Epistemic extendedness, testimony, and the epistemology of instrument-based belief

Philosophical Explorations

Volumn 15, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 181-197

  Goldberg, Sanford C ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

assertion; epistemic norms; instruments; testimony

Indexed keywords

EID: 84861739100     PISSN: 13869795     EISSN: 17415918     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2012.670719     Document Type: Review

References (12)

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3. Goldberg, S. 2007. Anti-individualism: Mind and language, knowledge and justification. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
4. Goldberg, S. 2010a. Relying on others: An essay in epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
5. Goldberg, S. 2010b. Putting the norm of assertion to work: The case of testimony. In Assertion, ed. J. Brown and H. Cappelen, 175-96. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
6. Goldberg, S. 2011. The division of epistemic labor. Episteme 8: 112-25.
7. Goldberg, S. Forthcoming. A reliabilist foundationalist coherentism. Erkenntnis. Goldberg, S. Draft. Assertion: A philosophical essay.
8. Goldman, A. 1979. What is justified belief? In Justification and knowledge, ed. G. Pappas, 1-23. Dordrecht
9. D. Reidel. Goldman, A. 1986. Epistemology and cognition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
10. Grice, P. 1957. Meaning. Philosophical Review 66: 377-88.
11. Moran, R. 2007. Getting told and being believed. In The epistemology of testimony, ed. J. Lackey and E. Sosa, 272-306. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
12. Williamson, T. 1996. Knowing and asserting. Philosophical Review 105: 489-523.