Extended cognition meets epistemology

Philosophical Explorations

Volumn 15, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 107-119

  Adams, Fred ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE   (United States)

Author keywords

ability credit theories; epistemology; extended mind; tracking theories

Indexed keywords

EID: 84861759537     PISSN: 13869795     EISSN: 17415918     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2012.670717     Document Type: Article

References (25)

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