Minimalism and the value of truth

Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 54, Issue 217, 2004, Pages 497-517

  Lynch, Michael P ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 60949220691     PISSN: 00318094     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2004.00369.x     Document Type: Article

References (32)

1. See, for example, numerous articles by Richard Rorty, including 'Is Truth a Goal of Inquiry? Donald Davidson vs Crispin Wright', repr. in M.P. Lynch (ed.), The Nature of Truth (MIT Press, 2001), pp. 259-87
2. and 'Universality and Truth', in R. Brandom (ed.), Rorty and his Critics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), pp. 1-30
3. B. Allen, Truth in Philosophy (Harvard UP, 1993)
4. See, e.g., Rorty, 'Is Truth a Goal of Inquiry?', p. 279
5. See M. Dummett, 'Truth', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 59 (1958), pp. 141-62
6. and H. Putnam, 'Does the Disquotational Theory of Truth Solve All Philosophical Problems?', repr. in his Words and Life (Harvard UP, 1995), pp. 264-78
7. See, e.g., Horwich, 'Norms of Truth and Meaning', in R. Schantz (ed.), What is Truth? (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2001), pp. 133-45
8. B. Williams, Truth and Truthfulness (Princeton UP, 2002)
9. S. Blackburn, 'Reason, Virtue and Knowledge', in A. Fairweather and L. Zagzebski (eds), Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility (Oxford UP, 2001), pp. 15-29, at p. 23
10. W.James, Pragmatism and the Meaning of Truth (Harvard UP, 1975), p. 42
11. The distinction between thick and thin values stems from Bernard Williams: see, e.g., his Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Harvard UP, 1985), p. 128
12. Williams applies the distinction to concepts, as opposed to properties as I do here. Adam Kovach claims that truth is a thick value-concept, 'Truth as a Value Concept', in A. Chapuis and A. Gupta (eds), Circularity, Definition and Truth (New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 2000), pp. 199-215
13. See for example, P. Engel, 'Is Truth a Norm?', in P. Kotatko et al. (eels), Interpreting Davidson (CSLI Publications, 2001), pp. 37-50
14. See Horwich, 'Norms of Truth and Meaning', p. 143
15. Williams, Truth and Truthfulness, pp. 65-6
16. Frankfurt, 'Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person', repr. in The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge UP, 1988), pp. 11-25
17. Horwich, Truth, 2nd edn (Oxford UP, 1998)
18. Horwich, Truth, 2nd edn
19. Meaning (Oxford UP, 1998), p. 190 1
20. and 'Norms of Truth and Meaning', in Schantz (ed.), What is Truth?, pp. 133-45
21. 'Norms of Truth and Meaning', pp. 140-1
22. Horwich, Meaning, p. 104
23. and 'A Defense of Minimalism', in Lynch (ed.), The Nature of Truth, pp. 559-78, at p. 560
24. For detailed discussions of particularism, see B. Hooker and M. Little (eds), Moral Particularism (Oxford UP, 2000)
25. R.M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), p. 60
26. R. Kraut, 'Robust Deflationism', Philosophical Review, 102 (1993), pp. 247-63
27. The first advocate of an expressivist view, as I understand him, was P.F. Strawson: see his 'Truth', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. 24 (1950), pp. 129-56
28. Brandom, 'Pragmatism, Phenomenalism and Truth-Talk', in P. French et al. (eds), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. XII: Realism and Anti-Realism (Minnesota UP, 1988), pp. 75-94, at p. 83
29. Rorty sometimes makes remarks tending in this direction: see, e.g., his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton UP, 1978), pp. 307-8
30. P. Boghossian, 'The Status of Content', Philosophical Review, 99 (1990), pp. 157-84
31. Blackburn, for example, often emphasizes this point with regard to moral expressivism: see his Ruling Passions (Oxford UP, 1998)
32. Field, Truth in the Absence of Fact (Oxford UP, 2001), p. 121