EPISTEMIC COMMITMENTS, EPISTEMIC AGENCY AND PRACTICAL REASONS

Philosophical Issues

Volumn 23, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 343-362

  Lynch, Michael P ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84886706564     PISSN: 15336077     EISSN: 17582237     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/phis.12018     Document Type: Article

References (25)

1. Alston, W. P. 1989. "Epistemic Circularity." In Epistemic Justification, by W. P. Alston (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).
2. Alston, W. P. 1993. The Reliability of Sense Perception. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).
3. Bergmann, Michael. 2006. "Epistemic Circularity Malignant and Benign." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69: 709-727.
4. Boghossian, Paul. 2006. Fear of Knowledge. (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
5. Christensen, David. 2007. "Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News." Philosophical Review 116(2): 187-217.
6. Cohen, L. Jonathan. 1989. "Belief and Acceptance." Mind 98: 367-389.
7. Cohen, Rachel. 1997. "The Common Point of View in Hume's Ethics." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57: 827-850.
8. Feldman, Richard. 2007. "Reasonable Religious Disagreements." In Louise Antony, ed., Philosophers Without Gods: Meditations on Atheism and the Secular Life. (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 194-214.
9. Fumerton, Richard. 1995. Metaepistemology and Skepticism. (Lanham, MA: Rowman and Littlefield).
10. Hazlett, Allan. 2013. "Review of In Praise of Reason." Forthcoming in International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
11. Hume, David. 1975. Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals in Enquires Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. I. A. Selby-Brigge 3rd ed. Revised by P. H. Nidditch. (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
12. Kelly, Thomas. 2005. "The Epistemic Signifance of Disagreement." In T. S. Gendler and J. Hawthorne, eds., Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Vol. 1. (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 167-196.
13. Kornblith, Hilary. 2002. Knowledge and its Place in Nature. (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
14. Lynch, Michael. 2009. Truth as One and Many. (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
15. Lynch, Michael. 2012. In Praise of Reason. (Cambridge: MIT Press).
16. Lynch, Michael. 2010. "Epistemic Disagreement and Epistemic Incommensurability." In A. Haddock, A. Millar, and D. Pritchard, eds., Social Epistemology. (Oxford: Oxford University Press.
17. Nagel, Thomas. 1997. The Last Word. (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
18. Pritchard, Duncan. 2005. Epistemic Luck. (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
19. Pritchard, Duncan. 2009. "Epistemic Relativism, Epistemic Incommensurability and Wittgensteinian Epistemology." In S. Hales, ed., The Blackwell Companion to Relativism. (Oxford: Blackwell).
20. Reed, Baron. 2006. "Epistemic Circularity Squared? Skepticism about Common Sense." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73: 186-197.
21. Sosa, Ernest. 1997. "How to Resolve the Pyrrhonian Problematic: A Lesson from Descartes." Philosophical Studies 85: 229-249.
22. Sosa, Ernest. 1997. "Reflective Knowledge in the Best of Circles." Journal of Philosophy 94: 410-430.
23. Stroud, Barry. 1994. "Skepticism, "Externalism" and the Goal of Epistemology." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 68: 291-307.
24. Whitcomb, Dennis. 2012. "In Praise of Reason" (review) Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2012.09.08.
25. Wright, Crispin. 2004. "Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)?" Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78(1): 167-212.