Coalitional Politics and Logrolling in Legislative Institutions

American Journal of Political Science

Volumn 44, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 261-277

  Carrubba, Clifford J ^a   Volden, Craig ^b  

^a STONY BROOK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b CLAREMONT GRADUATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034418766     PISSN: 00925853     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2669309     Document Type: Article

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