE; FRAMING BIAS; HUMAN; MAJOR CLINICAL STUDY; MALE; MEDICAL ETHICS; MORALITY; PHILOSOPHY; PRIORITY JOURNAL; RESPONSE TIME; TRAINING; MIDDLE AGED; PERCEPTION;

ADULT; FEMALE; HUMANS; JUDGMENT; MALE; MIDDLE AGED; MORALS; PHILOSOPHY; SOCIAL PERCEPTION;

EID: 84929318115     PISSN: 00100277     EISSN: 18737838     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2015.04.015     Document Type: Article

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