How not to test for philosophical expertise

Synthese

Volumn 192, Issue 2, 2015, Pages 431-452

  Rini, Regina A ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Expertise defense; Methodology; Moral intuition; Philosophical intuition

Indexed keywords

EID: 84925486882     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-014-0579-y     Document Type: Article

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