Truth as One and Many

Truth as One and Many

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 1-216

  Lynch, Michael P ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT   (United States)

Author keywords

Alethic functionalism; Deflationism; Moral truth; Pluralism; Realism; Theories of truth

Indexed keywords

EID: 77952915860     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218738.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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