Erratum to: NEUROMEDIA, EXTENDED KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING: Neuromedia, Extended Knowledge and Understanding (Philosophical Issues, (2014), 24, 1, (299-313), 10.1111/phis.12035);Neuromedia, extended knowledge and understanding

Nous-Supplement: Philosophical Issues

Volumn 24, Issue 1, 2014, Pages 299-313

  Lynch, Michael Patrick ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84927607311     PISSN: 15336077     EISSN: 17582237     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/phis.12134     Document Type: Erratum

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